Analysis of Brazil’s Leniency Program Regulation in light of Game Theory
Palabras clave:
leniency program, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, Brazil's regulation, benchmarkingResumen
Purpose ”“ This paper purpose is to evaluate, in the light of prescriptions of the Game Theory codified in the prisoner’s dilemma, if the regulation of the Brazilian Leniency Program is coherent with the intention of obtaining a greater number of confessions.
Methodology/approach/design ”“ The approach of the article consists in performing a critical analysis of the literature about the aforementioned topic, by establishing recommendations for the design of a program of leniency that increases number of confessions. It also compares each recommendation with the Brazilian program in order to verify if they are incorporated in it.
Findings ”“ It was found that the Brazilian Leniency Program has a high degree of adherence with the basic recommendations of game theory.
Practical implications ”“ The article leads to further steps on the evaluation of the empirical results of the practical application of the leniency program in the last decade and may serve as reference to similar regulation programs in other areas besides antitrust.
Originality/value ”“ The text is an attempt to analyze more minutely a tool of investigation that has been essential to shield competition in Brazil. Furthermore, findings on this investigative procedure add perspective to similar tools recently introduced in Brazil’s legal framework.
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Al enviar este documento a la Revista de Derecho, Estado y Telecomunicaciones, declaro que estoy aceptando los términos de Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0), disponible en http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0.
