Relacionismo substancial:

a ontologia do comportamento à luz do behaviorismo radical.

Autores

  • Diego Zilio Instituto de Psicologia - USP

Palavras-chave:

filosofia da psicologia; behaviorismo radical., Behaviorismo radical, Skinner, Comportamento, Ontologia, Relacionismo, Substância

Resumo

Sob a influência do pragmatismo e do contextualismo, autores analistas do comportamento extraíram do behaviorismo radical qualquer posição ontológica substancialista. Como resultado, há a defesa de um relacionismo extremado no qual a importância da substância é ínfima ou inexistente. O objetivo deste artigo é avaliar a pertinência dessa posição. Para tanto, nossa análise será guiada por três questões: (1) Por que a substância não é importante para o behaviorismo radical?; (2) Por que a substância é importante para o behaviorismo radical?; e (3) Qual seria, de fato, o posicionamento ontológico mais condizente com o behaviorismo radical? Argumenta-se que o relacionismo extremado não reflete com acurácia a ontologia behaviorista radical e sugere-se que o relacionismo substancial seja a posição mais coerente.

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.

Referências

Abib, J. A. D. (2001). Arqueologia do behaviorismo radical
e o conceito de mente. In H. J. Guilhardi (Ed.), Sobre
comportamento e cognição (pp. 20-35). Santo André: Esetec
Ed. Associados.
Abib, J. A. D. (2004). O que é comportamentalismo? In M. Zilah, et
al. (Ed.), Sobre comportamento e cognição (pp. 52-61). Santo
André : Esetec Ed. Associados.
Barnes, D., & Roche, B. (1994). Mechanistic ontology and
contextualistic epistemology: a contradiction within behavior
analysis. The Behavior Analyst, 17(1), 165-168.
Barnes, D., & Roche, B. (1997). A behavior-analytic approach to
behavioral reflexivity. Psychological Record, 47(4), 543-572.
Barnes-Holmes, D. (2000). Behavioral pragmatism: no place for
reality and truth. The Behavior Analyst, 23(2), 191-202.
Barnes-Holmes, D. (2005). Behavioral pragmatism is a-ontological,
not antirealist: a reply to Tonneau. Behavior and Philosophy,
33, 67-79.
Baum, W. M. (1999). Compreender o behaviorismo: ciência,
comportamento e cultura (M. Silva, Trad.). Porto Alegre:
Artmed Editora (Trabalho original publicado em 1994).
Bjork, D. (1993). B. F. Skinner: a life. New York: Basic Books.
Carrara, K. (2005). Behaviorismo radical: crítica e metacrítica (2.
ed). São Paulo: Editora Unesp.
Carvalho Neto, M. B. (2001). B. F. Skinner e as explicações
mentalistas para o comportamento: uma análise históricoconceitual
(1931-1959). Tese de Doutorado, Universidade de
São Paulo, São Paulo.
Chiesa, M. (1994). Radical behaviorism: the philosophy and the
science. Boston: Authors Cooperative, Inc., Publishers.
Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: toward a unified science
of mind-brain. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Day, W. (1992). On the difference between radical behaviorism and
methodological behaviorism. In S. Leigland (Ed.), Radical
behaviorism: Willard Day on psychology and philosophy (pp.
61-72). Nevada: Context Press (Trabalho original publicado
em 1983).
Descartes, R. (1984). Meditations on first philosophy and Objections
and replies. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, & D. Murdoch
(Eds.), The philosophical writings of Descartes (Vol. 2).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Trabalho original
publicado em 1641).
Hamlyn, D. W. (1995). History of metaphysics. In T. Honderich
(Ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (pp. 556-559).
New York: Oxford University Press.
Hayes, L. J. (1997). Scientific knowing in psychological perspective.
In L. J. Hayes, & P. M. Ghezzi (Eds.), Investigations in
behavioral epistemology (pp. 123-141). Nevada: Context Press.
Hayes, S. C., & Brownstein, A. J. (1986). Mentalism, Behavior-
Behavior Relations, and a Behavior-Analytic View of the
