Lobby Regulation in Brazil

Reflections from Mancur Olson’s Group Theory

Abstract

Purpose ”“ Through lobbying, economic power articulates with political power, seeking to further their interests. When this articulation occurs without control and transparency, it causes distortions, subverting the democratic debate. This article aims to bring reflections on the importance of a regulatory design for lobbying in Brazil, from the analysis of the US model and in light of the Group Theory developed by Mancur Olson from the perspective of the Public Choice Theory.

Methodology/approach/design ”“ A comparative study that will use as its empirical basis the US federal regulation on lobbying, as it is a globally recognized and advanced model in this area, and Bill No. 1,202, pending in the Brazilian National Congress. Notes and reflections will be made from the analysis of Group Theory, by Olson, and the Administrative Procedural Theory of Regulation.

Findings ”“ Understanding the relationship between the government and private agents and analyzing the US federal regulation of lobbying will allow a reflection on the relevance of building a Brazilian regulatory model for the activity, which favors transparency, without producing a barrier to legitimate action and democratic representation of interests. This reflection runs through Bill No. 1,202, which has been in the House of Representatives since 2007 and aims to discipline lobbying in the Federal Public Administration.