Agents who write, but do not sign
on the presence of artificial agents in institutional environments
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v13i2.57728Keywords:
Generative Artificial Intelligence. Artificial Agents. Institutional Facts. John Searle.Abstract
Generative artificial intelligence systems already have productive abilities similar or equivalent to those of humans, but their ability to actively participate in institutional contexts related to such productions remains a barrier to be overcome. In this article, I discuss the problem associated with the inclusion of artificial agents in institutional environments. Based on John Searle's theory of institutional facts, I present the conditions under which agents can be considered situated in them. In conclusion, I show that artificial generative agents are not capable of satisfying such conditions, much less of adequately perceiving the institutional reality in which they are already inevitably inserted.
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