The Question of Time in Martin Heideggers Phenomenology

Abstract

This article constitutes a brief exegesis on the question of time in Heidegger's phenomenology. In the Second Section of the work Being and Time, and in the work The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger discusses the existential problem as a determination of Dasein by temporality to show, in the end, how the perspective of Being as temporality is fundamentally different (and founding) from the perspective of Being as temporality. historical and immediate perspective of subsistence (timelessness, permanence as infinity) for the meaning of Being. Such a perception of subsistence, for the philosopher, is based on the temporal-historical-circumscribed handling of a World of meaning – which already gives such a perspective a character of time, of movement. Heidegger wants to show that the subsistence perspective, which, according to him, founds all the assumptions of the History of Philosophy as Metaphysics, is based on the temporal structure of understanding; it is founded, therefore, on mobility, consequently, on finitude.