Intentionality in Tomasello, Searle, Dennett and Behavioral Approaches to Human Cognition
Keywords:
Intentionality, Human cognition, Tomasello, Philosophy of mind, Behavior psychologyAbstract
The approach of Tomasello to the evolution of human cognition attempts to integrate biological, behavioral, and cultural processes within a sole explicative system. A fundamental critic towards it has been the need of a better elaboration of the concept of intentionality. The present paper aimed to: (1) analyze Tomasello’s use of the concept of intentionality, and (2) establish dialogues between this use and theories of intentionality in the philosophy of mind and functionalist approaches to human cognition in behavior psychology. The results of this paper indicate that Tomasello’s use of the concept of intentionality is compatible to these theories and approaches. Morevover, Tomasello’s approach may extend the investigation of more complex symbolic processes than the ones traditionally investigated by behavior psychology.
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References
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Tomasello, M. (2003). Constructing a language: A usage-based theory of language acquisition. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005a). Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 675-691.
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005b). In search of the uniquely human. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 721-727.
Tonneau, F. (2007). Behaviorism and Chisholm’s challenge. Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 139-148.
Állan, S., & Souza, C. B. A. (2009). O modelo de Tomasello sobre a evolução cognitivo-lingüístico humana. Psicologia: Teoria e Pesquisa, 25, 161-168.
Baum, W. M. (2007). Commentary on Foxall, “Intentional behaviorism.” Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 57-60.
Branch, M. N. (2007). Are Foxall’s intentions good? Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 61-64.
Burgos, J. E. (2007). About aboutness: Thoughts on intentional behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 65-76.
Day, W. F. (1976). Contemporary behaviorism and the concept of intention. In W. J. Arnold (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 23 (pp. 55-131). London: University of Nebraska Press. (Trabalho original publicado em 1975)
Dennett, D. C. (1971). Intentional systems. Journal of Philosophy, 68, 87”“106.
Dennett, D. C. (1983). Taking the intentional stance seriously: Author’s response. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6, 379-388.
Dennett, D. C. (1985). When does the intentional stance work? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 763-766.
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Book.
Dennett, D. C. (1988). Précis of the intentional stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11, 495-546.
Dutra, L. H. de A. (2006). Comportamento intencional e contextos sociais: Uma abordagem nomológica. Abstracta, 2, 102-128.
Foxall, G. R. (1999). The contextual stance. Philosophical Psychology, 12, 21-42.
Foxall, G. R. (2004). Context and cognition: Interpretating complex behavior. Reno, NV: Context Press.
Foxall, G. R. (2007). Intentional behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 1-55.
Foxall, G. R. (2008). Intentional behaviorism revisited. Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 113-155.
Hineline, P. N. (2003). When we speak of intentions. In K. A. Lattal & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Behavior Theory and Philosophy (pp. 203-221). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
Hocutt, M. (2007). Gordon Foxall on intentional behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 77-92.
Kileen, P. (2007). Fuzzy logic. Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 93-100.
Lacey, H. (2007). Intentional behaviorism and the intentional scheme: Comments on Gordon L. Foxall’s “Intentional behaviorism” Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 101-111.
Moore, J. (2007). Comments on “Intentional Behaviorism” by G. R. Foxall. Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 113-130.
Neuman, P. (2004). An intentional interpretative perspective. The Behavior Analyst, 27, 55-65.
Neuman, P. (2007). Some comments on the distinction between intention and intentionality. The Behavior Analyst, 30, 211-216.
Rachlin, H. (1992). Teleological behaviorism. American Psychologist, 47, 1371-1382.
Rachlin, H. (1994). Behavior and mind: The roots of modern psychology. Oxford University Press.
Rachlin, H. (2003). Privacy. In K. A. Lattal & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Behavior theory and philosophy (pp. 187-201). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
Rachlin, H. (2007). A Behavioral science of mental life: Comments on Foxall’s “Intentional behaviorism.” Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 131-138.
Rose, J. C. C. de (1982). Consciência e propósito no behaviorismo radical. In B. Prado Jr. (Ed.), Filosofia e Comportamento (pp. 67- 91). São Paulo: Brasiliense.
Ryle, G. (1969). The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson of London. (Trabalho original publicado em 1949)
Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1990a). Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13, 585-596.
Searle, J. R. (1990b). Who is computing with the brain? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13, 632-640.
Searle, J. R. (1992). The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Searle, J. R. (1997). Consciousness denied: Daniel Dennett’s account. In The mystery of consciousness (pp. 96-131). New York Review Book.
Searle, J. R. (1998). How the mind works: Intentionality. In J. R. Searle (Ed.). Mind, language, and society: Philosophy in the real world (pp. 85-109). New York: Basic Books.
Searle, J. R. (2004). Mind: A brief introduction. Oxford University Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1963). Operant behavior. American Psychologist, 18, 503-515.
Skinner, B. F. (1976). About behaviorism. New York: Vintage Books. Trabalho original publicado em 1974.
Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.
Tomasello, M. (2003). Constructing a language: A usage-based theory of language acquisition. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005a). Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 675-691.
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005b). In search of the uniquely human. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 721-727.
Tonneau, F. (2007). Behaviorism and Chisholm’s challenge. Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 139-148.
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Published
2011-07-13
How to Cite
Állan, S., & Souza, C. B. A. de. (2011). Intentionality in Tomasello, Searle, Dennett and Behavioral Approaches to Human Cognition. Psicologia: Teoria E Pesquisa, 27(2), 241–248. Retrieved from https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17529
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Revisão da Literatura
