Regulatory reform in Brazil: challenges to effective competition in oil refining
Palabras clave:
conformidade negativa, insegurança jurídica, instituições, reforma regulatória, vigência socialResumen
Purpose ”“ Explain the absence of social effectiveness of Constitutional Amendment No. 9/95 and Law 9,478 / 97, regarding the promotion of competition in the oil-refining segment in Brazil.
Methodology/approach/design ”“ Analysis of the evolution of the main market indicators, together with main drivers of regulatory framework.
Findings ”“ Change in legal and regulatory frameworks was not enough to create an environment favorable to free competition in this segment of the industry. More than that, the misalignment between domestic prices and international prices has increased, evidence of negative compliance with the new legal framework.
Practical implications (if applicable) ”“ Study points to the need to overcome institutional problems, which are factors of legal uncertainty, raising the risks for private investors.
Originality/value (optional) ”“ The use of the institutional approach to explain the lack of social effectiveness of the regulatory framework that was intended to ensure free competition in the oil refining segment in Brazil.
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EDELMAN, L. B., & SUCHMAN, M. C. (1997). The legal environments of organizations. Annual Review of Sociology, 23, 479”“515.
EDELMAN, L. B., KRIEGER, L. H., ELIASON, S. R., ALBISTON, C. R., & MELLEMA, V. (2011). When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures. American Journal of Sociology, 117(3), 888-954.
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FALCÃO-MARTINS, H. . The Exacerbation of Meso Policy: Public Policy Formulation and Regulatory Activity in Brazil. In: XVIII IRSPM Conference, 2014, Ottawa. XVIII IRSPM Conference, 2014.
GILLARD, F. & MAGGETTI, M.. (2011). The independence of regulatory authorities. In: The handbook on the politics of regulation. Edicted by Levi-Faur, D. Northampton, USA. 2011.
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JOSKOW, P.L. Regulation of natural monopolies. In: Handbook of Law and Economics. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (eds), Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007. 222p.
KINGDON, John W. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Boston: Longman, 2011.
LEVI-FAUR, D. The politics of liberalisation: privatisation and regulation-for competition in Europe’s and Latin America’s telecoms and electricity industries. In: European Journal of Political Research 42: 705”“740, 2003.
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_____. Delegation of Powers and the Fiduciary Principle. In: CONNEX Workshop. Paris. 2005. 18 p.
MARCH, J. G & OLSEN, J. P.. Rediscovering institutions ”“ the organizational basics of politics. The Free Press, New York, 1989.
MARTINS, H.F.; ANDRADE, M. Diagnóstico do processo de formulação e análise de políticas públicas em mercados regulados. Relatório final de consultoria para o PRO-REG. Presidência da República, Brasília, 2013. 57 p.
MORAN, Michael. The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
MUN, E.. Negative Compliance as an Organizational Response to Legal Pressures: The Case of Japanese Equal Employment Opportunity Law. Social Forces, 94(4), 1409-1437.
NORTH, D.C. Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives - Volume 5, Number 1 - Winter 1991 - Pages 97”“112.
NORTH, D. C.; WALLIS, J.; WEINGAST, B.. Violence and Social Orders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
OECD. Working Party on Regulatory Management and Reform. Designing independent and accountable regulatory authorities for high quality regulation. OECD, 2005. 236 p.
OLIVEIRA, P. V. S. C.. Impacto da política de preços da gasolina, diesel e GLP na indústria de petróleo: Opções de política. Dissertação (mestrado) ”“ Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Economia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia, 2015. 110 p.
PERISSÉ, J. B.. Evolução do Refino de Petróleo no Brasil. Dissertação (mestrado) ”“ Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Química, Programa de Pós-graduação em Engenharia Química, 2007. 158 p.
POSNER, R. A.. Theories of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 2. (Autumn, 1974), pp. 335-358.
SCHNEIBERG, M., & BARTLEY, T. (2001). Regulating American Industries: Markets, Politics, and the Institutional Determinants of Fire Insurance Regulation. American Journal of Sociology, 107(1), 101”“146. doi:10.1086/323574
SCOTT, W. R. (2014). Institutions and Organizations: ideas and interests. 4rd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage. (3ª ed., 2008).
SMITH, W. Utility regulator: the independency debate. In: Public policy for private sector. Note nº 127, Oct. 1997. The World Bank Group. Washington DC. 4 p.
STIGLER, G. J. The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1971, nº. 3, pp. 3”“21.
