

Logical and Analogical Thinking

[Pensamento Lógico e Analógico]

Gottfried Gabriel*

Abstract: The contrast between logical and analogical thinking is illustrated by the representative views of Frege and Nietzsche. These ways of thinking turn out to be expressions of different ways of conceiving the world. They stand for two opposing traditions of contemporary philosophy: scientific-analytic philosophy and postmodern deconstruction. Based on Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, it is argued that neither of the two perspectives is absolute, but that both should complement each other.

Keywords: Complementarity. Family. Resemblance. Logic. Metaphor. Rhetoric. Frege. Nietzsche. Wittgenstein.

Resumo: O contraste entre o pensamento lógico e analógico é ilustrado pelas visões representativas de Frege e Nietzsche. Essas formas de pensar acabam sendo expressões de diferentes formas de conceber o mundo. Elas representam duas tradições opostas da filosofia contemporânea: filosofia científico-analítica e desconstrução pós-moderna. Com base na filosofia da linguagem de Wittgenstein, argumenta-se que nenhuma das duas perspectivas é absoluta, mas que ambas devem se complementar.

Palavras-chave: Complementaridade. Semelhança de família. Lógica. Metáfora. Retórica. Frege. Nietzsche. Wittgenstein.

I should like to begin with a provisional elucidation of the concepts in the title of my paper. The term "logical thinking" means here a kind of thinking which argumentatively conducts itself on the basis of precise distinctions, i.e., by means of "sharply delimited concepts" (FREGE, 1903, § 56). In contrast, the term "analogical thinking" is supposed to designate a kind of thinking which, availing itself of "transiti-

ons," manages to keep the conceptual boundaries pervious. So defined, logical thinking compels the differentiation of that which is similar, while analogical thinking seeks similarities in disparity. The basis of analogical thinking is the vagueness of concepts.

My paper will treat analogical thinking in philosophy, but I want to stress the point that vagueness is the reason for analogical thinking in jurispru-

*Professor emeritus of Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany. PhD (1972). Habilitation (1976).
E-mail: gottfried.gabriel@uni-jena.de.

dence as well. If the rules of justice (*die Rechtssätze*) have gaps it might not be clear whether a special case is subsumable under a special law or not. That is, the logical law of the excluded middle is not applicable. And this happens because general laws cannot anticipate all possible particular cases to be judged. Such cases need interpretation by analogy. Though in criminal law - following the principle "nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege" - conclusions by analogy are controversial, in fact they are unavoidable. Here I refer to the continental civil law. In the Anglo-Saxon common law it is quite clear that the regard of precedents (*Präzedenzfälle*) in case law requires analogical thinking in judging the similarity and comparability of the cases.

The opposition between logical and analogical thinking should bring into view the central point of a conflict which has essentially shaped the self-understanding of Western philosophy, namely, the conflict between logic and rhetoric. Logic excludes rhetoric from its disciplinary realm. This is so because cognition is fixed to the concept of truth, truth conceived as the truth of propositions. This conception secures cognition to the form of propositionality. Therewith, it expels from logic all elements which make no contribution to the truth-valuative, propositional content of thinking and language. These elements are banished to another realm: the "ghetto"

of rhetoric, which, since A.G. Baumgarten, has been called "aesthetics," where they may "compensatorily" indulge their non-propositional manner of thinking. This development underlies the opposition of the scientific and aesthetic comprehensions of the world. Naturally, I should not like to assert that rhetoric and aesthetics coincide (already Aristotle wrote a separate "Poetics" along with a "Rhetoric"), nor that poetry and eloquence are taken up without remainder in analogical thinking. The fact is, however, that the contemporary return of rhetoric into philosophy - under the catch-word "metaphor" - accompanies an uprising of analogical thinking against its logical counterpart.

More narrowly seen, the goal of this rhetorical turn consists in levelling the generic difference between philosophy and literature as well as their peculiar forms of cognition. More broadly conceived, this attempt gains its practical-philosophical significance through its accompanying critique of the Western concept of rationality. Behind the epistemological question about the relation of logical and analogical thinking stands the anthropological question about the appropriate relation of man to world - the conflict between the logical-scientific and the analogical-aesthetic comprehensions of the world. One solution for overcoming this antagonism consists in compensating for the so-called deficits of analytical sci-

ence through rhetorical art (cf. MARQUARD, 2003, pp. 173-177). To me, however, this solution appears not only to be unjust towards science, but also to give art itself much too little credit. Compensation degenerates only too easily into mere surrogacy. More appropriate may be the stronger thesis which holds that science and art complement one another as equally entitled modes of disclosing the world (GOODMAN, 1976), although without allowing the difference between them to disappear. The following reflections are intended to help support this view by showing that it is justified and does not represent merely a flight from the surging tide of post-modernism.

