Relationality as the foundation of autonomy

Abstract

The current historical moment has been the scenario in which a full autonomy has been postulated. Such autonomy is understood as regarding personal and excluding interests. The morality of this exaltation of autonomy denies otherness, insofar as it legitimizes the use of the other, transforming the subject into an object. However, autonomy, as understood in modern philosophy - whose exponent was Kant - is basically relational. Relationality is understood here as the human condition that becomes an ethical requirement in the interaction between human beings. This paper proposes to verify the scope of relationality in the foundation of the ethical conception of autonomy. It consists of an argumentative hermeneutic bibliographical study around the Kantian conception of autonomy and its current interpretation in the contemporary context, which restricts it to individuals. In order to do so, it considers sociocultural, political and economic aspects that influence such interpretation; opposes the demands of relationality implicit in the Kantian conceptualization of autonomy; and concludes that the inclusion of the requirements of relationality in the ethical conception of autonomy is necessary, surpassing its confinement to the scope of individuals.