Deliberative Regulation: Searching the Public Interest on the Regulation of Long-Term Concession Contracts
Keywords:
regulation, independent agencies, regulatory design, concession contracts, deliberative regulationAbstract
Purpose ”“ The purpose of this article is to propose a regulatory model that allows the maintenance of the public interest in situations governed by long-term public contracts, through deliberative democracy tools, and the regulatory agencies have the role of mediation of the deliberative process.
Methodology/approach/design ”“ This articles approach is based on the analysis of justifying theories of regulation by the public interest, of theories that refute this possibility (public choice), and of theories that turn to the regulatory design as a way of avoiding the distortion of the purposes of regulation, to assess the possible ways of deliberative regulation of long-term public procurement, as well as the role of agencies in this context.
Findings ”“ It was concluded that by means of deliberative procedures, regulation can be constructed to assure the service to the public interest, as well as to maintain it over time, and independent regulatory agencies have the role of mediating the deliberative process between the social actors, public and private, interested. It was also found that deliberative regulation broadens the legitimacy of regulatory acts and reinforces its independence from other spheres of government, with positive results in terms of regulatory governance.
Practical implications ”“ The conclusions propose new developments on the regulatory process, form, participants, democratic legitimacy, as well as on the role of independent regulatory Agencies in this process, being able to have immediate application in the modeling of the decision-making process in the regulation of long-term concession contracts.
Originality/value ”“ The text is original, as it proposes a new debate in Brazil, about a real difficulty that is the regulation of long-term public contracts and their constant adaptation to the dynamic of variable public interests throughout the time, proposing ways to be followed to solve the issue.
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