A DISCUSSION ABOUT THE “ONLY CORRECT ANSWER” FROM THE THEORIES OF DWORKIN, ALEXY AND FINNIS LEGAL REASONING
Keywords:
Philosophy of Law, Theory of Law, Legal reasoning, Dworkin, Alexy, FinnisAbstract
This study aims to analyze the extent to which practical reasoning in general and legal reasoning in particular are capable of determining a single correct answer. In order to answer this question, using the bibliographic review as a methodology, the work presents a description of the affirmative thesis of the only correct answer in Dworkin. Subsequently, it addresses the criticisms of the affirmative thesis formulated from the theories of law by Alexy and Finnis. It was concluded that the distinction made by Finnis between the technical dimension and the moral dimension of legal reasoning is extremely useful to explain the possibilities and limitations of the reason for arriving at a single correct answer. Thus, on the technical side of legal reasoning, it would be possible to identify an option as the most correct or fair, in which there would be a unit of measurement that would make it possible to determine with great precision which solution best fits the specific case. Thus, determining the correct legal responses is certainly a problematic issue in the moral dimension of legal reasoning, when the legal interpreter may have several morally acceptable options that are immeasurable.
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