O programa nuclear iraniano e o regime de não-proliferação: dilemas para o futuro

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Raquel Gontijo
Luiza Elena Januário

Resumo

O programa nuclear iraniano causa receios e inquietações há tempos, existindo suspeitas de que o país almeje a utilização da energia nuclear para fins militares, tornando-se uma potência nuclear ilegítima. Décadas de sanções e iniciativas de negociação não têm alcançado resultados satisfatórios.  O presente artigo visa analisar o atual quadro da questão nuclear iraniana, argumentando que reflete controvérsias e dificuldades intrínsecas do regime de não proliferação nuclear.

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Gontijo, Raquel, e Luiza Elena Januário. 2020. “O Programa Nuclear Iraniano E O Regime De não-proliferação: Dilemas Para O Futuro”. Meridiano 47 - Journal of Global Studies 21 (julho). https://doi.org/10.20889/M47e21007.
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Artigos
Biografia do Autor

Raquel Gontijo, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais

Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Departamento de Relações Internacionais

Luiza Elena Januário, Universidade Estadual Paulista

Universidade Estadual Paulista, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais San Tiago Dantas 

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