I shall now proceed by sketching out, first, logical thinking with reference to its proponent Frege and, then, in somewhat more detail, the critique of logical thinking with reference to its opponent Nietzsche. I shall examine this critique in order to develop from it, in contrast to Nietzsche's own exaggerated claims, the justified aim of analogical thinking. Starting from an analysis and a new assessment of the Wittgensteinian concept of "family resemblance," I shall then attempt to place logical and analogical thinking in an appropriate relation, one which may be provisionally described as the complementarity of two contrary forms of presentation.

What is surprising is that both Frege

as a logical thinker and Wittgenstein as an analogical thinker employ the concept of perspicuity. A glance at the historical background of both forms of "perspicuous representation" (*übersichtliche Darstellung*¹) in the traditions of logical "sagacity" (*acumen*) and aesthetic "wit" (*ingenium*) supports the thesis that the antagonism of logic and rhetoric exists only superficially. Its roots lie in excessively one-sided orientations which fail to do justice to an anthropologically grounded complementarity of these forms of cognition.

Frege and Logical Thinking

I shall not occupy myself in the following too extensively with a description of logical thinking. I should like only to mention the reasons which underlie the demand for the sharp delimitation of concepts, especially as it has been placed by the father of modern logic, Gottlob Frege. The demand for this sharp delimitation follows from the bivalence of classic logic. Vague concepts, for which one cannot determine whether a given object falls under them or not, prevent one from determining the truth or falsity of those propositions which assert such a subsumption. Already in his "Begriffsschrift" (1879), Frege established that contents in which such concepts occur invalidate themselves as "judgable" and

¹The new translation „surveyable representation“ is much better. Wittgenstein means „Übersicht“, not „Durchsicht“.

therewith as contents capable of possessing truth-values. (FREGE, 1879, p. 64) It is worth noting that as an example of a concept which should be so excluded, Frege explicitly names the concept of a "heap," therewith addressing the so-called sorites, which, since antiquity, has been brought into play by rhetoric as a logical paradox and, moreover, as an argument for analogical thinking in transitions.² Frege does not, however, exclude vague concepts in general. He only emphasizes that logic - in the sense of classic bivalent logic - cannot work with them. The logic of vague concepts, especially so-called "fuzzy logic," is only a later development. It may be viewed as an attempted logical rehabilitation of certain forms of analogical thinking. In the following reflections, however, we wish to restrict ourselves to that particular thought which Frege brings to light, namely, that logic must select or prepare the concepts with which it wants to work. This thought poses the question whether such a preparation involves a counterfeiting or falsification (*Fälschung*) of reality. This is exactly the objection which F. Nietzsche - without knowing Frege's work, of course, although contemporaneously with him - advances. The classic author of modern logical thinking and the classic author of post-modern

analogical thinking speak as if to one another. This "dialogue" eases for us the task of examining and comparing the arguments of Nietzsche and his successors.

Nietzsche and the Critique of Thinking in Terms of Identity

In the more recent critique of logic which may be traced back to Nietzsche and the rhetorical tradition, Frege's thinking in terms of "sharply delimited concepts" means thinking in terms of "identity." Those who in one way or another have allied themselves with Nietzsche's view, such as Th. W. Adorno, J. Derrida and J.-F. Lyotard, among others, pass themselves off as "advocates of the non-identical."³ Usually, advocates are counsels for the defense. These advocates, however, are instead prosecutors, and Adorno renders their complaints even more acute by intentionally placing the logical order of concepts in one and the same context with the dominant structures of the political order.

"The universality of thoughts, as discursive logic develops it, mastery in the sphere of the concept, exalts

²On the basis of vague concepts such as "heap" and "bald," hence, concepts which are not at all sharply delimited, rhetoricians attempted to argue that the opposites coincide because one cannot additively or subtractively decide, as the case may be, when a heap of grain begins or a healthy head of hair ends.

