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## MORAL RELATIVISM IN SOCIAL SCIENCES UNDERSTOOD FROM THE IDEAS AND PERSPECTIVES OF KUHN TO ARENDT

## RELATIVISMO MORAL NAS CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS COMPREENDIDO A PARTIR DAS IDEIAS E PERSPECTIVAS DE KUHN A ARENDT

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### ABSTRACT

The present essay has the purpose of explaining, through the perspectives of six different thinkers and scientists, what is the philosophical idea of Moral Relativism within Social Sciences – with a special focus on International Relations –, how might it be useful in understanding its (philosophical) implications for future research, and what could be the possible alternatives. The thinkers and authors discussed are Thomas Kuhn, Hannah Arendt, Charles Wright Mills, Arnold Brecht, Kees Van Der Pijl and Jeppe Nicolaisen. Some of them don't discuss directly about Moral Relativism, while others deal specifically with the theme. Ideas of what power and truth are also discussed. By the end of the essay it is affirmed how this philosophical idea was and is used by the elite to influence unconsciously the opinion and moral ideas for their own benefits, and to keep the *status-quo*.

**Key-words:** Moral Relativism. Social Sciences. Power-relations. Truth. Power.

### RESUMO

O presente ensaio tem por objetivo explicar, através das perspectivas de seis diferentes pensadores e cientistas, o que é a ideia filosófica de Relativismo Moral nas Ciências Sociais - com especial enfoque nas Relações Internacionais –, como pode ser útil a sua compreensão (filosófica), quais as implicações para pesquisas futuras, e quais poderiam ser as alternativas possíveis. Os pensadores e autores discutidos são Thomas Kuhn, Hannah Arendt, Charles Wright Mills, Arnold Brecht, Kees Van Der Pijl e Jeppe Nicolaisen. Alguns deles não discutem diretamente sobre o Relativismo Moral, enquanto outros tratam especificamente do tema. Idéias sobre o que é poder e verdade também são discutidas. Ao final do ensaio afirma-se como essa ideia filosófica foi e ainda é utilizada pelas elites para influenciar inconscientemente a opinião e as ideias morais em seu próprio benefício, ou seja para manter o *status-quo*.

**Palavras-chave:** Relativismo Moral. Ciências Sociais. Relações de poder. Verdade. Poder.

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

Moral relativism is the idea (or view) that there is nothing morally right or wrong for everybody, moral judgements are only true or false to some culture or historical period, and no view is better than any other. Moral relativism, since it relativizes the truth of moral claims, also relativizes truth in a broader spectrum. In other words, “beliefs and actions are not inherently right or wrong, but only right or wrong for certain people” (WESTACOTT, 2020, p.1). In terms of objective and subjective thinking, moral relativism then believes that there isn't a universal objective moral truth, facts and values are subjective according to specific cultures and historical periods.

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Due to this subjectivity in dealing with morals and values, it might be relevant and necessary to understand what are the possible implications of this philosophical (moral relativism) view within social sciences in general. Since science and morality aren't normally discussed together, the present short essay tries to do just that. Not only, but also tries to demonstrate how moral relativism is used by specific leaders and the anglophone elite to disseminate their moral views and values throughout the world. We first analyze an article by Arnold Brecht, secondly, we discuss the ideas of Thomas Kuhn, specially in his book *The Structures of Scientific Revolutions*. Afterwards we write about the American sociologist Charles Wright Mills, then we discuss the article of Hanna Arendt entitled *Truth and Politics* of 1967. We discuss moral relativism within specific fields and subjects of social sciences with Kees van der Pijl, and we finish with a brief discussion of Jeppe Nicolaisen on what is truth and how to detect misinformation on the internet, seen through the perspectives of relativism and science.

