How to be a Responsible Philosophical Naturalist

Authors

  • Luís R. G. Oliveira University of Houston

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26512/2358-82842017e10670

Keywords:

Philosophical Naturalism, Scientific Realism, David Hume, Science, Philosophy

Abstract

Responsible allegiance to some version of philosophical naturalism requires the explicit and careful formulation of some argument. In four steps, this paper expands and examines an argument that is frequently mentioned in defense of popular versions of naturalism: Reductive Naturalism and Secular Naturalism. First, I explain what is known as Scientific Realism, a view on the objectivity of certain scientific theories. Second, I defend this position by reference to the well-known no-miracles argument. Third, I extract two principles from David Hume’s discussion of miracle reports. Finally, from the conjunction of scientific realism and these two Humean principles, I articulate what I call Deferentialist Philosophical Naturalism. As we will see, deferentialist naturalism is a less triumphant position than most popular versions of naturalism. However, what my discussion in this paper reveals is that a responsible philosophical naturalism interested in something more  mbitious - such as Reductive Naturalism or Secular Naturalism - owes us a supplementary argument to the one that is frequently offered as sufficient.

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Author Biography

Luís R. G. Oliveira, University of Houston

Luís R.G. Oliveira was graduated in Philosophy at Calvi College, and earned his MA and PhD at University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He is professor at University of Houston (Texas) and author of various academic articles in epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of religion.

References

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Em particular, o meu argumento parece depender de uma demarcação entre o que é filosofia e o que é

ciência. Mas isso é uma sugestão controversa. Teses mais específicas sobre esse tipo de demarcação já

foram muito criticadas - uma tentativa famosa e sem sucesso foi proposta por Popper (1959) - e a busca

por uma tal demarcação em geral já foi também criticada em princípio - uma crítica famosa nessa linha

vem de Quine (1953). Essa é uma dificuldade séria que deixo para uma discussão futura.

LUIS R. G. OLIVEIRA

REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE FILOSOFIA DA RELIGIÃO / BRASÃLIA / V. 4 N.1 /P.09-25/AGO. 2017 / ISSN 2358-8284

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COMO SER UM NATURALISTA FILOSÓFICO RESPONSÁVEL

REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE FILOSOFIA DA RELIGIÃO / BRASÃLIA / V. 4 N.1 /P.09-25/AGO. 2017 / ISSN 2358-8284

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Naturalism and its Implications by Bana Bashour & Hans Muller (eds.). Routledge.

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Oxford University Press.

SCHUPBACH, Jonah N & SPRENGER, Jan (2011). “The Logic of Explanatory Power”.

Philosophy of Science 78(1):105-127.

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University Press.

VAN INWAGEN, Peter (2017). O Problema do Mal. Brasília: Editora UnB. Traduzido por

Sérgio Miranda.

WESTON, Thomas (1992) “Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism”. Philosophy of Science

(1):53-74.

SAVAGE (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press: 355-391.

EARMAN, John, (2000). Hume’s Abject Failure. Oxford University Press.

VAN FRASSEN, Bas (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford University Press.

GEORGE, Alexander (2016). The Everlasting Check:Hume on Miracles. Harvard University

Press.

GOULD, Stephen Jay (1999). Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life.

Ballantine Books.

HARMAN, Gilbert (1965) “The Inference to the Best Explanation,”Philosophical Review

(1): 88-95.

HÁJEK, Alan (2008). “Are Miracles Chimerical?” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion,

Volume 1. Oxford University Press: 82-104.

HENDERSON, Leah (2017) “The No Miracles Argument and the Base Rate Fallacy,” Synthese

(4): 1295-1302.

HUME, David (1748/1902). Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning

the Principles of Morals. Clarendon Press.

HUNT, Shelby D. (2011) “Theory Status, Inductive Realism, and Approximate Truth: No

Miracles, No Charades,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25(2):159-178.

KITCHER, Philip (2014). Life After Faith: The Case for Secular Humanism. Yale University

Press.

KORNBLITH, Hilary (1994) “Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological”. Midwest

Studies in Philosophy 19(1): 39-52.

KORNBLITH, Hilary (2001). Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Blackwell.

KUHN, Thomas (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.

LAKATOS, Imre (1970). “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research

Programmes” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave.

Cambridge University Press: 91-196.

MACINTOSH, Duncan (1994) “Partial Convergence and Approximate Truth,” British Journal

for the Philosophy of Science 45(1): 153-170.

MILLICAN, Peter (2013). “Earman on Hume on Miracles” in Debates in Modern Philosophy:

Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses, by Stewart Duncan and Antonia LoLordo.

Routledge.

OLIVEIRA, Luis R.G.& PERRINE, Timothy (Em Breve). “Cornell Realism, Explanation, and

Natural Properties”. European Journal of Philosophy.

POPPER, Karl (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson.

PUTNAM, Hilary (1975). Mathematics, Matter and Method. Cambridge University Press.

QUINE, Willard V.O. (1951). “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Philosophical Review 60(1): 20-

RHEINBERGER, Hans-Jorg, MULLER-WILLE, Staffan and MEUNIER, Robert (2015).

“Gene”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, by Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

RORTY, Richard (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.

ROSENBERG, Alexander (2014). “Disenchanted Naturalism,” in Contemporary Philosophical

Naturalism and its Implications by Bana Bashour & Hans Muller (eds.). Routledge.

SCHMITT, Frederick (2014). Hume’s Epistemology in the Treatise: A Veritistic Interpretation.

Oxford University Press.

SCHUPBACH, Jonah N & SPRENGER, Jan (2011). “The Logic of Explanatory Power”.

Philosophy of Science 78(1):105-127.

TROUT, J.D. (2016). Wondrous Truths: The Improbable Triumph of Modern Science. Oxford

University Press.

VAN INWAGEN, Peter (2017). O Problema do Mal. Brasília: Editora UnB. Traduzido por

Sérgio Miranda.

WESTON, Thomas (1992) “Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism”. Philosophy of Science

(1):53-74.

Published

2018-07-25

How to Cite

Oliveira, L. R. G. (2018). How to be a Responsible Philosophical Naturalist. Brazilian Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 4(1). https://doi.org/10.26512/2358-82842017e10670

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Section

Artigos (temática geral)