Você Está Aqui: Dor e sua Localização
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v9i1.41031Palavras-chave:
Dor. Localização da Dor. Representacionalismo. Experiencialismo. Triangulação. Segunda Pessoa.Resumo
Quando consideramos a dor corporal, parece que estamos exclusivamente no reino da primeira pessoa, sem espaço para uma segunda pessoa. Neste artigo, argumentarei que é da interação entre a primeira e a segunda pessoas, a dimensão social da linguagem, que nosso uso de termos espaciais locativos herda suas regras e restrições. Essa interação, em uma forma de triangulação proposta por Davidson, poderia nos fornecer uma solução viável para o problema da localização da dor corporal. A solução está em adotar o representacionalismo enquanto se reconhece os limites do sistema representacional.
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