## 2 MORAL RELATIVISM WITHIN SCIENCE

Relativism in political theory is dealt in particular in an article by Arnold Brecht. The text is presented as a summary of discussions that took place between some important scholars of the subject. The purpose of those meetings was to try to analyze the vacuum that modern sciences and the modern scientific method have left in areas such as ethics,

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religion and philosophy. “An emptiness that leads to an inability for men to distinguish what is good or bad, right or wrong in a scientific way” (BRECHT, 1947, p. 470).

Brecht and the scholars dwell on what they define as "higher-level relativism", the relativism that supports the possible existence of an absolute truth that defines the superiority and inferiority of values and the possibility that some men can see that. Man can understand the truth but cannot convey it through conclusive proofs or demonstrations to other men. What Brecht is affirming is that the personal preferences, influenced by emotions, will always go before the impartial truth. In other words, when one understands the truth and tries to express it, he/she cannot speak through statements but only through emotional preferences. In doing so, the validity of the value is beyond scientific proof. The only thing science can do is “1) clarify the ratings of values and 2) examine the consequences of political action based on these evaluations” (BRECHT, 1947, p. 472).

Another point made by Brecht is the definition of “proof” of values. As it has been said, it is not possible to have a scientific proof of values. Perhaps, there are other types of proof of value, which are referred to as “valid natural law theory”. The first type of proof is “from the outside”, which means that the value of the test is impossible to carry out. In short, the declaration is impossible either for logical impossibility or for biological impossibility. The second test is “from the inside”. This test happens when the value represents something contrary to the basic needs. For example, the feeling of justice and injustice can change between people and yet it is an inescapable category for man. The recognition of the connection between truth and justice represents a stable and intrinsic factor of man. Justice is not universally recognized but the idea of justice and the need for truth to do justice represent an inevitable part of man. “Hence, the evidence “from the inside” weakens human unavoidable factors” (BRECHT, 1947, p. 476).

The real existence of these two proofs (from the outside / from the inside) is however questioned and criticized. According to some scholars, the test from the outside does not represent an assessment of the value but of the person's capabilities to think correctly. While the proof from the inside turns out to be null because there is no idea what a complete proof really is. So, we can't even have an idea of what an approximation or plausible proof is. Brecht also reports a speech by Mr. Hallowell regarding the central role of Christianity in recognizing man's power to understand what is right and wrong through reason. Still, “some scholars' criticism of Hallowell's view moves towards the inability to have scientific proof of the existence of universal values” (BRECHT, 1947, pp. 477- 483).



The final part of the analysis about universal values and relativism moves towards activism in the society of relativistic scholars in school and politics. Regarding the role of relativist scholars in teaching there are two paths: either to be neutral or to be aligned. The problem is deeply felt, above all because of the relativists' fear of reopening ideologies such as the fascist one. "According to scholars, there is no right path to follow how to teach. What is important for the scholars discussed in Brecht's article is that the assumptions are clearly established" (BRECHT, 1947, pp. 477- 483).

In relation with the theme of politics, the discussion of Brecht moves on to the contribution that can be given by relativist scholars in understanding the origins of political values. According to them, "politics should not only be understood as an objective goal and purposes but also as a subjective relationship between social actors" (BRECHT, 1947, p. 483). Following this, the analysis shifts to the role of intellectuals in practicing politics. Brecht reports that many of the scholars profess to be in accord with the idea of being active in politics, particularly to combat ideologies. "Mr. Hallowell argues that truth should not only be sought and be taught but also be practiced through politics" (BRECHT, 1947, p. 487). Relating to this idea of objective truth and values on sciences by Brecht, Tomas Kuhn discusses these ideas and relativism in his book.

In the book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* Kuhn tackles the question of scientific relativism. Analyzing the history of science, Kuhn studies, in particular, the changes in what he calls paradigms. "The paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share and at the same time a scientific community consists of men who share the same paradigm" (KUHN, 2012, p. 164). Paradigms are indispensable for science because they allow it to be stable and lasting. In the absence of a paradigm, there are different currents among the different schools competing for scientific capacity. However, paradigms are not laws but models of action of a given community. The paradigm shift brings with it a revolution in how the world is viewed. A paradigm is tested when, following persistent failures in solving a puzzle, a new theory and a new paradigm are born. No paradigm answers all puzzles, but some answer more puzzles than others.