³I employ here a formulation from WELLMER (1985). Cf. particularly the expositions on pp. 85 f., 145 f., 148 f.

itself upon the foundation of mastery in reality." (ADORNO/HORKHEIMER, 1969, p. 20)

the process of assimilation must already have occurred [...]." (NIETZSCHE, 1966, p. 476)

Already Nietzsche indicates that logic arises not from the will to truth, but rather from the will to power. This objection is grounded in the fact that the formation of its concepts presupposes the thinking of identity, that is, the comprehension of the disparate as in a certain regard the same. By disregarding the peculiarities of individuals, this process of abstraction leads directly to the "universality of thoughts" which Adorno addresses. Nietzsche argues:

"The judgment - this is the belief: 'this and this is so.' Therefore, there lies in the judgment the avowal to have encountered an 'identical case': therefore, it presupposes comparison, with the help of memory. The judgment does not bring it about that there seems to be an identical case. Instead, it believes itself to perceive such; it works under the presupposition that there are identical cases at all. What is that function called which must be at work much longer, earlier, which in itself equalizes and assimilates unequal cases? [...]. Before one can judge,

On the basis of this conception of assimilation, Nietzsche develops the more principal objection of his broader assertion that such identification is a "counterfeiting" or "falsification" (*Fälschung*):

"Logic is bound to the condition: posited, there are identical cases. In fact, in order that one can think and conclude logically at all, this condition must first be feigned as having been fulfilled. This means: the will to logical truth can only carry itself out after having presupposed a fundamental counterfeiting of everything which occurs. As a result, there reigns here a drive which is capable of both means, first, of counterfeiting and, then, of carrying out its point of view: logic does not stem from the will to truth." (NIETZSCHE, 1966, p. 476)

The connection between the delimiting formation of concepts and thinking in terms of identity results from the fact that "identical cases" are to be understood as cases of the same universal regardless of the individual differen-

ces. The formulation "this and this is so" (in the first quotation from Nietzsche) says that in view of the universal "so," various individual "thises" are the same. The term "judgment" means the predicative proposition; and, in fact, it presupposes that the same predicate can apply to various subjects. In this sense, Nietzsche's formulation refers to an enumeration of elementary propositions in which the same predicate is attributed to various objects. In their common predicate, one ignores the differences between these objects. Now, one might wish to name just such a procedure analogical, because it equalizes that which is disparate. This procedure would then not at all stand in opposition to logical thinking, but instead would simply form what Nietzsche calls its "presupposition." In order to obviate any possible terminological misunderstandings here, it must be emphasized that not every comparison amounts to analogical thinking, but instead only such which maintains a thinking in transitions. The "process of assimilation" - of the becoming similar of that which is in itself disparate - which Nietzsche addresses excludes such transitions because it amounts to an appropriation of individual cases, in the sense of a classification which, for the sake of clear-cut distinctions from other concepts (classes), suppresses the peculiarities of the individual cases.

Thus, the objection against logical thinking defines itself not simply through the fact that here the subsuming power of judgment is at work, but rather first and foremost through the additional demand that for its subsumptions the principles of the excluded third and the excluded contradiction commonly hold. Therewith, the subsumptions follow the logic of the exclusive "or," of "either-or."

In fact, both analogical and logical thinking proceed comparatively; but they have different goals. Logical comparison is generalizing, for it disregards the peculiarities of the individual cases by levelling off their differences. Analogical comparison is differentiating, for it stresses the peculiarities by nuancing them. If analogical thinking is described here as "differentiating," these differences are naturally not meant in the sense of the sharp distinctions which characterize logical thinking, but rather in the sense of those shadings which make possible gradual transitions. Thus, two concepts of difference are to be distinguished: the logical concept of exact distinctions (in the realm of the universal) and an analogical concept of fine nuances (in the realm of the particular).⁴ Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance shall give us occasion to elucidate this difference further.

