From Worlds of Possibles to Possible Worlds
Or, Dionysus and Apollo after Nihilism

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Abstract:
Is it possible to simultaneously escape the regime of authoritarian overdetermination distinctive of all modern totalitarianisms and the regime of anarchic underdetermination characteristic, in turn, of all hypermodern nihilisms? To what extent is Nietzsche’s philosophy responsible for having transformed such conceptual polarity in a frozen dichotomy? And to what extent are Heidegger and Deleuze, despite their differences, responsible for having rendered it all the more inescapable with their subtractive thought, which tends to privilege the possible over being? How, then, should we fancy the Otherwise – the otherwise of today’s unworld? Dionysus and Apollo, this paper argues, provide a tool for it in their quality of conceptual personae through whose interplay “elicitation” and “containment” (Roy Wagner) regain their lost reciprocity against any Subject/Object divide. It thus combines a philosophy-of-mythology approach with a neo-structuralist critique of contemporary thought in dialogue with current anthropological theory in an attempt to figure out the minimal structure of any worlding process. Additionally, it engages in a discussion on the nature and limits of cosmopolitics vis-à-vis nihilism’s accomplishment and it underlines the benefits of embracing a rigorously extra-modern type of logic, neither machinic nor demonstrative nor illuminative, but chiastic.

Keywords: cosmopolitics; nihilism; otherwise; philosophy of mythology; structuralism; worlding

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It is impossible to leave a closed space simply by taking up a position merely outside it, either in its exterior or its profundity: so long as this outside or profundity remain its outside or profundity, they still belong to that circle, to that closed space, as its “repetition” in its other-than-itself.
– ALTHUSSER and BALIBAR, Reading Capital, p. 53

A life […] that undergoes an education is held in the tension between submission and mastery, between imagination and perception, between aspiration and prehension, and between exposure and attunement.
– INGOLD, The Life of Lines, p. 141

so that the world as we normally perceive it […] is thrown into sharp relief, caught in a play of light and shadow between one extreme and the other.
– WAGNER, Coyote Anthropology, p. ix

1 / Overdetermination, underdetermination, and the Otherwise

“It fut un temps où l'anthropologie était au cœur de la culture intellectuelle,” writes Patrice Maniglier recalling the influence exerted, in particular by Lévi-Strauss’s anthropology, in the French-speaking world of the 1960s.2 “[Mais] alors même que notre monde devenait de plus en plus multiculturel à l'intérieur de nos frontières et de plus en plus décentré dans ses pôles de pouvoir globaux,” he adds, “l'intérêt pour cette attention particulière aux altérités que proposait l'anthropologie allait s'affaiblissant.”3 Yet “[c]ette relative marginalisation semble […] désormais terminée,” he concludes: “Depuis quelques années, l'anthropologie est redevenue une discipline non seulement particulièrement vivante en elle-même, mais aussi très influente au sein des sciences sociales et même plus largement du débat public.”4

Philosophy has not escaped anthropology’s renewed seductive skills. Thus, in a recent volume,5 Pierre Charbonier, Gildas Salmon, and Peter Skafish gather a number of highly relevant articles (authored, among others, by Philippe Descola, Marilyn Strathern, Martin Holbraad, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Bruno Latour, and Maniglier himself) which variously assess anthropology’s impact on comparative ontology and ponder, more generally, the chance that anthropology thence has today – by offering what Maniglier calls a “formal ontology of ourselves as variants,” i.e. a “formal theory of variance in general that is best fitted to account for the variations that the subject of science can itself perform”6 – to eventually replace physics as the reference science in the making of what Foucault might well have called a new “episteme.”

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3 Ibid., p. 136.
4 Ibid., p. 136.
5 CHARBONIER, SALMON, and SKAFISH (eds.), Comparative Metaphysics.
6 MANIGLIER, “Anthropological Meditations,” p. 127. Cf. Roy WAGNER’s allusion (in An Anthropology of the Subject, p. 6) to Heidegger’s view that “[a]nthropology is that interpretation of man that already knows fundamentally what man
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We wish to open this essay with an even bolder statement about anthropology’s additional potential incidence on today’s philosophy of culture – a discipline that Schelling inaugurated with his philosophy of mythology,7 and that Nietzsche popularised with his distinction between the Dionysian and the Apollonian.8 Only anthropology, whose object is the study of what we are not or rather no longer,9 can probably take us, should we like to venture, simultaneously (a) outside of the regime of authoritarian overdetermination distinctive of all modern totalitarianisms (whichever their particular abstract signifier: “God,” “Man,” the “State,” “Class Struggle,” the “Free Market,” etc.) and (b) outside of the regime of anarchic underdetermination characteristic, in turn, of all hypermodern nihilisms (“deconstructionist,” “neo-cynical,” “object-oriented,” “anti-correlationist,” etc.) – i.e. outside the (false) alternative: subjugation or contingency, contingency or subjugation, and into the Otherwise.

We shall return to the falsity of such alternative in Section 4, and to the plural shape of the Otherwise in Section 5.10 As for the reason why current anthropology can help us move outside such twofold, in fact single, box, it should become apparent in the pages that follow. For now, let us underline that only by fully exceeding that box’s double perimeter (hence both a and b) we might be able to no longer merely see, and/or dream of, ourselves,11 since despotism and contingency – we are willing to call them Apollo’s and Dionysus’s distortions – define our modern malaise.

But at stake in all this there is more than the typically modern inability to embrace otherness: the very texture of our world, or rather of our un-world, is concerned in it as well; as is its fate, including the possibility of re-worlding it otherwise in the plural. For today’s “world-less-ness”

is and hence can never ask who he may be. For, with this question it would have to confess itself shaken and overcome. But how can this be expected of anthropology when the latter has expressly to achieve nothing less than the securing consequent upon the self-securing of the subiectum?” (HEIDEGGER, The End of Philosophy, p. 14-15).

7 Which, despite remaining unpublished in his lifetime, must be seen not so much as his latest philosophy than his major philosophical contribution, since he worked on it from 1815 to 1854. See SCHELLING, Samtliche Werke, vols. 11–13, of whose more than 1,600 pages only little more than 250 (corresponding to its historical introduction in v. 11, p. 1-252) have been translated into English so far (SCHELLING, Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology).

8 On which see already The Dionysian Vision of the World, which antedates The Birth of Tragedy in two years.

9 “Are” au sens fort. See further HOLBRAAD and PEDERSEN, The Ontological Turn. As Paolo HEYWOOD highlights, the ontological turn – according to which there is not one reality and many cultural interpretations of it, but as many realities as cultural views on what, consequently, cannot be described anymore as a universe, but as a pluriverse – “continues a long tradition in anthropology of aiming to take difference seriously and understand it as best we can on its own terms” (“Ontological Turn,” p. 9). For, as Roy WAGNER remarked as early as 1967, if “projection […] is the means by which men […] extend the realm of the ‘known’ by applying the range of their symbolization to the data and impressions of the ‘unknown’ […] the practice of extending the realm of the ‘known’ by applying one’s symbolizations to the ‘unknown’ can easily become a means of finding what one wants to find” (The Curse of Souw, p. xviii-xix). In this respect, “[t]he so-called ontological turn,” writes Eduardo VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, “is nothing more than a change in the disciplinary language-game that forbids, by declaring it an ‘illegal move’, such an analytical facility from the anthropologist’s part” (“Who Is Afraid of the Ontological Wolf?” [p. 16]); for the practice of anthropology, and then too anthropology as a practice (which can never be merely descriptive, but is always theoretical for that very reason), implies “sticking one’s neck out through the looking-glass of ontological difference” (ibid. [p. 18]).