The inability to grasp reality in the scientific field leads to an impossibility to experience the truth. "Yet, Kuhn himself in the Post Scriptum of the related book defines his system as non-relativist theory" (KUHN, 2012, p. 186). "Kuhn argues that scientific progress is irreversible and unidirectional, although it rejects the linear and progressive conception of the history of science" (KUHN, 2012, p. 136). "Kuhn supports those who try to move his ideas towards the development of other non-scientific subjects



such as art, history, music, and literature" (KUHN, 2012, p. 188). The division into periods of these subjects (e.g. Humanism, Renaissance) represents a clear example of Kuhn's theory of revolution and paradigms. Bringing Kuhn to the level of relativistic moralism is difficult. His vision could influence the moralistic sphere with the theory of the indefinable nature of reality. For what it is easy to transpose from scientific indeterminability of reality to total indeterminability of reality this step cannot absolutely be taken so lightly. For example, Kuhn's view does not eliminate the possibility of accessing the truth through other forms. The book does not address issues such as morals, ethics and the values of a society. Nevertheless, the relevance of Kuhn's idea in moral relativism is the fact that people with different moral perspectives have different models of the way the world works, emphasizing different indicators linked to different values. A more powerful idea (as accepted) gets embraced and some values may conflict with these accepted ideas, as it is thoroughly discussed by Mills below.

262 In the book *The Sociological Imagination* C. Wright Mills deals with the theme of values and moralistic relativism. He argues that we are entering a new age. Each epoch brings new questions and new answers about who we are, where we are, where we go. "The previous epoch was born from the Enlightenment, and in particular from two of its ideological currents that characterized the following centuries, liberalism and socialism" (MILLS, 2020, p. 165-166). In both these two ideologies the author sees many affinities of values and assumptions. In particular, both doctrines believe that an increase in rationality leads to an increase in freedom for men. Freedom and reason are two central themes of the entire analysis of Mills. According to him, in this new era that we are entering (the Fourth Epoch), "freedom and reason have become questionable values. An increase in rationality does not lead to an increase in freedom" (MILLS, 2020, p. 167).

Today, large and rational organizations, such as bureaucracy, have led to the alienation of the individual. As Mills argues, a high level of rational organization of society and technology have not led to an increase in social or individual intelligence. Furthermore, the new organization of society has not led to an increase in freedom but rather often ends in tyranny and manipulation. Authority is also faded: there is no clear limit between those who produce alienation and those who suffer from it. In fact, being an active part of the alienated society makes you a promoter of alienation. Mills highlights these "great problems of society as the crisis of individuals and the crisis of the history-making" (MILLS, 2020, pp. 167-173). In the new society that will be born, it is necessary to clarify what freedom and rationality will be. Mills argues that "freedom is the possibility of formulating possible choices,



evaluating and choosing them. But not everyone wants this freedom today" (MILLS, 2020, p. 174).

Mills argues that politics in addressing issues considers values. As sociological science professionals and individuals, it is therefore important to clarify what these values are. According to Mills, what are defined as universal values are actually the values of a dominant culture, namely the Western civilization. Social scientists very often do not need to choose values because they assume the values of the dominant culture as universal. The values of the social sciences are neither transcendent or immanent. The first example he takes into consideration is the value of factual truth. As accurate as the role of social scientists tries to be, its result is very often not rated as important to human affairs. Two values come into action here: first the value of the role of reason in human affairs, second the value of human freedom. This system of values has led to the development of the Western model, yet in their implementation, they often lead to disagreement. On account of this fact, "the purpose of the intellectuals is to clarify what the ideals of freedom and reason are" (MILLS, 2000, p. 179).

