ANCHORING MEANING-THEORIES AGAINST TRUTH-CENTERED MEANING THEORIES
a defense of Dummett against Davidson’s Program
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v13i28.53848Keywords:
Truth-conditional semantics. Meaning-theory. Inferentialism. Meaning foundationalism.Abstract
Micheal Dummett, in 1991(1993), proposed a defense against a meaning-theory based on truth, using inspiration from proof-theories, intuitionism, and a anti-realistic epistemic conception. He argued that truth-based approaches fail to account for inferential phenomena that are not classically formalized. He emphasizes the need to avoid blindly assuming fixed success parameters based on inductive generation of meaning through the concept of "truth". Instead, Dummett suggests that the relationship between truth and meaning should prioritize the theoretical conception of meaning as the mediating element for anchoring successful assertion strategies. In this article, we utilize Dummett's theory to present a framework that challenges Davidson's theory. We argue that Davidson's theory only holds scientific-linguistic value in idealized optimal conditions, where the interpreter's problem is already circumscribed by a non-problematic representation of truth. This framework excludes situations where the truth parameter itself becomes problematic, such as conflicts between translation hypotheses or disagreements between scientific paradigms.
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