Brentano and the Ideality of Time

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v9i2.42918

Palabras clave:

Brentano. Time. Hume. Intentionality.

Resumen

How is it possible to have present memory experiences of things that, being past, are no longer presently experienced? A possible answer to this long-standing philosophical question is what I call the “ideality of time view,” namely the view that temporal succession is unreal. In this paper I outline the basic idea behind Brentano’s version of the ideality of time view. Additionally, I contrast it with Hume’s version, suggesting that, despite significant differences, it can nonetheless be construed as broadly Humean.

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Biografía del autor/a

Denis Seron, University of Liège, Belgium

Doctor in Philosophy (PhD Universidade de Liège, Bélgica). FNRS senior research associate at the University of Liège (Belgium).

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Publicado

2021-08-31