The scientist can do this in three ways to convince politicians: become a power advisor, take power, and stay independent. By showing these three ways, Mills argues that men are free and with their rationality they can change the course of history. Again, men are free to make history but some of them are freer than others. "The freedom to shape the future requires the possession of power. In our society, men, and especially the elites, can make history" (MILLS, 2000, p. 183).

In the search for a definition of freedom and reason, the scientist must determine the limits of these two values in history. Mills also remembers that scientists, who try to isolate themselves from reality to study it, are themselves part of reality. Nobody is outside the society. However even if the scientist seeks the complete truth, he cannot reach it. "The scientist's purpose as a teacher must be to try to create a society of genuine individuals rather than popular masses" (MILLS, 2000, p. 187). Similarly to Mills, Arendt discusses the ideas of what truth is, and why it is never in politics, since it is the opposite of power relations.

Hannah Arendt argues in her essay *On Truth and Politics* that, since factual truth is the opposite of opinion, lying and persuasion, it is outside of the political sphere, because this latter is within power-conflicts relations. As she affirmed, truth is of a coercive nature, beyond agreement, dispute, opinion, or consent. For this reason, "it is outside of the political realm, and is as independent of the wishes and desires of the citizens as is the will of the worst tyrant" (ARENDR, 1967, p. 8). In other words, there is an objective truth that should be searched by the true scientist, named by her in her essay as "truthtellers". For



Arendt, "truth telling should be the duty of the isolated scientists and the artist, the impartial judge and historian, the independence of the fact-finder, the witness, the reporter, and the solitude of the philosopher" (ARENDR, 1967, p. 16). As she wrote, "(impartiality) is the root of all so-called objectivity – this curious passion, unknown outside Western civilization, for intellectual integrity at any price. Without it no science would ever have come into being" (ARENDR, 1967, p. 18).

Differently from the view of moral relativism, Arendt kept affirming throughout her essay that there exists factual universal truth independent of opinion or world views, and no historian or person should blur this for his/her benefits or interests. As she said, even if we "admit that every generation has the right to write its own history, we admit no more than that it has the right to rearrange the facts in accordance with its own perspective; we don't admit the right to touch the factual matter itself" (ARENDR, 1967, p. 7). In her essay, she gives examples in which different power complexes and private organizations try to manipulate and blur factual objective truth for their benefits. "The self-deceptions practiced on both sides in the period of the Cold War are too many to enumerate, but obviously, they are a case in point" (ARENDR, 1967, p. 15). According to her, "the danger is that nothing prevents these new stories, images, and non-facts from becoming an adequate substitute for reality and factuality" (ARENDR, 1967, p. 14).

For Arendt then, relating back to the idea of moral relativism, there are innumerable cases where lies were performed in politics, in which those in power tried to manipulate factual truth for their benefits (when they used the idea of moral relativism for their power interests). This view is similar to that of Van der Pijl with the Atlantic ruling class as we'll notice below, in which the Atlantic anglophone class advanced their moral relativistic view of International Relations throughout the world. For Arendt then, the alternative to moral relativism (the belief that nothing is inherently right or wrong) is the search for factual truth – consequently the knowledge of what is right or wrong – and it can only be found and preserved outside politics, and should be the job of the true impartial scientist or philosopher.

Kees van der Pijl demonstrates in his article *The world view of the Atlantic ruling class as academic discipline*, how the academic intelligence base was created to support the national and transnational hegemony of North American business. Van der Pijl argues that specialized disciplines in universities can often be used by the ruling class (specially the anglophone ruling classes) to keep the *status-quo*. As he argues, "academic disciplines in the contemporary sense are part of the social structures through which a ruling class seeks to maintain its political-economic pre-eminence" (VAN DER PIJL, 2017, p.