Purposes of Science. The Behavior Analyst, 9(2), 175-190.
Hempel, C. G. (2000). The logical analysis of psychology. In
R. Jeffrey (Org.), Carl G. Hempel: selected philosophical
essays (pp. 165-180) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
(Trabalho original publicado em 1935).
Hocutt, M. (1996). Behaviorism as opposition to cartersianism. In
W. O’Donohue, & R. F. Kitchener (Eds.), The Philosophy of
psychology (pp. 81-95). London: Sage Publications.
Inwagen, P. V. (2007). Metaphysics. Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
metaphysics
Kitchener, R. F. (1977). Behavior and behaviorism. Behaviorism
5, 11”“71.
Krägeloh, C. U. (2006). Pragmatism and a-ontologicalism in a
science of behavior. The Behavior Analyst Today, 7(3), 325-
334.
Leigland, S. (1997). Systems and theories in behavior analytic
science: an overview of alternatives. In L. J. Hayes, & P. M.
Ghezzi (Eds.), Investigations in behavioral epistemology (pp.
11-31). Nevada: Context Press.
Leigland, S. (2004). Pragmatism and radical behaviorism: comments
on Malone (2001). Behavior and Philosophy, 32, 305-312.
Lowe, E. J. (1995). Ontology. In T. Honderich (Ed.), The Oxford
Companion to Philosophy (pp. 634-635). New York: Oxford
University Press.
Moore, J. (1980). On behaviorism and private events. The
Psychological Record, 30, 459-475.
Moore, J. (1981). On mentalism, methodological behaviorism, and
radical behaviorism. Behaviorism, 9, 55-67.
Moore, J. (1984). On behaviorism, knowledge, and causal
explanation. Psychological Record, 34, 73-97.
Moore, J. (1994). On introspections and verbal reports. In S. Hayes,
L. Hayes, M. Sato, & K. Ono (Eds.), Behavior analysis of
language and cognition (pp. 281-299). Nevada: Context Press.
Moore, J. (1999). The basic principles of behaviorism. In B. A.
Thyer (Ed.), The philosophical legacy of behaviorism (pp.
41-68). London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Moore, J. (2008). Conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism.
New York: Sloan Publishing.
Moore, J. (2010). Behaviorism and the stages of scientific activity.
The Behavior Analyst, 33, 47-63.
Moxley, R. A. (2001a). The modern/postmodern context of
Skinner’s selectionist turn in 1945. Behavior and Philosophy,
29, 121-153.
Moxley, R. A. (2001b). Sources for Skinner’s pragmatic selectionism
in 1945. The Behavior Analyst, 24(2), 201-212.
Moxley, R. A. (2002a). Some more similarities between Peirce and
Skinner. The Behavior Analyst, 25(2), 201-214.
Moxley, R. A. (2002b). The selectionist meaning of C. S. Peirce
and B. F. Skinner. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 18, 71-91.
Moxley, R. A. (2004). Pragmatic selectionism: the philosophy of
behavior analysis. The Behavior Analyst Today, 5(1), 108-125.
Reese, H. W. (1996). How is physiology relevant to behavior
analysis? The Behavior Analyst, 19(1), 61-70.
Robinson, H. (2009). Substance. Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
substance
Schnaitter, R. (1984). Skinner on the “mental” and the “physcial”.
Behaviorism, 12(1), 1-14.
Skinner, B. F. (1954). Critique of psychoanalytic concepts and
theories. The Scientific Monthly, 79(5), 300-305.
Skinner, B. F. (1961a). The concept of reflex in the description of
behavior. In B. F. Skinner (Ed.), Cumulative record: a selection
of papers (2ª ed., pp. 319-346). New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts. (Trabalho original publicado em 1931).
Skinner, B. F. (1961b). The generic nature of the concepts of
stimulus and response. In B. F. Skinner (Ed.), Cumulative
record: a selection of papers (2ª ed., pp. 347-366). New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts. (Trabalho original publicado em
1935).
Skinner, B. F. (1961c). The operational analysis of psychological
terms. In B. F. Skinner (Ed.), Cumulative record: a selection
of papers (2ª ed., pp. 272-286). New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts (Trabalho original publicado em 1945).