10 See also in this respect BENSUSAN’s contribution above.

(Weltlosigkeit) and “wonder-less-ness” (Entzauberung) gravitate around two transcendental poles that can be easily deduced from Heidegger’s critique of modernity and Guattari’s critique of semico-capitalism, respectively; two poles which, once more, express, each, an Apollonian and a Dionysian distortion. On the one hand, an enframing pole that conscripts all earthly things and places them at the ready to be appropriated, investigated, classified, experimented-with, manipulated, modified, exchanged, destroyed, and replaced when needed under the law of an enforced ordering which removes all reality and relationality from the things themselves and exposes them in instrumental terms. On the other hand, an exchanging pole which puts all things on a single “plane of equivalence” to make them exchangeable and circulate under the law of a radical contingency that deprives all things of consistency and links them no matter how. In short, the first of such poles overdetermines what there is qua totally available, whereas the second one underdetermines it qua infinitely exchangeable; as a result, being is liquidated twice: it is overcoded to then be fallaciously decoded, and freed to be endlessly enslaved: the self-disclosive (auto-poietic) and multinaural (prismatic) “forest” is turned into a standing reserve of resources which can be fractally multiplied thus:

$$\{ [n \times (\ldots + \ldots n) \subset n \times (\ldots + \ldots n)] \subset n \times (\ldots + \ldots n) \} \subset n \times (\ldots + \ldots n) \ldots$$

i.e. “the potentially-limitless combination of whatever with whatever else must be seen as a potential subset of another potentially-limitless combination of whatever with whatever else, and so on and so forth” – or, an area of the Amazonian forest as a touristic spot exploited by a multinational company of organic food that produces sustainable multi-flavoured soja each of whose commercial units raffle superhero trading cards for children plus vacation packages for adults and include a charity donation option if you buy 3 for the price of 2 within the next 48 hours, etc. As we have written elsewhere, this, ultimately, is also the principle of contingency upon which contemporary capitalism unwaveringly rests.  

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12 On the term Weltlosigkeit, see HEIDEGGER’s Einleitung in die Philosophie (= Gesamtausgabe [henceforth GA], v. 50, p. 105, 114-116, 127), where it relates to the “objectivation” (Vergegenständlichung) of reality, as well as Heidegger’s 1967 letter to Medard Boss (reproduced in GA, v. 89, p. 350-351), where it describes the nature of that which is merely “present-at-hand” (vorhanden). In turn, the term Entzauberung – famously coined by Max Weber in 1917 (after Tolstoy) in a lecture at Munich University titled “Science as Vocation” (WEBER, The Vocation Lectures, p. 13, 30) – figures in HEIDEGGER’s Beiträge zur Philosophie (GA, v. 65, p. 107) in connection to the “bewilderment” (Verzauberung) provoked by modern technology, whose “machination” (Machenschaft), says Heidegger, makes everything stand in a “permanent presence” (beständige Anwesenheit).


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2 / From Nietzsche’s vessel to Ulysses’s mast

Contemporary thought appears to be lashed to this odd admixture of totalitarianism and anarchism\(^\text{16}\) as willingly as Ulysses had himself lashed to the mast of his ship to refuse the call of the Otherwise. Somewhat asymmetrically, though. For who is for restoring today a solid “ground” (Grund) or a firm “principle” (ἀρχή) to what we have learned to see – not only since Nietzsche: already after Baudelaire\(^\text{17}\) – as an ineluctably fragmentary, and thus ultimately incoherent, reality? Steven Pinker and Yuval Noah Harari are still able to speak of “human progress” and “global vision,” but we all know that is not philosophy: it is a cocktail of evolutionary psychology and wishful thinking zipped together in divulgation format, at the service of the neoliberal narrative and of its eco-social Popperian-like mutation to the greater glory of the Market Almighty, a.k.a. capitalism’s “Great Reset.”\(^\text{18}\) Today’s philosophical milieu is refractory to these “grand narratives,” as Lyotard labelled them in the late 1970s. Contemporary philosophy – to retell in a few brushstrokes a complex family story – is the great-grandchild of the hermeneutics of suspicion mobilised by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud against modernity’s certainties, which Foucault expanded and enriched. It is also the grandchild of Heidegger’s critique of the assimilation of being and presence, and the child of Derrida’s deconstructionist exploitation of it. It is the child of Deleuze’s playful encouragement, after Nietzsche and Heidegger, to jump in between the territories once reclaimed by the gods, and of Guattari’s subsequent defence of the free productivity of the unconscious. It is, finally, the younger sibling of Lyotard’s rejection of any totality, and of Vattimo’s Heideggerian-inspired non-fundationalist, weak thought.

The pillars of Hercules of today’s philosophical discourse are the inscription of determination as an unwarranted logical threat to the possible (as though any determination would imply a negative judgement on the otherwise and prove illusory) and the celebration of difference in itself (as though difference could only be absolute, indeed the new absolute, or else not be) at the core of, and as the sole law in, reality’s morphogenesis. Thus, the two constituent and governing principles (the two ἀρχαι, despite all) of early 21st-century metaphysics: ontological openness\(^\text{19}\) and, ontological singularity on the other.

\(^{16}\) Our use of the term “anarchism” is strictly philosophical and, more exactly, ontological; no political pun intended: the domain of practical reason, including now too the cosmopolitical (on which see BENSUSAN’s contribution above and MONG-HY’s, BALAUD and CHOPOT’s, and BENNETT’s contributions below) cannot be but a space of spontaneous, transversal, and non-surveilled (in short “mutualist,” as Proudhon has it) cooperation.

\(^{17}\) See PESTALOZZI, “Nietzsches baudelaire-rezeption”; LE RIDER, “Nietzsche et Baudelaire.”

\(^{18}\) See further PINKER, The Better Angels of Our Nature; Enlightenment Now; HARARI, Sapiens; Homo Deus; SCHWAB and VANHAM, Stakeholder Capitalism; MCKINNON, Neo-Liberal Genetics; SASSOWER, Popper’s Legacy, p. 3-4, 81, 83-85, 123.
Overall, this dual articulation goes back to Nietzsche’s dismissal of that which is given (i.e. objective and undecidable) and common (or supra-individual), a dismissal that reaches contemporary philosophy through Nietzsche’s probably most influential 20th-century readers, to wit, Heidegger and Deleuze, whose crucial roles in the shaping of the main philosophical currents of our time can hardly be overstated. For while, for example, Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (henceforth OOO) derives from Heidegger’s critique of the presentness of that which is at hand, Meillassoux’s philosophy of pure chance would be unthinkable without Deleuze’s prior revitalisation of the dice-throw nature and singularity of being qua event. Aside: it matters little that the poietic qualities of the void are stressed or that, alternatively, the trace of a shipwreck is evoked to then make the surface on which such trace might be located vanish at the beating of a siren’s tail; major and minor tonalities are equally explorabel once the agreement is made that (i) the fact that what is could be otherwise or not be at all is more decisive than the fact that it is and that it is what it is (which represents an inversion of Aristotle’s axiom in GA 731b30-31 that being is preferable to non being [βελτίων τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι]), and that (ii) the irreducible specificity of what is precludes its identification by means of its classification (which defies, in turn, Plato’s premise that there are no things at the expense of their εἴδη).

