ON CARNAP'S CRITERION OF EMPIRICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN LIGHT OF KAPLAN'S CRITIQUE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v13i28.54059Keywords:
Empirical Meaningfulness. Carnap. Kaplan. Structural-Methodological Approach.Abstract
In this paper, I present Carnap's proposal regarding a possible criterion for empirical significance. We demonstrate that Carnap's proposal consists of a partially semantic interpretation of a formal system that would represent the total language of science. Furthermore, we consider Kaplan's critique of the thinker's structural-methodological approach. Our objective, therefore, is merely to raise considerations about Carnap's criterion of empirical significance in light of Kaplan's reservations. Thus, we divide the article into three sections. Initially, we outline the philosophical debate on empirical significance, then we present Carnap's proposal. Finally, we expose Kaplan's considerations and their strength in Carnap's thesis. We argue, in conclusion, that Kaplan's criticisms are somewhat unintuitive and can be circumvented.
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