Skinner, B. F. (1961d). What is psychotic behavior? In B. F. Skinner
(Ed.), Cumulative record: a selection of papers (2ª ed., pp. 202-
219). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts (Trabalho original
publicado em 1956).
Skinner, B. F. (1963). Behaviorism at fifty. Science, New Series,
140(3570), 951-958.
Skinner, B. F. (1965). Science and human behavior. New York: The
Free Press (Trabalho original publicado em 1953).
Skinner, B. F. (1966a). The behavior of organisms: an experimental
analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofs (Trabalho
original publicado em 1938).
Skinner, B. F. (1966b). What is the experimental analysis of
behavior? Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior,
9(3), 213-218.
Skinner, B. F. (1967). The problem of consciousness ”“ a debate.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 27(3), 325-337.
Skinner, B. F. (1969a). Contingencies of reinforcement: a theoretical
analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1969b). The machine that is man. Psychology Today,
2, 20-25, 60-63.
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1975). The steep and thorny way to a science of
behavior. American Psychologist, 30(1), 42-49.
Skinner, B. F. (1979). The shaping of a behaviorist: part two of an
autobiography. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Skinner, B. F. (1981). Selection by consequences. Science, New
Series, 213(4507), 501-504.
Skinner, B. F. (1983). Can the experimental analysis of behavior
rescue psychology? The Behavior Analyst, 6, 9-17.
Skinner, B. F. (1985). Cognitive science and behaviourism. British
Journal of Psychology, 76, 291-301.
Skinner, B. F. (1987). Whatever happened to psychology as the
science of behavior? American Psychologist, 42(8), 780-786.
Skinner, B. F. (1988). In A. C. Catania, & S. Harnad (Eds.),
The selection of behavior: the operant behaviorism of B. F.
Skinner: comments and consequences. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Skinner, B. F. (1990). Can psychology be a science of mind?
American Psychologist, 45(11), 1206-1210.
Smith, L. D. (1986). Behaviorism and logical positivism: a
reassessment of the alliance. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Smith, L. D. (1992). On prediction and control: B. F. Skinner and
the technological ideal of science. American Psychologist,
47(2), 216-223.
Tonneau, F. (2005a). Antirealist arguments in behavior analysis.
Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 55-65.
Tonneau, F. (2005b). Behavior analysis, common sense, and logic:
reply to Barnes-Holmes. Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 81-84.
Zilio, D. (2009). A natureza comportamental da mente: behaviorismo
radical e filosofia da mente. Dissertação de Mestrado,
Universidade Estadual Paulista ”“ UNESP, Marília.
Zilio, D. (2010). Fisicalismo na filosofia da mente: definição,
estratégias e problemas. Ciências & Cognição, 15(1), 217-240.
Zuriff, G. E. (1975). Where is the agent in behavior? Behaviorism,
3(1), 1-21.
Zuriff, G. E. (1980). Radical behaviorist epistemology. Psychological
Bulletin, 87(2), 337-350.
Zuriff, G. E. (1985). Behaviorism: a conceptual reconstruction.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Zuriff, G. E. (1995). A review of Baum’s Understanding
Behaviorism: Science, Behavior, and Culture. The Behavior
Analyst, 18(2), 395-400
Zuriff, G. E. (2003). Science and human behavior, dualism, and
conceptual modification. Journal of the Experimental Analysis
of Behavior, 80(3), 345-352.

Downloads

Publicado

2012-04-03

Como Citar

Zilio, D. (2012). Relacionismo substancial:: a ontologia do comportamento à luz do behaviorismo radical. Psicologia: Teoria E Pesquisa, 28(1), 109–118. Recuperado de https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17559

Edição

Seção

Revisão da Literatura