Admittedly, the former point (i.e. the privileging of the fact that what is could be otherwise or not be at all over the fact that it is and that it is what it is) admits two variants: intelligible and substantial, respectively. The former one is Heidegger’s, for whom, echoing Plato’s analogy of the sun in Rep. 504d–518c, “being” qua Lichtung stands beyond all beings; the latter one is...
Deleuze’s, for whom while nonsense stands (similarly, then) beyond sense, being’s single δύναμις beats under being’s transitory configurations. As for the second point (regarding the allegedly irreducible specificity of what is), it is endorsed by Deleuze, whose philosophy turns, therefore, around the iridescence of the καθόλου and the καθ’ έκκαστον (also in the domain of thought itself, since, for Deleuze, the latter is of being in the double sense of the genitive, but it is, at the same time, plural production of concepts), whereas Heidegger fully remains in the perspective of the καθόλου, which he somehow identifies with Anaximander’s τὸ ἄπειρον.

To be sure, Derrida has added a new turn to this all-too-modern negativity. “Only pure absence – not the absence of this or that, but the absence of everything in which all presence is announced – can inspire,” he writes. Language understood not so much as ontologically disclosive – which is how philosophy originally conceived it in continuation with the Homeric epos – but as something irretrievably elusive of its referent, provides Derrida the model. Yet it is Levinas, with his view of textuality as that which bears on it the voice of an absent Other, and of that Other as an instance that cannot be appropriated, on whom Derrida relies in the last instance – and, via Levinas, Rosenzweig’s prejudice that a single trend of thought leads from the Presocratics to Hegel that explains Derrida’s deconstructionist project.

In fact Deleuze – who draws both on Nietzsche and Heidegger – and Derrida – who builds on Heidegger’s “destruction of metaphysics” as the determination of “being” qua fully-achieved “presence” – can be said to have laid the foundations of today’s ontological anarchism, and thus to have launched the boat on whose deck the Odyssean mast of contemporary philosophy is

26 DELEUZE, The Logic of Sense, p. 66-73.
27 DELEUZE, Difference and Repetition, p. 35-42 (on being’s univocity); Spinoza, p. 91-92 (arts. “Mode,” “Nature”), p. 97-104 (art. “Power” (“Poussance”)).
29 BAUDELAIRE was the first to vindicate the term “modernity” in connection to (the experience of) “the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent” (The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays, p. 13).
30 DERRIDA, Writing and Difference, p. 7.
31 On which see MARTÍNEZ MARZOA, El decir griego, p. 13-50; MÍGUEZ BARCIELA, Mortal y fúnebre, p. 21-46; SEGOVIA, La cólera de Aquiles, p. 13n9.
32 “Th[e] state of being haunted […] is perhaps the general mode of the presence or absence of the thing itself in pure language” (DERRIDA, Writing and Difference, p. 4).
33 Ibid., p. 97-192.
34 ROSENZWEIG, The Star of Redemption, p. 18.
35 In Nietzsche and Philosophy, written on the wake of BATAILLE’S On Nietzsche and, especially, KLOSSOWSKI’S Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle.
36 In particular on Heidegger’s “ontological difference” between “beyng” and “beings” (see DELEUZE, Difference and Repetition, p. xix, 35, 64-66, 117, 334).
37 DERRIDA, Writing and Difference, p. 354.
38 Notice DELEUZE’s use of the expression “crowned anarchy” (after Artaud) in The Logic of Sense, p. 37, 41, 265, 278, 304. For an anarchist/archaeological interpretation of Heidegger, see in turn SCHÜRMANN, Heidegger on Being and Acting and, now too, BENSUSAN, “An-arché, xéinos, urithi α,” p. 3-7, from whom we borrow the term “anarcheological” (BENSUSAN, Being Up for Grabs).
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(despite the latter’s pretended precariousness) firmly settled; a boat – let us advance it – that, upon close examination, appears to be the same one Nietzsche’s fancies in §343 of *The Gay Science*, where he dreams with freely exploring the ocean after the “death of God.” But more on this in short. For a clarification is first in order. Why Ulysses’s mast? Because, let’s not forget it, it is when Ulysses hears the mermaids’ singing the κλέος of the *heroes* that he asks his men to tie him up so as not to fall under their spell; and when Ulysses hears of his own κλέος he cries, “because in his world forms are merely aspects of the event, fame an illusion, and pain the only true reality […] [which] cannot be sung but narrated.”* But otherwise: Ulysses’s reality is, like the liminal reality of contemporary philosophy, a fragmentary one, a painful one. Modernism consists in the rejection of glory, or, seen from the opposite angle, in the affirmation – even in the sanctification of lowness. We have already evoked Baudelaire. Deleuze: “The shame of being a man – is there any better reason to write?” With which we are back on the shores of a *theologia crucis*, under the auspices of a new kenotic thought. One could object to this that Heidegger removes “beyng” from “beings” out of “beyng”’s eminence rather than to stress “being”’s precariousness. Indeed. Yet he also opens the door to the undetermined, and there are enough subtractive developments of his philosophy (including Derrida’s deconstructionism, Vattimo’s weak thought, and Harman’s OOO) to take seriously Heidegger’s own flirt with negativeness.

But there is, leaving now Derrida aside, a non-kenotic side to such negativeness, as well; and we should like to conclude this section by pointing it out. For while Nietzsche declared the Christian God dead, or rather asked about the implications of that god’s acknowledged death, Lacan is right to observe that “[t]he true formula of [Nietzsche’s] atheism is not *God is dead* […] but *God is unconscious.*” Put differently: Nietzsche’s children have rebelliously reassumed that god’s positiveness, which is to be found not so much in his Law (whose interdictory qualities make it anything but positive) as in his infinite Will. Descartes (whom Nietzsche’s children often discard too quickly) already considered that, regardless of the knowledge and the power that assist it, God’s will “does not seem any greater than mine,” which is, like his, “not restricted in any way.” The death of God is thus the birth of Man’s unrestricted will, which Nietzsche identifies with Dionysus.

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39 Or “Anti-Oedipus complex,” as Rob WEATHERILL labels it after Deleuze and Guattari in *The Anti-Oedipus Complex*. Cf. the cult of the fragmentary in DELEUZE and GUATTARI’s *Anti-Oedipus* and in its sequel, *A Thousand Plateaus*, on which see also MELLAMY, “Fragmentality (thinking the fragment).”
40 DIANO, *Forma ed evento*, p. 60 (our translation).
41 As GENET’S *Our Lady of the Flowers* provocingly has it.
46 Ibid., p. 39.
so, the boat can sale despite all. Behind the affirmation of the infinitely possible (informal) over any actual form, therefore, Dionysus claims his right to be against Apollo, under the pretext that paying justice to latter would take us back to the Father’s Law.

3 / The conjuring of a double fear

Arguably, the formula: openness \( \cap \) contingency + singularity, or, what amounts to the same: chaos + difference, which we have identified with the very axiom, almost infinitely declinable,\(^{47}\) of contemporary philosophy, aims at conjuring a double fear: (1) the fear that over-exposure may lead to conscription, and (2) the fear that classification may devaluate specificity.

