THE MORAL PRINCIPLE OF DISCOURSE ETHICS AS A POSSIBLE ANSWER TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE KANTIAN CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Abstract

It will be analyzed the possibility that Habermas’s formulation of the moral principle, in the context of his discourse ethics, responds to certain problems present in Kant’s categorical imperative, in particular some of the problems pointed by Hegel in §135 of his Philosophy of Right. Thus, we will investigate, i) in a synthetic way, the foundation of morality given by Kant in his moral philosophy texts and the formulation of the categorical imperative; ii) briefly, some of the pertinent Hegelian criticisms directed at Kant’s categorical imperative; and iii) the way in which Habermas’s moral principle present in his discourse ethics and his strategy of moral foundation offer an alternative path and reformulation to the categorical imperative, not falling into the problems identified as present in Kant’s moral principle.