IMPEACHING STF JUSTICES:

BETWEEN THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL AND THE INSTITUTIONAL COOPTATION

Abstract

Constitutionally designated as an accountability instrument of the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) justices, the impeachment has been increasingly triggered since 2019. Used to control potential excessive behaviors, as well as to contest judicial decisions, it presents challenges to the President of the Brazilian Senate, responsible for its admissibility procedure. In this empirical study, I describe and analyze the reasons and misconducts claimed by the petitioners, as well as the responses given by the Senate when rejecting the impeachment requests. I observe that requests have been politically used: they are increasingly moved by deputies and senators and plenty of them seek the removal of all ministers from the Court. The Senate, on the other hand, has played its roll politically: aalthough their decisions have taken on an increasing argumentative burden, the Senators have postponed the inadmissibility decisions, making impeachment a threatening institute applicable at any time. The plurality of usages and intentions regarding the impeachment tool demands caution on its handling in order to avoid its discretionary and authoritarian use.