2). In other words, the goal (of the academic intelligence base, also known as *Lockean Heartland*) is to eliminate non-disciplinary, ‘undisciplined’ forms of thinking in all fields of the university. "Especially in the US the structures of socialization of knowledge remain private but their operation was geared to US policy in every domain" (VAN DER PIJL, 2017, p. 7). As Van der Pijl affirms, from the "Reagan presidency onwards, and again with the ‘War on Terror’, the West’s imperial attacks have largely reaffirmed the coercive orientation of the main policy-related disciplines" (VAN DER PIJL, 2017, p. 11).

Van der Pijl gives examples of how moral relativism related to historical class formation and world view appeared in scholarship in International Relations. "After 1945, a one-sided political international relations (IR) emanated, disqualifying political-economic theories of imperialism, while supporting liberalism" (VAN DER PIJL, 2017, p. 2). "This anglophone ruling class has privileged access to the organs of social reproduction, both in the material sphere and of ideas" (VAN DER PIJL, 2017, p. 2). "The world view of the Atlantic ruling class is constantly being constructed, as it is affirmed in the end of his article, ‘American hegemony rests on the multiple foundations of a monopoly of violence, economic dominance, and ideological “soft power” ’" (VAN DER PIJL, 2017, p. 12). Furthermore, "moral ideas such as "liberty" and "self-government" were understood as pertaining only to the propertied classes, not to slaves or contract workers "(VAN DER PIJL, 2017, p. 5).

The design for the discipline of IR was the "Wilsonian blueprint" (characterized by rule-base relations, free trade etc.), established with the election of Woodrow Wilson. "In order for it to be broadly accepted and hegemonized, incipient ideas of the discipline of IR such as "anarchy" and "power insecurities" had to be first solved and neutralized" (VAN DER PIJL, 2017, p. 5). "That Wilson's project – the creation of a world of formally sovereign nation-states under liberal, Anglo-American supervision – remains the implicit program of IR till the present day" (VAN DER PIJL, 2017, p. 7). "During the 1950, many CIA members and Cold War Intellectuals assisted the dissemination of a ‘positivistic empiricism, rationalism, technocratic modernism, and a general opposition to “totalizing” philosophies”" (VAN DER PIJL, 2017, p. 9).

Relating to the idea of moral relativism and some examples of its appearance in scholarship of IR, Van der Pijl argues that IR was constructed around the contradiction of idealism versus realism. "In this contradiction the world view of the Atlantic ruling class is being drip-fed into successive generations of students across the globe" (VAN DER PIJL, 2017, p. 11). Thus the American hegemony in the IR discipline was consciously constructed during the first half of the XX century (especially with the





elections of Woodrow Wilson), and is an example of how certain values, norms and world views are induced and disciplined as universal truth and regarded as eternal verities based in nature, for the benefits of the Atlantic ruling class. Examples that we can see are neoliberalism, free trade, among others. Similarly, as Mills affirmed, the social scientist is already working on the basis of certain values. The values that these disciplines now embody have been selected from those created in Western society. Therefore, "what a man calls moral judgment is merely his desire to generalize, and so make available for others, those values he has come to choose" (MILLS, 2000, p. 178). Thus, the moral values that men pursue have been inculcated by vested interests. As he affirmed, "these values are often the only ones men have had any chance to develop. They are unconsciously acquired habits rather than choices" (MILLS, 2000, p. 194).

Similar to this idea, Mills argues that large organizations and the structure in society (the milieu) have alienated men through embedded self-rationalization into their private lives. This alienation (or powerlessness) causes men to lose real freedom and the capacity to reason. As he affirms

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The chance of men to reason is destroyed, as rationality increases and its control is moved from the individual to the big-scale organization (in service of a managerial elite). There is then rationality without reason. Such rationality is not commensurate with freedom but the destroyer of it (MILLS, 2000, p. 170).

