On emotions: António Damásio and the criticism of James-Lange theory

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to point out some possible carelessness by A. Damásio in the criticism that he addresses William James' theory of emotions. This criticism consists in pointing that the Jamesian formulation restricts emotions to the level of somatic changes. According to Damásio, James does not give due attention to the mental evaluation process that provokes the emotion. Thus, its theoretical framework satisfactorily explains the emotions derived from congenital dispositive representations, but it is insufficient when it comes to acquired dispositive representations. In this paper, I defend the thesis that James' theory of emotions accounts for the occurrence of emotional states triggered by learned representations. In order to defend this thesis, I will present James' theory of emotions in its organic, cognitive and social aspects. I intend to show that António Damásio's criticism reduces Jamesian theory to his approach to standard emotions, disregarding the broad development of his theory.