Moral theology for hedgehogs: Ronald Dworkin's theory of justice

Abstract

After decades of studies that emphasized the necessity of a moral reading of the law, the American philosopher Ronald Dworkin published in 2011 the book Justice for Hedgehogs in which he explicitly presents his theory of justice. This paper analyzes the theory exposed, showing the structure of Dworkin’s arguments, showing how he adopts an Aristotelian methodology (which elaborates interpretations able to attribute meaning to effective social practices) that leads to the Platonic conclusion that affirms a fundamental unit of values. It is held at the end of this ethical project is not consistent because the analysis of effective practices do not to lead to the recognition of the unity of the Good, but only to the recognition that the liberal tradition adopted by Dworkin has a universalist discourse based on the existence of a unitary concept of Good. Thus, the moral understanding of the morality proposed by Dworkin generates a discourse that is more theological than philosophical, because it maintains its validity in denying the possibility of a philosophical critique that questions the moral assumptions of the author.