STIGLITZ, J. E. Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation. In: BALLEISEN, Edward; MOSS, David (ed.). Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
TAVARES, M. E. E.. Análise do refino no Brasil: estado e perspectivas - uma análise “cross-section". Rio de Janeiro, 2005. Tese ”“ Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, COPPE. 384 p.
TEUBNER, G.. O direito como sistema autopoiético. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1993.
THATCHER, M.. Delegation to independent regulatory agencies: Pressures, functions and contextual mediation. West European Politics 25, 2002. pp 125”“147.
THELEN, K. Varieties of Capitalism: Trajectories of Liberalization and the New Politics. Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 15, 2012
THORNTON, P. W. & OCASIO. W. (2008). Institutional Logics. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, R. Suddaby (Eds.). The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism, (pp. 99-129). Los Angeles: Sage.
TOLBERT, P. S., & ZUCKER, L. G. (1983). Institutional sources of change in the formal structure of organizations: The diffusion of civil service reform, 1880”“1935. Administrative Science Quarterly, 28, 22”“39.
TRILLAS, F. Independent regulators: theory, evidence and reform proposals. IESE Business School. University of Navarra, Barcelona, 2010. 32 p.
TRONDAL, J. Agencification. Public Administration Review, Vol. 74, Iss 4. pp. 545-549. 2014.
VIEGAS, T. O. C.. Competitividade em custos na atividade petrolífera em águas profundas. Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ/IE, 2013. Tese de Doutorado ”“ UFRJ/IE Programa de pós-graduação em Economia da Indústria e da Tecnologia, 2013. 296 p.
BARROS, M.M.. Análise da flexibilidade do refino de petróleo para lidar com choques de demanda de gasolina no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ/COPPE, 2014. 142 p.
BRASIL. ANP. Anuário estatístico brasileiro do petróleo, gás natural e biocombustíveis 2016. Rio de Janeiro: ANP, 2016.
BRASIL. Presidência da República. Plano diretor da reforma do aparelho do Estado. Brasília: Câmara da Reforma de Estado, Ministério da Administração e Reforma do Estado, 1995a.
CHRISTENSEN, T.; LAEGREID, P.. Regulatory reforms and agencification. Working Paper 6 ”“ 2005. Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies UNIFOB AS. November 2005.
CROLEY, Steven P. Regulation and Public Interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 1-25; 239-257; 304-306.
DIMAGGIO, P. (1988). Interests and agency in institutional theory. In L. Zucker (Ed.). Institutional patterns and organization, pp. 3-21. Cambridge: Ballinger Press.
DIMAGGIO, P. J. & Powell, W.W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational field. American Sociological Review. Vol. 48, Issue 2. Apr. 1983. pp 147-160.
EDELMAN, L. B., & SUCHMAN, M. C. (1997). The legal environments of organizations. Annual Review of Sociology, 23, 479”“515.
EDELMAN, L. B., KRIEGER, L. H., ELIASON, S. R., ALBISTON, C. R., & MELLEMA, V. (2011). When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures. American Journal of Sociology, 117(3), 888-954.
EWICK, P., & SILBEY, S. S. (2002). The structure of legality: the cultural contradictions of social institutions. In: R. A. Kagan, M. Krygier, & K. Winston (eds.), Legality and Community: On the Intellectual Legacy of Philip Selznick (pp. 149”“165). Oxford, England: Rowman & Littfield Publishers.
FALCÃO-MARTINS, H. . The Exacerbation of Meso Policy: Public Policy Formulation and Regulatory Activity in Brazil. In: XVIII IRSPM Conference, 2014, Ottawa. XVIII IRSPM Conference, 2014.
GILLARD, F. & MAGGETTI, M.. (2011). The independence of regulatory authorities. In: The handbook on the politics of regulation. Edicted by Levi-Faur, D. Northampton, USA. 2011.
HESSE, K. (1991). Die normative Kraft der Verfassung. Tradução: Gilmar Ferreira Mendes. Disponível em: <http://www.geocities.ws/bcentaurus/livros/h/hessenpdf.pdf:. Acesso em 24 de novembro de 2016.
HALL, P. A., & SOSCKICE, D.. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001
JORDANA, J. & LEVI-FAUR, D. The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America - Sectoral and National Channels in the Making of New Order. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. March 2005, vol. 598, nº. 1, pp 102-124.
JOSKOW, P.L. Regulation of natural monopolies. In: Handbook of Law and Economics. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (eds), Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007. 222p.
KINGDON, John W. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Boston: Longman, 2011.
