A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF HUME AND HIS ROLE IN MORAL JUDGMENTS
the pursuit of impartiality, stability, and objectivity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v13i28.53636Keywords:
David Hume. General point of view. Moral judgments.Abstract
Hume's moral theory is famous for the centrality it gives to feelings. But this does not make him a naive slave to passions. This paper investigates the role played by the Humean general point of view in moral judgments. The work has three sections. The first presents a picture of Humean moral sentimentalism. The second investigates the concept of the general point of view, its main elements and its function in the correction of moral judgments. The last one deals with the principle of humanity and its importance for the intersubjective "stability" of moral judgments. The point of view "corrects" the particular elements of situated feelings: judgments are freed from natural selectivity and partiality and achieve stability and objectivity. The importance of the general point of view lies in its ability to regulate the contradictory nature of feelings. It confers, to the extent of human possibility, impartiality, stability and objectivity to moral judgments.
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