CORRESPONDENCE THEORIES OOF TRUTH

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v9i18.29581

Keywords:

Correspondence Theories of Truth. Alethic Realism. Bertrand Russell. John Austin.

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to discuss two versions and some main problems concerning the correspondence theories of truth (CR). We wish here to focus primarily at the fact-based contemporary versions of CRs. In this area, there’s still a bifurcation concerning the two main variations of the CRs. The first of them gives an account of the correspondence relation in terms of congruence, the second, in terms of correlation. We’ll thus try to articulate the specificities of each one as portraited in Russell’s and Austin’s versions of correspondence theories, which are taken as paradigmatically representing this distinction, respectively. Our final goal is also to discuss some implications and objections often raised to CRs and its theorists.

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Author Biography

Matheus Colares do Nascimento, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

Graduado em Filosofia (2018) pela Universidade Federal do Pará e estudante de mestrado na Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC). Tem interesse em Filosofia Contemporânea, com ênfase em Filosofia Analítica, Filosofia da Linguagem, Ética; principalmente com os seguintes autores: Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin. Atualmente pesquisa o desenvolvimento da relação entre Ética e Linguagem em Wittgenstein.

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Published

2020-08-31

How to Cite

Colares do Nascimento, M. (2020). CORRESPONDENCE THEORIES OOF TRUTH. PÓLEMOS – Revista De Estudantes De Filosofia Da Universidade De Brasília, 9(18), 293–314. https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v9i18.29581

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