From the Empty of the “Meinen” (Mean) to the Whole of the “Lebensform” (Form of Life) in the Second Wittgenstein

Abstract

The fascination with the process inherent to understanding has always been something that has disturbed Philosophy with its question: what makes understanding possible? On the contrary, little attention has been paid to the use we make of this term. This took it out of its context and investigated it as related to a mental process, situated in the subject. This approach generated some questions, among them: if understanding and the processes involved in it take place in the mind, how can one have access to them? How do you know what’s on the other’s mind? This text intends to present the role played, both by the verb meinen (to mean), in its disconnection with mental processes, in terms of its grammar, and by the expression lebensform (form of life), in Philosophical Investigations, as a condition in which, both the meinen has its most authentic use, as well as the background that makes it possible to understand the Investigations as a whole.