REBUILDING THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: A REALISTIC OVERLOOK AT THE SUPREME COURT’S PLACE IN POLITICS
Keywords:
Judicial independence. Brazilian Supreme Court. Realist constitutional law.Abstract
In this article, I seek to present a conceptual reconstruction of judicial independence that is
useful for a realistic analysis of the Federal Supreme Court in the Brazilian political system. I
argue against most of the Brazilian scholarship that insists on a sterile contraposition between
politics and law that elevates the court to an Olympic position of neutrality, impartiality and
independence, before which institutional considerations do not gain space. My proposal is to
contribute to a non-idealized concept of judicial independence. At the outset, I return to the
historical origins of the concern with the independence of judges and courts from the debate
between federalists and anti-federalists. Afterwards, I bring the discussion to the present,
presenting the distinction between de jure independence and de facto independence, and
analyzing the formal and informal characteristics of the Supreme and its context. All this
allows us to arrive at a more realistic diagnosis about the place of the STF in politics.
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