Logical Pluralism, Monism and Relativism

Abstract

Is there only one logic? Or are there several equally adequate logics? What does it mean, after all, that different logics can be equally adequate? And they would be adequate with respect to what? This article intends to analyze the different answers to these questions, that is, we will evaluate the central arguments of the debate between pluralism, relativism and logical monism. We will explain, on the one hand, the main assumptions of this discussion and, on the other hand, its philosophical ramifications. We will end by indicating the development of a possible logical pluralism using the notion of paraconsistentization of logics, which will be explained afterward. We do not intend to refute, once and for all, logical monism. We will show that the main arguments put forward by a monist against logical pluralism are unsound and therefore the existence of some form of logical pluralism remains possible.