THE ARGUMENT FROM HALLUCINATION AND SENSORIMOTOR ENACTIVISM
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v11i23.44418Keywords:
Enactivism. Theory of perception. Argument from illusion. Sense data. Philosophy of mind.Abstract
According to sensorimotor enactivism, as developed by Alva Noë in Action in Perception (2004), perception occurs due to the perceiver's knowledge of the sensorimotor contingencies, that is, of how the flow of sensation changes according to their movement. This thesis implies a commitment to the theory of direct realism, according to which our perception puts us in direct contact with the world. The argument from hallucination concludes the opposite of that, that it is only possible to have perceptual contact with the world through mental entities, not directly. The main premise of this argument is that hallucinations are phenomenologically indistinguishable from veridical perception. The goal of this text is to argue through the framework of enactivism against the argument from hallucination and for a direct realist conception of perception. It is argued that it follows from the enactivist approach that hallucinations can always be phenomenologically distinguished from veridical perception.
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