Thus, regarding the first fear (that over-exposure may lead to conscription), Heidegger, for example, intimates that early-Greek φύσις and λόγος i.e. the “shining-forth” and the “gathering of what is into presence, paved the way for the summoning of everything into the “assured availability” (Sicherstellung) of the modern “enframing” (Ge-stell)\(^{48}\) – in a manner similar to how Deleuze will later contend that identity and representation conscript being’s infinite flow.\(^{49}\) Hence too Heidegger’s demand in one of his recently published Black Notebooks to go “above […] φύσις […] [so as to] ground the domain of the open [offene Stelle] as such,” and his statement: “Never again should we begin with φύσις, and hence never again with ἀλήθεια!”\(^{50}\) True, Heidegger proves a little bit ambiguous concerning this point. For if, on the one hand, he writes: “‘Being’ has since the early days of the Greek world up to the latest days of our century meant being present,”\(^{51}\) on the other hand he acknowledges that if the Ge-stell comes from the “letting-lie-before” (Vorliegenlassen) experienced by the ancient Greeks as a result from their “letting-come-forth” (Her-vor-ankommen-lassens) of everything into presence – “for only when there is something present that is brought about by a bringing-here-forth,” e.g. a stone, he adds, “can human positioning, [or] θέσις, then arrange upon such a presence ([…] the stone) and out of this presence […] something else that presences ([e.g.] a stone staircase and its steps), here among what is already present (the native rocks and soil),” he adds – nevertheless “[w]hat stands here through θέσις essences otherwise than what is brought forth here by φύσις.”\(^{52}\) There is simply no continuity between φύσις \( \cap \) λόγος and θέσις, though. Pretending otherwise requires, to begin with, that the non-secular dimension of ancient-Greek culture be ignored.

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\(^{47}\) Its penultimate instantiation might well be Timothy MORTON and Dominic BOYER’s Hyposubjects.

\(^{48}\) HEIDEGGER, Off the Beaten Track, p. 54 (= GA, v. 5, p. 72).

\(^{49}\) DELEUZE, Difference and Repetition, p. 28-69, 168-221, 262-304. See also HALLWARD, Out of This World, p. 27-103.

\(^{50}\) HEIDEGGER, GA, v. 94, p. 241 (emphasis original, our translation). This view (from 1934–1935) is expressly contradicted, though, in GA, v. 71, p. 14-15, 302 (§§ 9, 341) (another “esoteric” writing which dates from 1941–1942).

\(^{51}\) HEIDEGGER, The Question of Being / Über «Die Linie», p. 63/64 (emphasis added).

\(^{52}\) HEIDEGGER, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, p. 60-61 (= GA, v. 79, p. 64) (emphasis original).
Πάντα πλήρη 0εδώ! Besides, it is quite significant that Heidegger, whose interpretation of Heraclitus (and other early-Greek thinkers) is otherwise duly refined, seems not to know what to do with Heraclitus frag. B123: φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ. He conflates it with frag. B16: τὸ μὴ δύνων ποτε πώς ἄν τις λάθοι, but only to show how poor the modern understanding of Heraclitus evinces to be when some kind of contradiction is surfised thereof and, additionally, to hint at the notion that “emerging” and “submerging” co-imply each other. 53 It is fair to suppose that Heraclitus, though, had in mind one or more of the following intuitions: (a) that under what we see, and hence under what there is (or φύσις), there are other possibilities which are either no longer or not yet, i.e. already submersed and not-yet emerged opportunities for being54 (as Anaximander famously claimed in a fragment that condenses philosophy’s dawn); (b) that next to what we see there are hidden ways of seeing it otherwise (thus anticipating Viveiros de Castro’s “multinaturalism,”55 but was not Boreas for the Athenians their “son-in-law?”),56 and (c) that behind what shines forth before our eyes there is the opening disposition by which it comes to shine thus.57 That is to say, φύσις’s hiddenness might have been for Heraclitus temporal, perspectival, and/or meta-dynamic. No Ge-stell can be established upon such premise. And the same can be said about the Presocractic λόγος: its unfathomable depth is highlighted by both Heraclitus and Sophocles.58 Plus we have already mentioned the elusiveness of Plato’s τὸ ὁγαθόν. It is actually with Aristotle that things begin to change, that φύσις is first taxonomised with the help of a demonstrative λόγος.59

Heidegger, however, has consecrated the view that φύσις inevitably leads to the modern “enframing,” and that, in consequence, privileging the undetermined over the determined is both necessary and urgent. In fact, he believes that if there is a chance for us to experiment an “other beginning” (andere Anfang in respect to the “first beginning” (erste Anfang) opened up by the Greeks, it ought to be beyond φύσις λόγος so as to “build” there where that “first beginning” did

53 HEIDEGGER, Heraclitus, 83-95. In turn, the reference to frag. B123 of Heraclitus proves both minimal and elliptic in HEIDEGGER and FINK, Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67, p. 45 – if φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, how must one interpret φύσις?, asks Heidegger; yet the question goes unanswered.
54 Cf. CANTIN-BRAULT, “La métaphysique d’Héraclite.”
56 HERODOTUS, Histories 7.189.
59 See once more GEVORKYAN and SEGOVIA, “Post-Heideggerian Drifts,” p. 6. Cf. the re-allowance of φύσις in RENTMEESTER’s contribution above and the relation between φύσις and worlding that we explore in GEVORKYAN and SEGOVIA, “Earth and World(s),”
60 HEIDEGGER, Contributions to Philosophy, p. 7, 11 (= GA, v. 65, p. 5-6, 10).
not.⁶¹ Commenting on Heidegger’s History of Beyng, Hilan Bensusan summarises the issue perfectly:

After a thorough exploration of the writings of Nietzsche, Heidegger became persuaded that the metaphysical forgetfulness of being and the corresponding ontological difference between being and beings were a consequence of an arché – a beginning, an Anfang – which is itself to be exorcized. That initial beginning placed physis – the nature of processes but also the way things unfold by themselves, of their own power and their own accord – at the center of the effort to think the world through. That starting point paved the way to the bias of thought in favor of control, expressed in the endeavor of extracting the intelligibility from what one finds around.⁶²

Derrida inherits this view, which is also (formerly) in Levinas.

As for the second fear (that classification may devaluate specificity), Deleuze alludes to it in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense. There are, he says, two ways of approaching difference. One privileges identity over difference, in the sense that it takes the repetition of the identical – i.e. paradigmatic or iconic reflection – to be difference’s norm. According to this view, depending on their degree of approximation to, or deviation from, their originals, things should be identified as their good or their bad copies; or, what amounts to the same, as their true “copies” and their “simulacra” or “false pretenders.”⁶³ Yet not only does multiplicity fall into the trap of unity under this all-too-symmetric⁶⁴ logic of “resemblance”;⁶⁵ ontology, too, falls into the trap of morality – what is replaced by what should be, he argues. Conversely, the other way of approaching difference consists in “reversing” such logic, in “mak[ing] the simulacra […] rise and […] affirm their rights among icons and copies.”⁶⁶ In a nutshell: it is about proclaiming “subversively”⁶⁷ the “twilight of [all] idols”⁶⁸ (Nietzsche) – about vindicating “difference in itself”⁶⁹ so as to establish “the Different as primary power.”⁷⁰ But Deleuze not only writes thus against what he takes to be Platonism’s intrinsic devaluation of the Different: he writes too, if tacitly, against another philosophy of difference that was in place when Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense were

