Tupi or Not Tupi – That is the Question
On Semio-cannibalism, Its Variants, and Their Logics

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Abstract
In this paper I argue that, if put into due anthropological perspective, Oswald de Andrade’s aphorism: “Tupi or not Tupi, that is the question,” does not exactly reverse the mainstream distribution of the terms involved in the colonial imaginary divide, but that it replaces the latter with an unthinkable (for the modern cogito) alter-oriented counter-logic, as “Tu-pi,” i.e. to be a Tupi, requires the intervention of a possible Other. Furthermore, I examine these two logics as semio-cannibal variants and analyse their differing conceptual matrices against the backdrop of structural anthropology, in dialogue with Viveiros de Castro’s studies on cannibalism, kinship, and embodiment. I conclude that, paradoxically, whereas in one case the Other is fully erased albeit being metaphorically eaten, in the other case, despite the Other being physically eaten, its position is exchanged but never suppressed. Additionally, I attempt at a characterisation of capitalism as a form of semio-cannibalism and venture a new definition of ritual exo-cannibalism, on whose social function I offer a number of insights, as well.

Keywords: Cannibalism, Difference, Identity, Modernity, Otherness.

Resumen
El célebre aforismo de Oswald de Andrade: «Tupí o no Tupí, esa es la cuestión», no sólo subvierte el imaginario colonial, sino que permite —al ser puesto en perspectiva antropológica— sustituirlo por una lógica de la alteridad literalmente impensable para el cogito moderno, cuya propia lógica dicha lógica niega, dado que «Tu-pi», esto es, ser «Tupí», requiere, por definición y a diferencia de ser «moderno», la intervención de un Otro cualquiera que sea. Pero quizá ambas lógicas no sean, en rigor, sino dos variantes de lo que cabría denominar semicannibalismo, cuyas respectivas matrices conceptuales examino a la luz de la antropología estructural y en diálogo con los estudios de Viveiros de Castro sobre canibalismo, parentesco y corporeidad. Concluyo que mientras que, paradójicamente, en un caso el Otro es suprimido para ser engullido solo metafóricamente, en el otro caso el Otro, pese a ser literalmente engullido, no es suprimido, sino que es incorporado a un proceso de intercambio simbólico. Las páginas que siguen contienen asimismo una descripción del capitalismo en tanto que semicannibalismo y una reflexión innovadora —espero— sobre la función social del exocannibalismo ritual.

Palabras clave: canibalismo, diferencia, identidad, modernidad, alteridad.

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Prelude

In an important passage, Lévi-Strauss recalls that to the Europeans of the sixteenth century – with the partial exception of Montaigne\(^2\) – “the discovery of America confirmed the diversity of customs more than it revealed it,”\(^3\) in the sense that “encountering [the natives] did not bring anything that was not already well known”\(^4\) to them – or so they thought. “[O]nly a slight difference in degree was perceived between the savages (*silvaticus*, ‘of the forest’) and the pagans (*paganus*, ‘peasant’),” adds Lévi-Strauss.\(^5\) Hence “[t]here was nothing in the customs of the inhabitants of the New World that warranted any excitement.”\(^6\) all the Europeans encountered “was, if not already seen, at least already known.”\(^7\) The verdict is conclusive: “This voluntary *retreat onto oneself*, this reluctance, this blindness were the first response of humankind that had believed itself full and complete when, from one day to the next, it was faced with the evidence that it made up only half of the human species.”\(^8\) My hypothesis is not only that two “halves” of the “human species” (to use Linnaeus’s somewhat problematic expression)\(^9\) encountered each other when the Europeans arrived to America – and it is not only that, interestingly enough, anyway, one of them (the non-European half) *did* actually perceive the other half’s *otherness* (on which more below). My hypothesis –

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\(^2\) Whose “attitude toward the things and the peoples of the New World,” writes Lévi-Strauss, “turns out to be more complex than some famous pages have lead us to think” (LÉVI-STRAUSS, *The Story of Lynx*, p. 208; the reference, of course, is to Montaigne’s essays “Of Custom,” “Of Cannibals,” and “Of Coaches,” in MONTAIGNE, *Complete Essays*, p. 77-90, 150-159, and 685-699, respectively, as well as to Montaigne’s “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” in ibid., p. 318-457). Lévi-Strauss’s judgement on Montaigne is ambivalent – like Montaigne’s own stance for that matter: on the one hand, he writes, Montaigne displays an “ambiguity” which “still embarrasses and sometimes even paralyzes our thinking. All societies appear savage or barbarian when their customs are judged by the criterion of reason; but judged by this same criterion, no society should ever appear savage or barbarian, since a well-conducted discourse can find a foundation for any custom replaced in this custom’s context” (LÉVI-STRAUSS, *The Story of Lynx*, p. 211) – and this to the point that Montaigne, in a sort of Pyrrhonian drive (p. 215-216), “does not [just] drag to the tribunal of reason various customs and beliefs in order to legitimatize all of them or to recognize in them only a relative value; he uses them to take reason itself to court” (p. 212); on the other hand, however, Montaigne’s own *prise de position* does not “astray” from that of the 16th-to-17th-century explorers and missionaries (de Acosta, Sagard, etc.) who felt the encounter with the Native Americans could only “led them to ‘gratefulness to this God of all the world who has allowed us to be born in a Christian country and from Catholic parents” (p. 218; the quotation, to which I shall later return, is from Sagard’s *Histoire du Canada* (1636), vol. 1, p. xii). See further (also on Montaigne) LÉVI-STRAUSS, *We Are All Cannibals*, p. 72-75, and now too ARNOULD and FAYE (eds.), *Rouen 1562*.

