Realizing Who I Am
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v9i1.41032Mots-clés :
Self-Knowledge. Second Person. Practical Knowledge.Résumé
In this paper, the old view of self-knowledge as a practical achievement is vindicated. Constitutivism, the view that connects self-knowledge to the rational agency, thus taking a step towards this practical dimension, is discussed first. But their assumption of an epistemic asymmetry that privileges self-knowledge is found mistaken. The practical dimension of self-knowledge, its potential transformative power, is accounted in terms of the interiorization of the concepts acquired in intersubjective interaction.
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