This context makes suitable a further preventive remark apropos the unders-

⁴The tradition differentiates here between "distinct" and "confused" concepts.

tanding of the principle of identity. In traditional logic, the proposition "A = A" stands first and foremost for the identity of concepts, not objects. These two cases were often not distinguished, since one ordinarily considered objects to be individual concepts. Modern logic (since Frege) is here more precise. Nonetheless, if one comprehends identity first and foremost as the identity of objects, any talk of "thinking in terms of identity" (*identifizierendes Denken*) can be easily misunderstood against this background. Hence, let it be emphasized once more: "identical cases" are for Nietzsche not the same case, but rather disparate cases of the same concept. Thus, the "advocates of the non-identical" are authors who resist thinking in sharply delimited concepts. Of course, one can only make this qualification with regard to the aforesaid authors and not on systematic grounds. If, quite generally, we define the question of the possibility (or impossibility) of the identity of the disparate as our fundamental question, the one with respect to which the logical and the rhetorical traditions have dissented, then this question bears import not merely for concepts, but also for objects. In the end, modern logic and semantics (in alliance with Frege's distinction between "sense" and "reference") have uniformly replied in both cases that disparate in-

tensions may have the same extension.

Nietzsche reproves logical thinking for counterfeiting reality in its complexity and manifoldness by attempting to apprehend it in distinct concepts. In order adequately to evaluate this reproof, we must distinguish two aspects, namely, first, the question whether Nietzsche accurately describes logical procedure; and, second, the allied further question whether his valuation of this procedure is adequate. In view of what we have said about logical thinking, we may unequivocally answer the first question with "yes." The answer to the second question depends upon the extent to which the claims of logical thinking reach. If these were to go so far - and in some cases perhaps they do - as to pretend that only a thinking which employs sharply delimited concepts can lay claim to cognitive value, then one could argue against such a presumption in favor of analogical thinking. In any event, however, one should do so not in the exaggerated manner of Nietzsche, who contests the cognitive value of logical thinking by referring to the metaphorical character of language in general, but instead by positively contraposing to it the independent cognitive value of analogical thinking itself.⁵

The question how to value the metaphorical character of language

⁵For Nietzsche, a metaphorical construction seems to lie already at the basis of simple predication, given the presupposition that the predicator of one object can be "transferred" to another. Accordingly, there could be no non-metaphorical conceptual formations (generalizations) at all. This would mean that for Nietzsche every generalization would amount as such to a "counterfeiting."

is of decisive significance for the determination of the relation of logical and analogical thinking. Does this character occasion a negative critique of every possibility of cognition or a positive extension of the possibility of cognition beyond the sciences? When Frege considers it the task of philosophy "to break the mastery of the word over the human mind," (FREGE, 1879, p. VI) he means to do justice to this task by eliminating the "multivalence," (FREGE, 1882, p. 52) i.e., the ambiguity, of signs, and the "restless flow," (FREGE, 1882, p. 53) i.e., the vagueness, of a thinking which employs transitions. Frege views both of these aspects in close connection to the "figurative," i.e., metaphorical, character of language. Cognition essentially demands, indeed, presupposes the overcoming of this character through securing fixed conceptual delimitations. The contrary counterposition, as it has been represented especially by Fritz Mauthner in alliance with Nietzsche, proceeds on the basis of the same finding, but in contesting the claim that the metaphorical character of language can be overcome, it succumbs to a radical skepticism. In Mauthner, an intimation already apparent in Nietzsche becomes especially clear, namely, that skepticism is merely the reverse of dogmatism (I. Kant). If, initially, one defines knowledge objectivistically as access to the things themselves, one completely surrenders all claims to it when

one discovers that it cannot be had in its "metaphysical" form.

Now, it may well be the case that we are so "entangled" in metaphors that we cannot escape them. The only question is how we react to this situation: whether it plunges us into an epistemological depression ("nothing doing") or a rhetorical euphoria ("anything goes") or, finally, leads us to reflect upon the balanced relation of logic and rhetoric. We must learn to deal critically with our metaphors just as much as with our distinctions. What we need is an analytic hermeneutics of language which critically thematizes both our metaphorical use of language and our sharp distinctions.

We must admit a need for advocates of the non-identical when logic sets about raising a universal demand. With regard to this demand, it is worthwhile to keep in mind the truth of the dictum "*omnis determinatio est negatio*," since every determination, due to its exclusion of peculiarities, is bound to a loss (insofar as one thinks in concepts of totality). The situation looks very different, however, when one understands identifying or classifying not as a general measure, but rather as one undertaken as a means to a specific end, e.g., a scientific one.

