CAN COGNITIVE SCIENCE EXPLAIN THE QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF OUR MENTAL STATES?

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v3i5.11586

Keywords:

Qualia. Cognitive Science. Materialism.

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that two famous arguments that were designed to show that a scientific approach to qualia is not possible do not succeed. I first present a general definition of what I understand by Cognitive Science focusing on its interdisciplinary approach. After that, I spell out some theoretical and methodological considerations about how one may proceed in order to approach the mind from an interdisciplinary perspective. I finish the paper by showing that the difficulties raised in the first part of the paper can be surpassed by approaching qualia in the interdisciplinary framework outlined here.

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Author Biography

André Rosolem Sant'Anna, Universidade Estadual de Maringá

Graduando em Filosofia pela Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM). Tem interesses em temas de filosofia da mente, filosofia da percepção e filosofia da ciência.

References

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Published

2014-09-12

How to Cite

Rosolem Sant’Anna, A. . (2014). CAN COGNITIVE SCIENCE EXPLAIN THE QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF OUR MENTAL STATES?. PÓLEMOS – Revista De Estudantes De Filosofia Da Universidade De Brasília, 3(5), 81–102. https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v3i5.11586

Issue

Vol. 3 No. 5 (2014)

Section

Artigos

License

Copyright (c) 2016 Pólemos

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