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⁶¹ HEIDEGGER, Pathmarks, 319 (= GA, v. 9, p. 423).
⁶² BENSUSAN, “An-arché, xenos, urihi a;,” p. 3.
⁶³ DELEUZE, The Logic of Sense, p. 253-262.
⁶⁴ Cf. the critique of symmetry in DELEUZE, Difference and Repetition, p. 20.
⁶⁵ DELEUZE, The Logic of Sense, p. 257-262.
⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 262.
⁶⁷ “There is no sin other than raising the ground and dissolving the form” (DELEUZE, Difference and Repetition, p. 29).
⁶⁸ DELEUZE, The Logic of Sense, p. 262.
⁶⁹ DELEUZE, Difference and Repetition, p. 28-69.
⁷⁰ DELEUZE, The Logic of Sense, p. 262. Cf. Difference and Repetition, p. 30: “is difference really an evil in itself? Must the question […] be] posed in these moral terms?; p. 29: “To rescue difference from its maledictory state seems, therefore, to be the project of the philosophy of difference.”
published; a philosophy of difference that Deleuze knew very well indeed\textsuperscript{71} and that approached difference in an altogether different manner: structuralism. For structuralism offers an approach to difference which does not fit within any of the aforementioned mutually exclusive outlooks. It affirms difference, in its \textit{irreducibility}, as that which is: “resemblance has no reality in itself,” writes Lévi-Strauss, “it is only a particular instance of difference [...] in which difference tends toward zero.”\textsuperscript{72} Yet it posits difference as \textit{reciprocity} – and hence not only as bidirectional relationality but also as coupled identity – in a number of cases (e.g. kinship, myth, and ritual) relevant for the study of human sociality. And it makes of \textit{analogy} or translatable identity an essential resource without which knowledge would be impossible. For unlike literature, which is often concerned, especially in its narrative forms, with exploring the singular, knowledge, says Lévi-Strauss, amounts to the “quest” for approximate, i.e. relative, non-totalising, “invariants,” capable of making sense of the otherwise-intransitable multiplicity of the given.\textsuperscript{73} It is not so much a \textit{formalism} that is thereby pursued, though, but the possibility of what we are willing to call \textit{translatability}: “[t]he problem [...] is [...] to try to reach the invariant property of a [...] complex set of codes [...] to find what is common to all of them. It’s a problem, one might say, of translation, of translating what is expressed in one language – or one code [...] – into expression in a different language.\textsuperscript{74} In other words, the problem is to find out something’s \textit{variations}. Variations, of course, imply resemblance, and thus \textit{sameness}, but a sameness that must be thought of in πρὸς ἐν terms, that is to say, in a “focal” and inherently plural manner, like Aristotle’s “being,” in the sense that, for Aristotle, being X (e.g. “healthy,” when it is said from a hot bath, rosy cheeks, or a person) is said “multiply” (πολλαχῶς) without there being any need for a unified καθ ἐν content (i.e. a definition of “health”) in order to understand what we \textit{mean} by saying that something is X, and hence the \textit{different} ways in which \textit{different} things are X.\textsuperscript{75} Compare to this the Yanomami notion of \textit{utupê}, which, as Marco Antonio Valentim remarks, denotes an “image” that is both “different” and “not-different” from itself, i.e. a “copy” which is at the same time its own “original.”\textsuperscript{76}

Plainly: while pure identity makes translation \textit{superfluous}, pure difference makes it \textit{impossible}. Now, in spite of the fact that translation is never fully \textit{accurate}, it is – as Leibniz fancied – always \textit{possible} to some extent.\textsuperscript{77} And even if in his essays on painting and cinema Deleuze overtly

\textsuperscript{71} See DELEUZE, Desert Islands and Other Texts, p. 170-192.

\textsuperscript{72} LÉVI-STRAUSS, The Naked Man, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{73} LÉVI-STRAUSS, Myth and Meaning, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75} ARISTOTLE, \textit{Met.}, Γ 2, 1003a33–1003b6; the examples are Aristotle’s and Sefrin-Weis’s, whom we follow in her innovative interpretation of Aristotle’s πρὸς ἐν in “Pros Hen and the Foundations of Aristotelian Metaphysics.”

\textsuperscript{76} VALENTIM, Extramundanidade e sobrenatureza, p. 213-238.

\textsuperscript{77} See also VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, “Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Equivocation.”
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deals with translation (forces are variously expressed in Cézanne’s and Bacon’s paintings, time
differently explored in Ophüls’s and Visconti’s films, etc.)78 his early philosophical writings are
(together with Derrida’s Of Grammatology and Writing and Difference) responsible for raising
“difference in itself” to the doxological spotlight of contemporary thought – which is another way of
keeping underdetermination above determination, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, the absolutely
different eludes identification.79

Undeniably, these two fears (that over-exposure entails conscription, and that
classification subdues specificity) are radically different from that expressed in Heraclitus’s in frag.
B27 (ἄνθρωπος μένει ἀποθανόντας ἄσσα οὐκ ἐλπονται οὐδὲ διδάσκοντι), on which we have written
elsewhere80 and where what produces terror is rather de-composition – or “defiguration,” to borrow
from Evelyne Grossman;81 in other words: negativity and subtraction. But does not Greece prove
rigorously extra-modern in this? Compare in this sense the extra-modern passion for classification as
studied by Lévi-Strauss from Totemism onwards, the Yanomami fear before that which makes the
“head spin,”82 the Guarani fear before “oneness” or the lack of repetition,83 and the Greek fear before
“decomposition.”84 For worlds are built neither in the lack of centre – as Pasolini suspected following
Eliade85 – nor on indetermination.

4 / Dionysus and Apollo’s dual affirmation

Conversely, the apology of the liminal and the fragmentary – in short, the apology of the
undetermined – results in the making of “worlds of possibles” or provisional constellations of pure
possibles which lack the cohesiveness and coherence that any world requires through the
implementation of “lines of flight” susceptible of escaping the “empty redundancies” of any enclosed
space or “territory” (i.e. through a process of “determinational”). The expressions “lines of flight,”
“territory” and “determinational,” on which Deleuze and Guattari famously abound in A Thousand
Plateaus,86 are originally Guattari’s.87 In turn, the expression “worlds of possibles,” which we use in

