Ad hoc regulation in CADE’s decisions
Keywords:
Antitrust Authority, regulatory agency, decisions, legal norm, legitimacyAbstract
Purpose ”“ The paper intends to enlighten the incipient debate concerning the Administrative Council for Economic Defense ”“ CADE’s insertion in Brazilian agencies’ model and discuss the acknowledgement of the authority as a regulatory agency in Brazilian institutional panorama.
Methodology/approach/design ”“ Procedural regulatory theories and CADE’s decisions.
Findings ”“ CADE plays a regulatory role in the cases submitted to its jurisdiction.
Practical implications ”“ CADE being institutionally recognized as a regulatory agency may incur in a review of its role as a policy maker and add complimentary and interdisciplinary knowledge to the various fields of regulation.
Originality/value ”“ CADE has been increasingly required by Brazilian society to make interventions in economic domain regarding competition defense. CADE’s decisions are ways of State intervention that are not always considered regulation. Brazilian regulatory agencies governmental plan does not include CADE as a competition fostering agent and as a possible tool of regulation in more specific areas of the economy. However, when CADE applies behavioral and structural remedies in merger control or in analysis of anticompetitive practices the antitrust authority does an ad hoc regulation. Those interventions are able to model and, in some ways, regulate some markets without legal authorization or legal prohibition to CADE’s ruling. Recognizing CADE’s regulatory role may mean the changing from an auxiliary in Brazilian regulatory structure to an effective policy maker agent, process that is able to benefit the whole society.
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