Intentionality and consciousness by Searle

Authors

  • Joelma Marques de Carvalho Universidade Estadual do Ceará - UFC

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v4i2.12550

Keywords:

Searle, Intentionality, Consciousness, Unconsciousness, Background, Ontological status

Abstract

The objective of this article is to present a critical analysis about the relation between intentionality and consciousness in John Searle. According to this author, these phenomena are closely related to each other, but the concepts of intentionality and consciousness are not equivalent and neither of them comprises the other completely, for the preposition “of” in expressions with intentionality does not mean the same as the preposition “of” in expressions with consciousness. However, by means of a deeper analysis of Searle’s theory of mind, especially about the ontological status of the content of unconscious states, it is possible to see that the separation between intentionality and consciousness defended by Searle is questionable.

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Author Biography

Joelma Marques de Carvalho, Universidade Estadual do Ceará - UFC

Possui graduação no curso de licenciatura em filosofia pela Universidade Estadual do Ceará (UECE) em 2002, mestrado em filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) em 2005 e doutorado em filosofia (sub-área: psicologia) pela Ludwig Maximilians Universität (LMU) em 2011. Foi bolsista na graduação da Funcap e do Cnpq e teve bolsa da Capes durante o mestrado e doutorado em convênio com o DAAD. Atualmente é coordenadora do curso de graduação em filosofia (licenciatura e bacharelado) e professora adjunta da Universidade Federal do Ceará com experiência nas áreas de filosofia da mente, filosofia da linguagem, fenomenologia, lógica e ensino de filosofia.

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Published

2017-05-21

How to Cite

CARVALHO, Joelma Marques de. Intentionality and consciousness by Searle. Journal of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, [S. l.], v. 4, n. 2, p. 54–66, 2017. DOI: 10.26512/rfmc.v4i2.12550. Disponível em: https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/12550. Acesso em: 13 may. 2024.

Issue

Vol. 4 No. 2 (2016)

Section

Articles

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