An Assessment of a Part of Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory
Keywords:
Intentional terms, Dennett, Ryle, Selection by consequences, BehaviorismAbstract
Dennett (1981/1987b) characterizes his approach as to how intentional terms (those for the so called propositional attitudes) work as a “holistic logical behaviorism,” or a holistic version of some of Ryle’s (1949) conceptual remarks. This paper examines possible contributions and disadvantages of Dennett’s approach, as well as the consequences of this proposal in relation to the employment of intentional terms in psychology. It is argued that Dennett’s approach does not turn out to be more accurate than his predecessor’s, since the mentalistic dimension it adds to the latter is erroneous. Accordingly, Dennett’s contributions and related proposal should be understood without the implications of this dimension. A non-mentalistic alternative, based upon Skinner’s selectionist model, for eventually adopting intentional terms in psychology is briefly discussed.
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References
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Baum, W. M. (2006). Compreender o behaviorismo: Comportamento, cultura e evolução (2a ed., M. T. A. Silva e cols., Trad.). Porto Alegre: Artmed (Trabalho original publicado em 2005).
Baum, W. M., & Heath, J. L. (1992). Behavioral explanations and intentional explanations in psychology. American Psychologist, 47, 1312-1317.
Bennett, M. R., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2003). Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Oxford: Blackwell.
Brentano, F. (1995). Psychology from an empirical standpoint (A. Rancurello e cols., Trad.). London: Routledge (Trabalho original publicado em 1874).
Brook, A., & Ross, D. (Eds.). (2002). Daniel Dennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carvalho Neto, M. (2001). B. F. Skinner e as explicações mentalistas para o comportamento: Uma análise histórico-conceitual (1931-1959). Tese de Doutorado, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo.
Churchland, P. M. (1979). Scientific realism and the plasticity of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cleaveland, J. M. (2004). Beyond trial-and-error in a selectionist psychology. Behavior and Philosophy, 30, 73-99.
Dennett, D. (1969). Content and consciousness. London: Routledge.
Dennett, D. (1978a). Intentional systems. In Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology (pp. 3-22). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Trabalho original publicado em 1971).
Dennett, D. (1978b). Skinner ‘skinned’. In Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology (pp. 53-70). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dennett, D. (1987a). True believers: The intentional strategy and why it works. In The intentional stance (pp. 13-42). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Trabalho original publicado em 1981).
Dennett, D. (1987b). Three kinds of intentional psychology. In The intentional stance (pp. 43-81). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Trabalho original publicado em 1981).
Dennett, D. (1987c). Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The ‘Panglossian’ paradigm defended. In The intentional stance (pp. 237-286). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Trabalho original publicado em 1983).
Dennett, D. (1991). Real patterns. Journal of Philosophy, 88, 27-51.
Dennett, D. (1996). Kinds of minds: Toward an understanding of consciousness. New York: Basic Books.
Dennett, D. (2007). Philosophy as naive anthropology: Comment on Bennett and Hacker. In M. R. Bennett, D. Dennett, P. M. S. Hacker, & J. Searle (Eds.), Neuroscience and philosophy (pp. 73-95). New York: Columbia University Press.
Foxall, G. (2004). Context and cognition: Interpreting complex behavior. Reno, NV: Context Press.
Foxall, G. (2007). Intentional behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 1-55.
Glenn, S. S. (1991). Contingencies and metacontingencies: Relations among behavioral, cultural, and biological evolution. In P. Lamal (Ed.), Behavioral analysis of societies and cultural practicies (pp. 39-73). Washington, DC: Hemisphere Press.
Hempel, C. G. (1980). The logical analysis of psychology (W. Sellars, Trad.). In N. Block (Ed.), Readings in philosophy of psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 14-23). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Trabalho original publicado em 1935).
Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought, and other biological categories: New foundations for realism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Millikan, R. G. (1989). In defense of proper functions. Philosophy of Science, 56, 288-302.
Moore, J. (2008). Conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism. Cornwall-on-Hudson, NY: Sloan.
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In S. Hook (Ed.), Dimensions of mind (pp. 138-164). New York: Collier.
Rachlin, H. (1994). Behavior and mind: The roots of modern psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Reichenbach, H. (1938). Experience and prediction: An analysis of the foundations and the structure of knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson.
Ryle, G. (1979). On thinking (K. Kolenda, Ed.). Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
Ryle, G. (2009). Taking sides in philosophy. In Collected papers, Vol. 2 (pp. 161-177). London: Routledge (Trabalho original publicado em 1937).
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan.
Skinner, B. F. (1969). An operant analysis of problem solving. In Contingencies of reinforcement: A theoretical analysis (pp. 133-171). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts (Trabalho original publicado em 1966).
Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond freedom and dignity. New York: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York: Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1988). Selection by consequences. In C. Catania & S. Harnad (Eds.), The selection of behavior (pp. 11-20). New York: Cambridge University Press (Trabalho original publicado em 1981).
Skinner, B. F. (1990). Can psychology be a science of mind? American Psychologist, 45, 1206-1210.
Tanney, J. (2009). Reasons as non-causal, context-placing explanations. In C. Sandis (Ed.), New essays on the explanation of action (pp. 94-111). Hampshire, UK: Mcmillan.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. (G. E. Anscombe & R. Rhees, Eds., G. E. Anscombe, Trad.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Wright, L. (1973). Functions. Philosophical Review, 82, 139-168.
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Published
2012-07-02
How to Cite
Lazzeri, F. (2012). An Assessment of a Part of Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory. Psicologia: Teoria E Pesquisa, 28(2), 245–253. Retrieved from https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17569
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