78 See further DELEUZE, Francis Bacon, p. 34-43; Cinema 2, p. 68-97.
79 On Deleuze’s discussion of Greek (in particular, Aristotelian) thought thereof, see FARIAS REZINO, “Gilles Deleuze
e Aristóteles.”
80 SEGOVIA, “The Alien – Heraclitus’s Cut.”
81 GROSSMAN, La Défiguration.
82 KOPENAWA and ALBERT, The Falling Sky, p. 40.
83 CLASTRES, Society Against the State, p. 169-175.
85 Cf. Medea’s protest against Jason and the Argonauts in Pasolini’s Medea (00:40:37-48) and the notion of omphalos
mundi in Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, p. 367-387. See further SEGOVIA, “Pasolini’s Counter Political Gaze
at the Sacred.”
86 DELEUZE and GUATTARI, A Thousand Plateaus, passim.
87 See e.g. GUATTARI, Lines of Flight, passim.
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this volume to signal the point of departure of a theoretical transition nowadays in the making that apparently leads somewhere else – namely, to the making of “possible worlds” – is Liane Mozère’s. Yet “possibilities in their nascent state” – “residual,” “creative,” “innovative,” “polyvocal,” “deterritorialising” – are expressions that belong in the Guattarian lexicon, as well. As it is known, since the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s Guattari dreams with a “machinic” (read: connective) “unconscious” measured by its “quanta of freedom” or “deterritorialisation,” and thus capable of expressing the unrestricted productiveness of a new “productive force” – “desire,” as proposed by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, their first joint volume at the crossroads of Marxism and psychoanalysis – independent from any prefixed “relations of production.” The notion of the possible is the axis around which it all turns for Guattari in those years: the possible,” he writes, “doesn’t exist as a purely logical matter; it doesn’t start out from nothing, either. It is organised in the form of quanta of freedom, in a sort of system of valences, the differentiation and complexity of which gives nothing away to the chains of organic chemistry or genetic codes. It puts into play matters of expression that are differentiated . . . [as per] their degree of deterritorialisation.” Once more, we encounter here Dionysus’s polymorphism, which affirms all possibilities alike before they actually crystallise into something: “Dionysos anté-Œdipe,” as Bruno Heuzé says.103

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88 Who was responsible for the posthumous publication in 2011 of GUATTARI’s Lines of Flight: For another World of Possibilities (French: Lignes de fuite. Pour un autre monde de possibles – hence of “possibles”), originally titled Équipements collectifs et assujettissement sémiotique.
89 Ibid., p. 201.
90 Ibid., p. 148.
91 Ibid., p. 149.
93 Ibid., p. 189.
95 In her “Preface” (ibid., p. 3, 443-444 n4), MOZÈRE dates this document to end of 1979 or, at most, the beginning of 1980, i.e. right after the publication of GUATTARI’s The Machinic Unconscious, with which Lines of Flight presents notable textual parallels. A close comparison between both documents suggests, though, that Lines of Flight could be earlier than The Machinic Unconscious. Compare e.g. the use of the terms “evolution” and “transformation” apropos the development of what Guattari called “archaic societies” on p. 166 and 64, respectively: it is hard to imagine the diachrony “transformation” → “evolution,” since “transformation” looks like a more debugged word choice.
98 Ibid., p. 147, 169, 205.
99 DELEUZE and GUATTARI, Anti-Oedipus.
100 GUATTARI, Machinic Revolution, p. 114-115.
101 GUATTARI, Lines of Flight, p. 148. It would be important to examine what of all this actually changes, and the point to which it does, in the late GUATTARI, who rather speaks of the “reciprocal presupposition” of the “real,” the “possible,” the “actual,” and the “virtual” (Schizoanalytic Cartographies, p. 28, fig. 1.2.), and stresses that the “trans-entititarian (matricial) generativity” at play between such factors four prevents the “primacy” of any of them over the others (ibid., p. 69).
102 Dionysus ἄδης. Cf. HERACLITUS’s frag. B15: […] ὠντός ὃς Ἀδης καὶ Διόνυσος […] , as well as LACAN’s fabulous wordplay between Ἀδης, αὐδή, and ἀναγωγή in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, p. 299.
In ancient Greece, though, Dionysus and Apollo shared one sanctuary: Delphi. Dionysus was worshiped there in the winter, whereas Apollo returned to Delphi every spring. Plutarch suggests that the two gods were actually one: a single god with two names, with Dionysus’s symbolising nature’s becoming and Apollo’s symbolising being. In any event Dionysus was for the ancient Greeks the god of life’s continuity, for “life” can be ultimately said in two different albeit complementary ways: as ζωή and as βίος. The former (ζωή) is strictly pre-individual: it names the anonymous and impersonal “life” that lives in everything, which will continue living and taking other forms after things die; the latter (βίος) is individual instead: it is this and that “life forms” (βίοτο), and thus indexical rather than holistic. In short while Dionysus symbolised ζωή, Apollo symbolised βίος, i.e. the shining forth of X, Y, and Z as Z, Y, and X – as well the political compossibility between Z, Y, and X, since Apollo was also the god of the polis. Furthermore Dionysus, the masked god, was in Greece a compassionate god who communicated the earth’s delivering truth to those who knew they die: the truth that life qua ζωή is both unconditional and immortal. Nevertheless, this did not function in ancient Greece as a revulsive against any configured form of life, as the shining forth of something as that something was, for the ancient Greeks, life’s purpose instead of a deceiving illusion. At most, it could help to moderate any excessive pride, which explains Dionysus eventually-burlesque features. For the main purpose of such truth was to comfort mortals as much as possible, when they (we) lament the death of everything mortal, including those we love and ourselves. Falling back into darkness and oblivion after having been in the light, thought the ancient Greeks, is a terrible thing for which there is, however, no remedy: one must face it and cope with it. Yet, at the same time, one must not forget that life continues, that new living forms shine forth from the depths of the earth when others relapse into it, and that, most importantly, the impersonal life that we carry in our veins will flow through them – like the wind blows through Dionysus’s instrument: the flute, and the sap runs through the leaves of the vine.

Now, while Dionysus task was to enforce life’s oneness and continuity beneath the spatial and temporal discreteness of all earthly living forms, Apollo’s was to prevent these from clinging to their being and deprive others from their equal right to shine forth into, and thus become present for a while in, the realm of being. Thus Apollo’s loftiness symbolised compassion too, but in the form of political justice. In fact, Apollo’s name derives very possibly from that of the Dorian assembly, the

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104 Plutarch, Moralia, 388e-389b, 392e-393d.
105 On which Plato based his philosophy, making it turn around the concept of έιδος; but the term is already, if with different meanings, in Diogenes of Apolonia, Xenophanes, Melissus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Philolaus of Croton, and Democritus (see Pizarro Herrmann, “Estudio semiánico sobre έιδος e έίδα en el Corpus Hippocraticum y sus antecedentes históricos,” p. 103-135).
ἀπέλλα ("boundless" in the sense of "lacking" [ἀ-] any delimiting "stones" [-πέλλα] around it), in allusion to the empty space at the heart of the Spartan polis where it gathered – a symbol of political freedom and justice against any attempt to submit the political to particular interests. By means of his all-encompassing vision, on the one hand, and his fairness, on the other, Apollo brought – like the sun – all beings evenly into the openness of their unconcealed standing-there, allowing them to acquire their distinct forms and forcing them to assume their limits with his arrows – shot from afar by the god with a bow that resembled a lyre – if they did not show mutual esteem to one another. In this sense, Apollo worlds the earth, thereby delimiting ζωή in infinite ways.

In other words, then, both Apollo and Dionysus protected life’s rhythm, but did so in two different ways. Their dual affirmation is distinctive of ancient-Greek culture – and of any extra-modern culture, in the last instance.

Enters anthropology – but after Fränkel, Vernant, Detienne, Redfield, etc., is there any need to recall that one cannot approach ancient Greece save as an anthropologist, and that any pretension to make of ancient-Greek culture the antechamber of our own (un)world would prove inevitably deceitful? “What we might call ‘culture’ or ‘society,’” writes Roy Wagner in the meta-anthropological “Prologue” to his own study on the Usen Barok of New Ireland, is “the containment by human beings of a spontaneously occurring force or power” that enables them to produce meaning anew and that enables them, at the same time, to “test its limits.” Now, if, Wagner goes on to say, “power over something” is not only the ability to master it, but also the ability to “negate” or “destroy” it or to have it replaced by something else, then “social power […] cannot be merely a function of the social order itself,” for “[i]t may […] be [either] elicited or contained,” and when it is elicited it overflows any possible container. In short, its elicitation must be acknowledged to be broader than its containment – which means, too, that Dionysus is by definition broader than Apollo. But what

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106 BURKERT, “Apollo und Apollon.”

