Intencionalidade em Tomasello, Searle, Dennett e em Abordagens Comportamentais da Cognição Humana
Palavras-chave:
Psicologia - Psicologia Experimental, Intencionalidade, Cognição humana, Tomasello, Filosofia da mente, Psicologia comportamentalResumo
A abordagem de Tomasello da evolução da cognição humana busca integrar processos biológicos, comportamentais e culturais em um mesmo sistema explicativo. No entanto, uma das principais críticas a essa abordagem é a necessidade de uma melhor elaboração do conceito de intencionalidade. O objetivo do presente trabalho foi: (1) analisar o tratamento de Tomasello do conceito de intencionalidade; e (2) estabelecer interlocuções desse tratamento com teorias da intencionalidade na filosofia da mente e com abordagens funcionalistas da cognição humana na psicologia comportamental. Sugerimos que o tratamento do conceito de intencionalidade na abordagem de Tomasello é compatível com essas teorias e abordagens. Além disso, a abordagem de Tomasello pode ampliar a investigação de processos simbólicos mais complexos do que aqueles tradicionalmente investigados pela psicologia comportamental.
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