Why does pluralism matter to epistemology?

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v6i1.20237

Keywords:

Pluralism. Robustness. Coherence. Cognitive values. Philosophical knowledge.

Abstract

In this text a reflection about pluralism as a cognitive value, both in the domain of scientific knowledge and that of philosophical knowledge, is attempted. A few distinct forms of pluralism are presented at the outset that characterize various dimensions of scientific knowledge, with special attention being paid to pluralism of scientific themes, styles of thinking, theories, methodologies, and forms of rationality. Afterwards, the outline of an argument is presented with an aim at establishing the importance of pluralism as a value for scientific knowledge, insofar as pluralism would, within the scope of a coherentist view, increase the robustness of knowledge. Finally, the transposition of the argument is attempted towards the domain of philosophical knowledge, thus establishing pluralism as a value whose satisfaction would be desirable in philosophy as well. In order for this transposition to be possible, it is necessary to consider the problem of the distinction between science and philosophy taken as forms of knowledge, as well as the latter’s alleged lack of empirical character. Certain objections of a general nature to the view advanced here are taken into account, and it is maintained that a realization of pluralism to a high degree does not lead necessarily to either stagnation and conservatism or to the fragmentation of knowledge.

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Author Biography

Valter Alnis Bezerra, Universidade de São Paulo

Departamento de Filosofia - Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo.

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Published

2018-12-10

How to Cite

BEZERRA, Valter Alnis. Why does pluralism matter to epistemology?. Journal of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, [S. l.], v. 6, n. 1, p. 187–208, 2018. DOI: 10.26512/rfmc.v6i1.20237. Disponível em: https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/20237. Acesso em: 22 jul. 2024.