We also want to admit that boundaries which are drawn through definitions are not boundaries in reality. For this very reason, however, we do not need to be told that such concep-

tual formations involve a fundamental falsification or counterfeiting. It would only make sense to speak of "falsification" if there were some access to reality in itself - which is precisely what Nietzsche contests - by means of which the falsification could be exposed as falsification. In this context, it is somewhat suspicious that Nietzsche speaks of cases which are "in themselves" unlike. It is important here to establish a symmetry by maintaining that both: the making of distinctions and the stressing of similarities, are not compelled by things in themselves, but rather are a matter of the perspective which we take over against them (depending upon certain aims). Already with the admission of this point, our question about the adequate relation of logical and analogical thinking finds an answer which we may now develop further on the basis of certain reflections of Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein, "Perspicuous Representation" and "Family Resemblance"

Despite the currently common tendency to adduce Wittgenstein as an ally of Nietzsche and Adorno or even to declare him to be a post-modern thinker, his later philosophy can be conceived as an outline of an analogical comprehension of the world in which not only logi-

cal thinking retains its place (limited to the sciences), but also analogical thinking itself comes into critical view.

The early Wittgenstein dedicated himself to bivalent logical thinking in the tradition of Frege, with his demand for sharply delimited concepts. Later, however, Wittgenstein contradicted Frege with his own program of "perspicuous representation," the leading concept of which is that of "family resemblance." This concept is especially fitted for underpinning analogical thinking. Its tenor is not exhausted in describing the vagueness of our everyday concepts. What is more essential is that the relation of family resemblance, logically considered, is a transitive relation. If the relation of family resemblance holds for a and b and also for b and c, then it holds as well for a and c. At first glance, this transitivity is surprising, since family resemblance initially requires less than ordinary similarity (in the sense that its terms share at least one characteristic), thus seeming to compose the "weaker" relation. How can the relation of family resemblance be transitive, although this does not hold for the "stronger" relation of ordinary similarity?⁶ The transitivity is due to the fact that a common line of development of the different instances forms the background of the relation. Against such a background, the relation of family resemblance can hold for

⁶Example: a: red ball, b: red cube, c: green cube. Both a and b and b and c are similar, not, however, a and c.

two things without their having a single characteristic in common. This similarity is what is meant in R. Musil's novel Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, when it is said of "dinner forks, pitchforks, musket-forks, forks of trees, forks in the road and other forks" that:

"They do not even need to be all similar to one another [i.e., they need have no characteristic in common, G.G.], for it already suffices when one yields the other, when one moves from one to the other, when merely neighboring links are similar to one another: more distant ones are then similar through their mediation." (MUSIL, 1970, p. 1289)

With his concept of family resemblance, Wittgenstein introduced a concept of similarity which makes it possible to posit in relation to one another even more distant things which are not similar to one another, thus conveying a "perspicuous representation" of the manifold of appearance:

"A perspicuous representation mediates just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connections.' Hence, the im-

portance of finding and of inventing intermediate links. The concept of perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It designates our form of representation, the way in which we see things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung?')" (WITTGENSTEIN, 2001, p. 814, § 122).⁷

The *Weltanschauung* about which the final sentence of this quotation queries may be defined as an analogical *Weltanschauung* or an analogical comprehension of the world. Wittgenstein's emphasis ("fundamental significance") derives from his awareness that a "major source of our lack of understanding," from which philosophical confusion accrues, consists in the fact "that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. - Our grammar lacks 'perspicuity.'" (WITTGENSTEIN, 2001, p. 814, § 122)⁸

Now, how far does Wittgenstein go in his analogical thinking? The important qualification here is that family resemblance is a similarity internal to a certain region. It subsists between the members of a certain family. Even when the family is not "sharply delimited" and it remains open which of the so-called "more distant relations"

⁷Translation modified here and elsewhere.

⁸Thus the introductory sentences to the previous quotation.

may be reckoned among the family, the talk is not of a regionally overlapping family resemblance in the sense that everything coheres with everything else.

