Liberdade e vontade: Schelling, leitor de Lutero

Résumé

After a general introduction to the subject, a fundamental problem is identified for any comparative study of Schelling and Luther, namely the issue of necessity and freedom in the understandings of both human being and God. In this connection, a discussion ensues concerning, first, he concept of human beings as free and grounded their own will. This step brings to light the anthropological and ethical core into which positive theology and speculative philosophy may prima facie converge. Varying specificities and assumptions are also detected insofar as they both bring near, and keep apart, Luther’s and Schelling’s perspectives as they arise from their different contexts and interests. Among those assumptions is the struggle for the specific contours and place of the concept of God as it moves, noticeably so in the case of Schelling, between theism and a pantheism of freedom and the will. Eventually the conclusion is drawn that Schelling’s stance, though close enough to Luther’s, reflects a rather indirect reading which, concerning the essentials, goes well beyond the latter’s starting point and goal.