For Mills, this alienated man is the antithesis of the Western image of the free man. "The society in which this "cheerful robot" flourishes is the antithesis of the free society, of a democratic society" (MILLS, 2000, p. 172). Relating to this idea of truth in science and reason, Nicolaisen forwards a worthy, yet different, argument.

Jeppe Nicolaisen in his paper *Climbing Mount Dependable: How to detect misinformation on the Internet*, explains ways in how to detect misinformation and not fall into fake news or misinformation. Also known as *source criticism*, he explains how to separate good from false information. He argues that even though the internet can provide an infinite amount of good information through articles, videos and other sources, it can also give misinformation. "The first step then is to understand that not everything searched and found on the internet is true because, among other factors, peer review and quality control is often absent on the Internet" (NICOLAISEN, 2013, p. 2). Also, some kind of authority hierarchy exists, "some sources seem to possess higher authority compared to others, and sources with higher authority seem to be more trustworthy than sources with lower authority" (NICOLAISEN, 2013, p. 2).



The relevance of Nicolaisen's argument is the fact that it is important to search for a single universal truth that needs to be found and checked with a higher authority. Nicolaisen believes there is in fact a single, objective truth that can be searched with accepted higher authorities, opposing, consequently, relativism. For Nicolaisen then, we should look for sources coming from a higher authority hierarchy (the primary literature), and "it is advisable to move upwards in the authority hierarchy" (NICOLAISEN, 2013, p. 5). He acknowledges that even though there can be potential institutional affiliation influence and interests in scientific publications, "we should trust their impartiality because for him there is a fine line between vigilance and paranoia which one should not cross" (NICOLAISEN, 2013, p. 8).

### 3 CONCLUSION

267 After discussing the six authors a conclusion is drawn that even though there is not a consensus among them about the benefits of moral relativism in science in general, it can indeed be affirmed, through different historical examples, that the elite or the Atlantic ruling class as discussed by Van der Pijl has used relativism to impose their views and morality into the world. Ideas such as liberalism, free-trade as cited by Van der Pijl, or the examples by Arendt during the Cold War are just a few discussed. As Arendt affirmed, "since everything that has actually happened in the realm of human affairs could just as well have been otherwise, the possibilities for lying are boundless, and this boundlessness makes for self-defeat" (ARENDR, 1967, p. 15). Furthermore, even though Kuhn didn't consider himself as a relativist, he affirmed indirectly that science and paradigms can indeed be influenced by current hegemonic moral views. Mills agrees with Pijl about the power of the elite, and how the accepted norms and values are unconsciously acquired by the general population, and equally unconsciously defended. Mills finishes his book affirming that the real values should be freedom and reason, and the "cheerful robot" would realize them for its benefits.

The argument of Nicolaisen and of other authors discussed throughout the present essay relates to Kuhn's idea of scientific development and continued evolution, or scientific objectivity. The higher authority sources are often deemed to come from the current science community acceptance (or hegemonic power, *status quo* relation). These high authority sources might not necessarily be the true information, since science, through different paradigms and theoretical frameworks, are in constant development, and accepted paradigms can also be related to power relations. In other words, for Kuhn science



does not necessarily progress continually towards truth. Also, as we saw, moral relativism and power conflicts are related, in which there is a tendency for one moral norm to be more widely accepted and spread than others. Finally, for Mills and others, the main intellectual and political duty of the social scientist is to make clear to people the elements of unease and indifference that are currently present in society, and this duty is an alternative to overcome this moral relativism and alienation. A democratic society only flourishes with free and rational individuals, in which genuine publics rather than masses prevail. For these reasons, "freedom and rationality should be the predominant values of a society, not the values of vested interests. These latter values are unconsciously acquired habits rather than choices" (MILLS, 2000, p. 194). The end goal of social scientists, thus, "is to demonstrate and translate personal troubles in public ones, illustrating how the milieu and the society structures influence men's lives and are common to most people" (MILLS, 2000, p. 194).



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