The nature of the tax rule in the light of the logic of collective action

Abstract

[Purpose] To answer the research question about the nature of the legal-tax rule as a “social rejection rule”, using as a methodological parameter the investigation of the formation of collective will, made by the theory of public choice, in contrast to the theory of tax imposition by Ives Gandra da Silva Martins.

[Methodology/approach/design] The approach was made through the contraposition between the theories of Kenneth J. Arrow, with his “Theorem of (Im) possibility”, the “Theory of Collective Action” by Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan and, finally, the work of Mancur Olson in his “The Logic of Collective Action”, and the theory of tax imposition by Ives Gandra da Silva Martins.

[Findings] The research concludes on the logical impossibility of the existence of “social rejection norms” and this concept’s logical consequences, unable to sustain any reasoning that deduces a “principle of closed tax typicality” or a (natural) right to evade taxation. On the contrary, the collective will points to the existence of a social duty to pay taxes, and the center of the tax debate must be shifted towards examining the impacts of the intra-group distributive conflict.

[Practical implications] The definition of the nature of the juridical-tax rule has important repercussions on the discussions on tax reform and on the mechanisms of evasion, avoidance, tax evasion and tax planning, determining the focus on which these issues are dealt with.

[Originality/value] The article is relevant to support an analysis of the intragroup distributive conflicts existing in taxation and to engage in the discussion about the possibility of a general anti-tax rule in Brazilian Tax Law.