Abrantes, o Naturalismo e o Teísmo

Resumen

This article intends to expound and discuss Paulo Abrantes’ main theses about naturalism, one of the subjects he has dealt with most extensively in his academic career. Taking into account his most important works on the matter, this text analyses Abrantes’ exposition of naturalism in epistemology and philosophy of science, as well as in philosophy of mind and metaphysics. He shows the great diversity of proposals under the label of “naturalist” in those areas of philosophical enquiry. Abrantes points out to a basic distinction between metaphysical and methodological naturalism. Although he indicates the possibility of a methodologically neutral naturalism, he seems to be more inclined to admit that even the methodological version of it has to assume some ontological commitments. In view of the contrast with theistic metaphysics, which helps to understand better what unifies the different varieties of naturalism, the article evaluates the arguments in favor of the minimal ontological naturalism admitted by Abrantes. As a result, it proposes that, in order to better understand naturalism both in philosophy and in natural sciences, the neutral methodological version is the most recommended.