ON THE PARADOX OF THE WITTGENSTEIN SKEPTIC ENUNCIATED BY SAUL KRIPKE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v1i2.11538Keywords:
Skeptical paradox. Rule. Private Language Argument. Truth Conditions. Justification Conditions.Abstract
The present work introduces Wittgenstein’s skeptical paradox, which, according to Kripke, establishes that no course of action could be determined by a rule, because we cannot assure that the past learning of a rule can determine any behavior according to the same rule in the future. Later, this work presents what Kripke believes is the solution to the paradox, which lies in the argument opposite to the private language argument, according to the change in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, from Tractatus to Philosophical Investigations, which Kripke characterized as a change from a truth conditions theory to a justification conditions theory.
Downloads
References
KRIPKE, Saul. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. Investigações Filosóficas. Trad. Marcos G. Montagnoli. 6 ed. Petrópolis; Vozes, 2009.
_________________. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trad. Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos. 3 ed. São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 2010.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2016 Pólemos
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Todos os trabalhos que forem aceitos para publicação, após o devido processo avaliativo, serão publicados sob uma licença Creative Commons, na modalidade Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Esta licença permite que qualquer pessoa copie e distribua a obra total e derivadas criadas a partir dela, desde que seja dado crédito (atribuição) ao autor / Ã autora / aos autores / às autoras.