107 In a way, then, what NEYRAT (see his contribution above) calls the “inhuman,” which is too quickly assimilated today to the “human” on behalf of a connectivist rhetoric that serves the purposes of a flat ontology. We share, in this sense, much of NEYRAT’s criticism of contemporary thought in The Unconstructable Earth.

108 See e.g. DETIENNE, Comparative Anthropology of Ancient Greece.

109 WAGNER, Asiwinarong, xiv (translation slightly modified). Think, for example, in how any human group confers meaning not only to the flora and the fauna that forms its environment, but also to the social relations and roles of its members, and thus to itself, by means of a particular system of notional classification (what LÉVI-STRAUSS calls in The Savage Mind [p. 1-34] the “science of the concrete”). The group’s existence relies on the mastery of such capacity, which permeates reality and extends through the group as its immanent dynamic force: the same force that shapes the land and keeps it together, through which place-spirits manifest in innumerable forms, by which everything fructifies and invention takes place, etc. Hence the possibility of labelling it an eliciting “force” or “power,” of which any society represents a possible configuration among others. Any of such particular configurations can, however, be challenged not just by other enemy groups, but by the new challenges every society is forced to face, which demand that changes be made whatever their proportions. Now, what capacity or force will assist those who feel compelled to make such changes? The very same one at stake in the production of any possible configurations, which, being both creative and transformative, will enable them to modify the real, i.e. to replace a given state of things by a new one.

110 WAGNER, Asiwinarong, p. xiv.
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sense would it make to be in position to elicit such force without simultaneously being in position to contain it? Put differently, most extra-modern worlds, precisely because they are possible worlds and not mere constellations of possibles (let alone unworlds, like ours), turn around the dual affirmation of possibility and determination – compossibility – of “generation” and “preservation” (Heidegger), or, as the Guattari of the early 1990s had it, “disorder” and “order,” notions for which Dionysus and Apollo, but also “Coyote” and “Lynx,” i.e. “trickster” and “demiurge” (Lévi-Strauss), stand as their “conceptual personae.”

If the Rabbis once spoke of “two powers in heaven,” Dionysus and Apollo can be seen, then, as the earth’s twin powers. Furthermore, their reciprocal or structural presupposition opens up the chance of turning difference, rather than singularity, irreducible, and, thereby, of making of the relational co-implication of that which differs the ultimate principle of the articulation of reality. This and no other is the original intuition of structuralism. For the point made by the latter is that given two elements: A and B (e.g. consanguinity and affinity, langue and parole, etc.), they are susceptible of being interpreted as forming a “structure” when and only when A proves to be, and to be what it is, inasmuch as it differs from B, and vice versa, when and only when B proves to be, and to be what it is, inasmuch as it differs from A, their co-plied difference being their structure, i.e. the meaningful relation that determines their individual qua joint being – a structure which, consequently, is not exterior to, and hence does not transcend, its elements or terms, but coincides with them qua differentials from one another; thus, too, Althusser’s notion of an “immanent

111 “In holding sway, struggle pervades the whole of beings with a double power: as power of generation and power of preservation. [...] What Nietzsche characterizes as the Apollonian and the Dionysian are the opposing powers of this struggle” (HEIDEGGER, Being and Truth, p. 74).
112 “Order inhabits disorder, disorder inhabits order, and it is only by means of this dual immanence that true creation can arise” (GUATTARI, Qu’est-ce que l’éco sophie?, p. 105; our translation).
113 “It is clear that Lynx and Coyote in North America, and Maire and Opossum in South America, fill complementary but opposite functions. The first separates the positive and negative aspects of reality and puts them in separate categories. The other acts in the opposite direction: it joins the bad and the good. The demiurge has changed animate and inanimate creatures from what they were in mythical times into what they will be thenceforth. The trickster keeps imitating the creatures as they were in mythical times and as they cannot remain afterward. He acts as if privileges, exceptions, or abnormalities could become the rule, while the demiurge’s job is to put an end to singularities and to establish rules that will be universally applicable to all members of each species and category” (LÉVI- STRAUSS, The Story of Lynx, p. 49).
114 The expression is DELEUZE and GUATTARI’s in What Is Philosophy? (p. 2, 4-5, 7, 10, 24, 40, 48, 61-84, 92, 102, 110, 128, 131, 133, 177, 197, 211, 216, 217: 131: “conceptual personae are philosophical sensibilita [...]; through them concepts are not only thought but perceived and felt” (ibid., 131). On the intersections of ancient gods, extra-modern spirits, and philosophical concepts, see REDDEKOP’S, BENNETT’S, and SZERSZYNSKI’S contributions below.
115 SEGAL, Two Powers in Heaven.
116 Cf. DETIENNE, Comparative Anthropology of Ancient Greece, p. 70-71.
117 Cf. CARNEIRO DA CUNHA’s formula of the “cannibal cogito” (in Os mortos e os outros, p. 143): “I am that which I am not is not,” on which see further SEGOVIA, “Tupi or not Tupi.”
causality,” according to which a structure is immanent in its terms and hence solely present in its effects.118

5 / Cosmopolitics, nihilism, and chiastic logic

By now, though, “real subsumption” (to paraphrase Marx) under a totalitarian Ge-stell seems to be an accomplished fact.119 Against its unprecedented “liquidation of the real”120 and against the self-complacent view that we should either enjoy our world-less condition121 or resign, at the very least, to the hypermodern dystopia122 – not to speak of the view which holds that today’s contradictions will lead to emancipation and, eventually too, sustainability123 – a number of contemporary authors tend to emphasise the need we have of what many of them agree to call cosmopolitics, i.e. of renegotiating our non-purely self-referential, let alone exceptional, role in the midst of a reality that refuses from any exclusionist centred-ness.124 To be sure, this goes beyond any claim to better train ourselves for new life conditions.125 Yet it is likewise clear that cosmopolitics (which asks questions about how things, practices, and ideas may fit within the same world) is not enough: in order to variously re-world the earth, and to sort out new, less damaging, roles for us on a variously re-worlded earth, we also need to think afresh ontology (which asks what things are) and modality (both as a response to the demands of ontological pluralism126 and as a tool for deciding what is real, possible, given, and giving in each case).127 Put otherwise: pragmatics is not enough. And, in this regard, comparative ethnography and philosophy must work together.