LEVI-FAUR, D. The politics of liberalisation: privatisation and regulation-for competition in Europe’s and Latin America’s telecoms and electricity industries. In: European Journal of Political Research 42: 705”“740, 2003.
MAHONEY, J. & THELEN, K.. Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
MAJONE, G.. The regulatory State and its legitimacy problems. In: Political Science Series, nº 56. Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, July 1998. 30 pp.
_____. Delegation of Powers and the Fiduciary Principle. In: CONNEX Workshop. Paris. 2005. 18 p.
MARCH, J. G & OLSEN, J. P.. Rediscovering institutions ”“ the organizational basics of politics. The Free Press, New York, 1989.
MARTINS, H.F.; ANDRADE, M. Diagnóstico do processo de formulação e análise de políticas públicas em mercados regulados. Relatório final de consultoria para o PRO-REG. Presidência da República, Brasília, 2013. 57 p.
MORAN, Michael. The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
MUN, E.. Negative Compliance as an Organizational Response to Legal Pressures: The Case of Japanese Equal Employment Opportunity Law. Social Forces, 94(4), 1409-1437.
NORTH, D.C. Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives - Volume 5, Number 1 - Winter 1991 - Pages 97”“112.
NORTH, D. C.; WALLIS, J.; WEINGAST, B.. Violence and Social Orders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
OECD. Working Party on Regulatory Management and Reform. Designing independent and accountable regulatory authorities for high quality regulation. OECD, 2005. 236 p.
OLIVEIRA, P. V. S. C.. Impacto da política de preços da gasolina, diesel e GLP na indústria de petróleo: Opções de política. Dissertação (mestrado) ”“ Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Economia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia, 2015. 110 p.
PERISSÉ, J. B.. Evolução do Refino de Petróleo no Brasil. Dissertação (mestrado) ”“ Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Química, Programa de Pós-graduação em Engenharia Química, 2007. 158 p.
POSNER, R. A.. Theories of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 2. (Autumn, 1974), pp. 335-358.
SCHNEIBERG, M., & BARTLEY, T. (2001). Regulating American Industries: Markets, Politics, and the Institutional Determinants of Fire Insurance Regulation. American Journal of Sociology, 107(1), 101”“146. doi:10.1086/323574
SCOTT, W. R. (2014). Institutions and Organizations: ideas and interests. 4rd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage. (3ª ed., 2008).
SMITH, W. Utility regulator: the independency debate. In: Public policy for private sector. Note nº 127, Oct. 1997. The World Bank Group. Washington DC. 4 p.
STIGLER, G. J. The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1971, nº. 3, pp. 3”“21.
STIGLITZ, J. E. Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation. In: BALLEISEN, Edward; MOSS, David (ed.). Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
TAVARES, M. E. E.. Análise do refino no Brasil: estado e perspectivas - uma análise “cross-section". Rio de Janeiro, 2005. Tese ”“ Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, COPPE. 384 p.
TEUBNER, G.. O direito como sistema autopoiético. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1993.
THATCHER, M.. Delegation to independent regulatory agencies: Pressures, functions and contextual mediation. West European Politics 25, 2002. pp 125”“147.
THELEN, K. Varieties of Capitalism: Trajectories of Liberalization and the New Politics. Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 15, 2012
THORNTON, P. W. & OCASIO. W. (2008). Institutional Logics. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, R. Suddaby (Eds.). The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism, (pp. 99-129). Los Angeles: Sage.
TOLBERT, P. S., & ZUCKER, L. G. (1983). Institutional sources of change in the formal structure of organizations: The diffusion of civil service reform, 1880”“1935. Administrative Science Quarterly, 28, 22”“39.
TRILLAS, F. Independent regulators: theory, evidence and reform proposals. IESE Business School. University of Navarra, Barcelona, 2010. 32 p.
TRONDAL, J. Agencification. Public Administration Review, Vol. 74, Iss 4. pp. 545-549. 2014.
VIEGAS, T. O. C.. Competitividade em custos na atividade petrolífera em águas profundas. Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ/IE, 2013. Tese de Doutorado ”“ UFRJ/IE Programa de pós-graduação em Economia da Indústria e da Tecnologia, 2013. 296 p.
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2017-05-15
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VIEIRA, José Nilton de Souza. Regulatory reform in Brazil: challenges to effective competition in oil refining. Revista de Direito Setorial e Regulatório, [S. l.], v. 3, n. 1, p. 107–132, 2017. Disponível em: https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/rdsr/article/view/19198. Acesso em: 23 nov. 2024.
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