On Ur-intentionality

Auteurs-es

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v9i2.42920

Mots-clés :

Ur-intentionality. Radical enactivism. Teleosemantics. Basic cognition. Content ascriptivism.

Résumé

Starting from Brentano’s classical characterization of intentionality, we review the radical enactivist proposal about basic cognition and show that the underlying assumption that stripping teleosemantics of its representationalist commitments results in no explanatory loss is unwarranted. Significant features of basic cognition are lost, or so we argue, with the RECtification of teleosemantics that are retrieved by means of an alternative dubbed metaphysically non-committal content-ascriptivism.

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Bibliographies de l'auteur-e

Ludovic Soutif, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, PUC-Rio

Atualmente é Professor Associado do PPG em Filosofia da PUC-Rio e Presidente da Sociedade Brasileira de Filosofia Analítica (gestão 2021-2023). Possui Agrégation em Filosofia pela Universidade de Paris Ouest-Nanterre (1994), Mestrado (1997) e Doutorado (2005) em Filosofia pela Universidade Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne. Foi Visiting Fellow com bolsas Fulbright e Arthur Sachs em Harvard University (2000-2001), pensionnaire com bolsa Lavoisier da Maison Française dOxford (2001-2002) e Visiting Researcher nos Wittgenstein Archives of the University of Bergen (2002, 2003, 2004) com bolsa ARI da União Europeia. Fez pós-doutorado com bolsa FAPESP na Universidade de São Paulo (2008-2010). Foi pesquisador associado ao Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência (CLE) da UNICAMP, com bolsa PDS do CNPq (2021-2022).

Carlos Márquez, Universidade de São Paulo, USP

Doutor em Filosofia pela Universidade Nacional de Colombia (2016), graduado em Filosofia (2004) e Mestre em Filosofia (2007) da Universidade Nacional de Colombia. Pós-doutorado Junior na Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (2016-2017) com apoio do CNPq proc. 152155/2016-3 e Pesquisador de pós-doutorado na Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo FFLCH-USP (2018-2021) com bolsa da FAPESP proc. 2018/04058-7. Tem experiência nas áreas de Lógica, Filosofia de Linguagem e Filosofia da Mente. Atuando principalmente nos seguintes temas: teorias do significado e do conteúdo cognitivo, epistemológia analítica, referencia singular, intencionalidade, cognição situada e dinámica, representação e percepção de objetos, e representação espacial.

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Publié-e

2021-08-31

Comment citer

SOUTIF, Ludovic; MÁRQUEZ, Carlos. On Ur-intentionality. Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, [S. l.], v. 9, n. 2, p. 79–99, 2021. DOI: 10.26512/rfmc.v9i2.42920. Disponível em: https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/fmc/article/view/42920. Acesso em: 22 nov. 2024.

Numéro

Vol. 9 No. 2 (2021): Dossiê "Franz Brentano"

Rubrique

Dossier

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(c) Tous droits réservés Journal of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy 2021

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