As a result, Wittgenstein in no way relinquishes the process of making distinctions: "We shall again and again underline distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook." (WITTGENSTEIN, 2001, p. 816, § 132) This procedure is especially necessary when one is concerned with drawing comparisons between categorially disparate regions, with categorial metaphors, for here lurk the dangers of analogical thinking. Wittgenstein gives expression to this ambivalence by emphasizing on one hand that a "good simile" refreshes the understanding and, moreover, describing his own thinking as an inventing "of new similes," (WITTGENSTEIN, 1977, pp. 11, 43) while on the other hand warning us that similes can effect a "false semblance" (*falscher Schein*) which holds us "captive." (WITTGENSTEIN, 2001, p. 811, § 112; p. 811, § 115) (One can distinguish in this way between the elucidating function of comparison and the metaphysical application of analogies.) Wittgenstein's method consists in playing new similes off against old ones. Using analogical methods, he contests the analogization of categori-

ally disparate regions, e.g., the transfer of the spatial talk about inside and outside to the relation of the I and the world, which is then literally understood. The critical tendency of Wittgenstein's investigation towards metaphysics, which he himself names a "grammatical" one, consists precisely in discovering and removing the categorial "misunderstandings" which have been evoked, among other reasons, "by certain analogies between the forms of expression in disparate regions of our language." (WITTGENSTEIN, 2001, p. 802, § 90)⁹

This danger does not exist when we move within a categorially well-defined, unitary region. Wittgenstein's comparison of his own thinking with that of Hegel (independently of the question whether this comparison is accurate) is especially informative here:

"Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different. I was thinking of using as a motto for my book a quotation from King Lear: 'I'll teach you differences.'" (WITTGENSTEIN, 1984, p. 157)¹⁰

⁹Emphasis G.G.

¹⁰I read the adverb "really" not ontologically, but rather as an emphasis of Wittgenstein's own view of things over against that of Hegel.

If this is supposed to be a profession of a thinking in terms of differences, it is so in the sense not of making sharp delimitations, but rather of describing fine nuances in the way outlined above. Wittgenstein's analogical thinking consists not in making disparate appearances similar (or equivalent) by denying their differences, but rather in further refining these, so that the sharp delimitations are effaced. The method is precisely one in which a nuancing differentiation draws together, as it were, that which lies apart, so that the differences present themselves as an continuous sequence of transitions, like those between the colors of the spectrum. The tenor of the concept of family resemblance is, seemingly paradoxically formulated, such as to promote coherence through difference.

Logical and Aesthetic "Perspicuity"

The course of our reflections so far finds its confirmation in the fact that even our talk about perspicuous representation can be understood in two ways. In consideration thereof, I should like to bring into view the relation of the scientific and the aesthetic comprehensions of the world. Frege, too, demands "perspicuity of representa-

tion," but in his case for logical formalism. (FREGE, 1882, p. 55)¹¹ When he correctly emphasizes that his two-dimensional "Begriffsschrift" satisfies this demand better than (hitherto customary) one-dimensional logical notations, the standard which he invokes is one of optical distinctness, in which complicated logical relations, with the help of spatial delimitations, are represented in such a manner that they can be surveyed synoptically, "all at once": "In this way, the individual contents are distinctly separated from one another and yet are easily perspicuous in their logical relations." (FREGE, 1882/1883, p. 8)¹² (It suffices here merely to mention the advantage provided by the bracket-free presentation of logical formulae.) The idea of synopsis is for Wittgenstein likewise of fundamental import, although here this idea stands in Schopenhauer's tradition of aesthetic contemplation. (GABRIEL, 1991, pp. 47-51) Correspondingly, the criteria are of an aesthetic rather than a logical kind. For the synopsis of familiarly resemblant relations in the analogical comprehension of the world, the multiplicity of cases and growth in complexity increase rather than decrease the perspicuity. This is aesthetic perspicuity in the sense of "complete" clarity. In contrast, Frege's perspicuity is of a logical kind, in the sense of a delimita-

¹¹Cf. FREGE, 1882/1883, pp. 7 f.

¹²Emphasis G.G.

ting distinctness. Conceptual thinking in the mode of transitions is "aesthetic theory," that is, theory which itself deserves the name "aesthetic" and mediates an aesthetic view of things. Adorno demanded it, but only Wittgenstein realized it.