On the other hand, cosmopolitics is far from being an homogeneous category. It has different dialects: political,128 diplomatic,129 telluric,130 etc.131 They all have the virtue of re-connecting what the traditional Object/Subject divide (and its recent instantiations, from OOO to neo-

118 ALTHUSSER and BALIBAR, Reading Capital, p. 187. We are advancing here an argument we have developed at length in a forthcoming monograph titled Dionysus and Apollo after Nihilism, where we reassess the role of the two gods in ancient Greek culture, problematise Nietzsche’s interpretation of their differential relation, and analyse the implications of their twin-ness for contemporary philosophy.
119 On the concept of “real subsumption” see MARX and ENGELS, Collected Works, v. 95, p. 106.
120 POLT, “Eidetic Eros and the Liquidation of The Real.”
121 VEGSÖ, Worldlessness after Heidegger.
122 MORTON, Dark Ecology.
123 LIODAKIS, Totalitarian Capitalism and Beyond, p. 101-168.
124 See e.g. VIDAL and BENSUSAN (eds.), Primavera cosmopolitica.
125 SLOTERDIJK, You Must Change Your Life, of which HUY, The Question Concerning Technology in China, can be seen as a postcolonial (i.e. less Western-centric) drift.
126 See n9 supra.
127 See further GEVORKYAN and SEGOVIA, “Earth and World(s).”
128 DANOWSKY and VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, The Ends of the World., with their stress on multinaturalism and transversality. Cf. MONG-HY’s and BALAUD and CHOPOT’s contributions below.
129 SERRES, The Natural Contract; LATOUR, Facing Gaia: Down to Earth, with their stress on earthbound contractuality.
130 HARAWAY, Staying with the Trouble, with its stress on symbiosis and sympoiesis.
131 Cf. BENSUSAN, “Cosmopolitical Parties in the Post-human Age.”

63 DasQuestões, Vol. 13, n.1, dezembro de 2021, p. 46-72
Enlightenment) sever(s).\textsuperscript{132} We, too, want to go beyond such divide, but in an altogether different way. Not so much on behalf of a generalised connectivity\textsuperscript{133} as on behalf of the chiastic logic of dual thinking. What we mean by dual thinking ought to be evident by now: Dionysus leads back to the earth’s womb, so that we may experience our earthly condition and realise that the undetermined life which is alive in all living beings is indestructible and, hence, the source and the end of all determined life; conversely, Apollo allows all forms to take shape before they step back into the earth’s womb and thus brings all things into hidden-ness to be thought. In other words, Apollo cuts Dionysus’s continuum, which Dionysus restores despite Apollo’s cuts: were it not for Apollo, nothing definite would begin; were it not for Dionysus, things would not be in position to begin otherwise. Chaos/Cosmos, Earth/World, Limitlessness/Limitation, Possibility/Compossibility, Emergence/Shape, Becoming/Being, Transformation/Stability, Allowance/Care are among Dionysus’s and Apollo’s many names – among the many markers of their twin-ness. And there is surely no need to underline that thinking their co-implication amounts to something more than to assume our being-there-ness and to something else than to practice our being-with-ness. It does not only put the philosophy of mythology\textsuperscript{134} at the service of a new “futurability,” to borrow freely from Berardi,\textsuperscript{135} it obliges contemporary philosophy to reflect upon two issues which are paramount in any not-merely pragmatic\programatic discussion on dwelling and wording.\textsuperscript{136} First, the problem of nihilism, understood as the overexposure of all things in their availability\textsuperscript{137} and ephemerality,\textsuperscript{138} which makes them susceptible of being produced, used, and destroyed at will instead of being approached with awe and cared for. Second, the problem relative to the type of thinking we ought to explore after the collapse of modern demonstrative logic, which has accustomed us to establish a principle (again: “God,” “Man,” the “State,” “Class Struggle,” the “Free Market,” etc.) and deduce everything from it, thus subsuming everything under it. Should we go back to a type of illuminative logic, like New Age proponents and, somehow too, Russian Cosmists are ready to do?\textsuperscript{139} Should we remain instead within the subtractive logic characteristic of much contemporary philosophy, whose

\textsuperscript{132} Although OOO, and other new forms of (Speculative) Realism, might be taken as an attempt to recover a pre-Ge-stell reality (BENSUSAN, personal communication, June 26, 2021), if sometimes at the price of paradoxically loosing any reality to begin with, by tacitly expanding the critique of the Ge-stell into the critique of any “correlation” between thinking and being. Cf. BRASSIER, Nihil Unbound. Regarding neo-Enlightenment, see the works by PINKER and HARARI mentioned in n18.

\textsuperscript{133} See our critique to what we have called in Section 1 the “exchanging pole” of today’s unworld. In a manner of speaking, generalised connectivity and generalised exchange are one and the same phenomenon.

\textsuperscript{134} On which see also SZERSZYNSKI’S contribution below.

\textsuperscript{135} BERARDI, Futurability.

\textsuperscript{136} As are alterity and care, on which see BENSUSAN’S contribution above and REDDEKOP’S contribution below.

\textsuperscript{137} HEIDEGGER, Contributions to Philosophy, p. 91.

\textsuperscript{138} SEVERINO, The Essence of Nihilism, p. 1-32.

\textsuperscript{139} On the Russian Cosmists, see YOUNG, The Russian Cosmists.
main figures (echoes\prolongations of Heidegger’s “beynge”) are Deleuze's “difference in itself,” Derrida’s “trace,” and Harman’s withdrawing “objects.”\textsuperscript{140} Dionysus and Apollo’s recovered twinning militates for another type of logic that bears upon itself the mark not so much of the untimely but of the otherwise: the chiastic logic of most extra-modern peoples, the ancient Greeks included; that is to say, an extra-modern logic capable perhaps of teaching us to (re-)become extra-moderns on behalf of a complexity to which, as Gilbert Durand saw in the 1970s,\textsuperscript{141} neither the totalitarianism nor the anarchism of the concept are sensible at all.

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\textsuperscript{140} Notice, though, that in Heidegger's Bremen lectures, the \textit{Geviert}, rather than “beynge,” stands as a plausible \textit{antithesis} to the \textit{Ge-stell}. Whether it is “beynge” or the \textit{Geviert}, then, that take out of the modern “enframing” remains – one may conclude – undecided for Heidegger, as in his writings of the 1950s he employs both concepts, as it were, indistinctly (cf. the texts quoted in PINEDA SALDAÑA, “La triple escritura del ser en la obra de Heidegger,” p. 91-96, to which \textit{The Question of Being} must be added, and the texts collected in HEIDEGGER, \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought}, p. 148-159, 163-180, 187-208, respectively). One thing seems to be clear, anyway: whereas Heidegger's \textit{Geviert} is ultimately inspired in Hölderlin (MATTEI, \textit{Heidegger et Hölderlin}) and, via HÖLD LIN (\textit{Hyperion or The Hermit in Greece}, p. 118), in Heraclitus’s “chiastic” thinking (as WAGNER [\textit{Coyote Anthropology}, p. 5] rightly describes it), Heidegger’s “beynge” is, in turn, inspired in Eckhart (MOORE, \textit{Eckhart, Heidegger, and the Imperative of Releasement}) and, via Eckhart, in the abyssal theology of Christian gnosticism (ALTIZER, \textit{Godhead and the Nothing}, p. 112). Aside: for a non-ontotheological but meta-philosophical interpretation of Heidegger’s “beynge,” which goes beyond Heidegger's own \textit{said}, see GEVORKYAN, “Mea ning, that Demonic Hyperbole.”

\textsuperscript{141} DURAND, \textit{Sciences de l'homme et tradition} (see esp. the “Conclusion”).


GEVORKYAN, Sofya, and Carlos A. SEGOVIA. *Dionysus and Apollo after Nihilism: Reimagining Today’s Philosophical Board*. Foreword by Hilan Bensusan. Forthcoming.


From Worlds of Possibles to Possible Worlds


