ON THE PARADOX OF THE WITTGENSTEIN SKEPTIC ENUNCIATED BY SAUL KRIPKE

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v1i2.11538

Keywords:

Skeptical paradox. Rule. Private Language Argument. Truth Conditions. Justification Conditions.

Abstract

The present work introduces Wittgenstein’s skeptical paradox, which, according to Kripke, establishes that no course of action could be determined by a rule, because we cannot assure that the past learning of a rule can determine any behavior according to the same rule in the future. Later, this work presents what Kripke believes is the solution to the paradox, which lies in the argument opposite to the private language argument, according to the change in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, from Tractatus to Philosophical Investigations, which Kripke characterized as a change from a truth conditions theory to a justification conditions theory.

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Author Biography

Maysa Massimo, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro

Doutoranda em Filosofia pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-RJ)

References

KRIPKE, Saul. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.

WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. Investigações Filosóficas. Trad. Marcos G. Montagnoli. 6 ed. Petrópolis; Vozes, 2009.

_________________. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trad. Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos. 3 ed. São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 2010.

Published

2013-03-15

How to Cite

Massimo Ribeiro, M. M. (2013). ON THE PARADOX OF THE WITTGENSTEIN SKEPTIC ENUNCIATED BY SAUL KRIPKE. PÓLEMOS – Revista De Estudantes De Filosofia Da Universidade De Brasília, 1(2), 191–209. https://doi.org/10.26512/pl.v1i2.11538

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Section

Artigos