Result

The analogical comprehension of the world is nothing but a comprehension of the world. We are concerned with a form of the representation of things. This means that it is a matter of our way of seeing which is not compelled by the things themselves. We could also see things otherwise. Wittgenstein further emphasizes this freedom of vision by maintaining that the relations of family resemblance which manifest the "coherences" are attained not only by a "finding," but also by an "inventing" of connecting links, so that thereby a productive roll accrues to the imagination. Thus, he explicitly warns us against holding the "mode of representation" or the "form" to be a determination of the essence of things themselves.¹³

If, generalizing, we transfer the thought of the mode or form of representation as a way of seeing to the concepts of similarity and disparity, then

we can remove both of these from their ontologically bedded explanation and understand them epistemologically. This would mean that we can see - view - things as disparate and as similar, in accordance with the way in which we structure the world. We accentuate the differences or the similarities; we, i.e., the interested subjects, see the world in light of differences or similarities. To play them both off against each other does not make any sense. Instead, we have to free ourselves from our fixation upon a single mode of cognition and recognize disparate faculties and forms of cognition as complementary. That philosophy not only has to do with analogical thinking, but likewise requires thinking in terms of distinctions, we have seen in the preceding reflections. A wholly analogical, aesthetic comprehension of the world would be one-sided. As an exclusive alternative, however, a logical, scientific comprehension of the world would be none the less one-sided.

To hold fast to distinctions between things that appear to be similar by drawing conceptual boundaries and to manifest similarities between things that appear to be disparate by opening up the conceptual boundaries - these are diametrically opposed movements of thinking which in each individual case can be dialectically, but

¹³Cf. WITTGENSTEIN (2001, pp. 777f., § 50; p. 811, § 114). Cf.: "One predicates of the thing that which lies in the mode of representation." (WITTGENSTEIN, 2001, p. 807, § 104)

never fundamentally, played off against one another. In order for this play to retain its balance, it is important to master both forms. Only in this way can one succeed in bringing both the logical and the aesthetic conceptions of the world into an adequately complementary relation to one another.

The balanced relation of logical and analogical thinking is a demand which Kant raised on anthropological grounds. In his "Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht," he treats this question in the framework of the theory of the cognitive faculties. Kant continues here the tradition of the empirical

psychology (*psychologia empirica*) of his predecessors since Christian Wolff. These thinkers discriminated between wit (*ingenium*), as the faculty of analogy, and sagacity (*acumen*), as the faculty of distinction. The tradition quite self-evidently proceeded upon the assumption that there is something lacking in a man or woman who has the faculty of thinking only logically or only analogically. If the exaggeration of logical thinking leads to empty distinctions, the exaggeration of analogical thinking ends in a blind frenzy of ideas, in the chaos of free association, indeed, even in madness.

References

- ADORNO, Theodor W., HORKHEIMER, Max. *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, Frankfurt a.M. 1969.
- FREGE, Gottlob. *Begriffsschrift*, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle/Saale 1879.
<https://b-ok.cc/book/3517171/f28b88>
<https://gdz.sub.uni-goettingen.de/id/PPN538957069?tidy={%22view%22:%22info%22}>
- FREGE, Gottlob. *Über die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer Begriffsschrift*. *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 81 (1882), pp. 48-56.
- FREGE, Gottlob. *Über den Zweck der Begriffsschrift* *Jenaische Zeitschrift für Naturwissenschaft*, 16/Supplement (1883), pp. 1-10.
- FREGE, Gottlob. *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, vol. II, Jena 1903.
- GABRIEL, Gottfried. *Zwischen Logik und Literatur. Erkenntnisformen von Dichtung*, Philosophie und Wissenschaft, Stuttgart 1991.
- MARQUARD, Odo. *Zukunft braucht Herkunft. Philosophische Essays*, Stuttgart 2003
- GOODMAN, Nelson. *Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols*, Indianapolis, second edition 1976.
- NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. *Werke*, vol. 3. Ed. K. Schlechta, München 1966.
- MUSIL, Robert. *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, Hamburg 1970,
- WELLMER, Albrecht. *Zur Dialektik von Moderne und Postmoderne. Vernunftkritik nach Adorno*, Frankfurt a.M. 1985.
- WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, Herausgegeben von Georg Henrik von Wright, Frankfurt 1977.
- WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, Rush Rhees (ed.), Oxford/New York 1984.
- WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. Kritisch-genetische Edition. Herausgegeben von Joachim Schulte, Frankfurt 2001.

Received / Recebido: 18/07/2020
 Approved / Aprovado: 18/11/2020
 Published / Publicado: 30/12/2020