FREEDOM, NEED AND MORALS IN HUME

Abstract

Someone who is familiarized with the way that Hume treats the subject liberty and necessity, in the Treatise as in the Enquire, perceives that his argument has two parts: first, Hume offers arguments in order to establish the thesis that ours actions are determined; second, the philosopher talks about the way in which this discussion is related to moral. On this point, he asserts ”“ in a position diametrically opposite from the traditional way of thinking the question ”“ that, instead of incompatible, liberty and necessity are not only consistent, but even required by morality. Explain why, according to Hume, liberty and necessity are essential for morals is the central task of this text, reasons that, curiously, have passed unnoticed for many respectful commentators. In effect, the right understanding of this question passes through that Hume considers as the proper object of our moral feelings and the way in which those feelings are produced. That’s something whose comprehension requires the analysis of the second book of the Treatise, the Of the Passions book.