\(^3\) LÉVI-STRAUSS, *The Story of Lynx*, p. 218.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 219.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 219.

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 219-220.

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 220.

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 220 (emphasis added).

\(^9\) See n.54 below, as well as SEGOVIA, “Spinoza as Savage Thought.”
which I shall duly explain in the pages that follow – is that two different types of cannibalism came to confront one another after the landfall of the Europeans: not only “le royaume des cannibales et les cannibales du royaume,” as João Ricardo Moderno playfully has it¹⁰ – though surely that too – but (a) a type of “semio-cannibalism”¹¹ whose conceptual matrix I am willing to call Oneness, and (b) an altogether-different type of “semio-cannibalism” which has Twoness as its conceptual matrix; two types of cannibalism that differ as to their transcendental arithmetics as much as their do concerning the symbolic subsistence of the Other or its erasure.

**Becoming-One as a Type of Cannibalism**

The fact the Europeans viewed those whom they encountered as “pagans” means they viewed them as “potential Christians,” and therefore as people in an earlier stage of development or peripheran to it depending on the exact proportion of humanness acknowledged to them by virtue of their perceived moral qualities. As Guido Abbattista writes,

> Two prevalent attitudes towards the Native American quickly emerged. According to one attitude, they were living testimony to a lost golden age before the fall from innocence. According to this attitude, the natives were fully human and thus had the capacity to acquire all the perceived benefits of European civilization, including Christian doctrine and, accordingly, salvation. As potential members of the Catholic Church and subjects of the crown of Castile, they should not be enslaved, it was argued, and they should be granted the same rights as any other Spanish subjects. According to this view, it was the duty of the Spanish crown to establish a political order that would protect its American subjects from the colonists’ rapacity.

> [...] The other prevalent attitude defined the Amerindians as only semi-human beings or even “beasts,” lacking all the fundamental prerequisites of civilized people. They were not “good,” it was argued, but “bad savages”: cruel, immoral, stupid, incapable of hard work, devoid of moral and political norms, and with a propensity for inhumane practices, such as sodomy, cannibalism and human sacrifices. They were clearly [...] to be subjected to a superior political authority, which would bring them the blessings of European and Christian order.¹²

In both cases, however, the goal was one and the same: whether fully human albeit ignorant of the “benefits” of Christian civilisation, or semi human and thereby in

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¹⁰ MODERNO, “Montaigne et le paradoxe de la barbarie.”
¹¹ I am freely drawing here on VIVEIROS DE CASTRO’s notion of “semiophagy” in From the Enemy’s Point of View, p. 286, 292.
¹² ABBATTISTA, “European Encounters in the Age of Expansion,” §§16-17 (emphasis added).
need of being “civilised,” they had to become, as much as possible, like “us,” Europeans. Thus Deleuze and Guattari’s lucid contention:

European racism as the white man’s claim has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other: it is instead in primitive societies that the stranger is grasped as an “other.” Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity [...] From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime is not to be. [...] racism never detects the particles of the other; it propagates waves of sameness until those who resist identification have been wiped out.\(^\text{13}\)

Otherwise, the belief that God’s sovereignty extends to “all the world” – the premise upon which Sagard composes his colonial eulogy\(^\text{14}\) – would stumble and ultimately collapse.

The roots of such premise ought to be traced back to Paul. In particular, to the following two passages, which can be said to epitomise his κήρυγμα: (a) Gal 3:28: “There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one [ἐν] in Christ Jesus”\(^\text{15}\), and (b) Rom 3:21-24: “But now, apart from law, the righteousness of God has been disclosed [...] the righteousness of God through faith [πίστις] in Jesus Christ for all who believe. For there is no distinction [διαστολή], since all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God; they are now justified by his grace [χάρις] as a gift [δωρεάν], through the redemption [ἀπόλυτρωσις] that is in Christ Jesus.”\(^\text{16}\)

Neil Elliott provides the political setting of Paul’s preaching – the making of the Roman Empire and its campaigns against different kinds of non-Romans. The Romans attributed to the “meritorious piety of their ancestors” the “destinies” of the peoples they came across with, and the “fact” that their own ancestor, Aeneas, by bringing safely his father, son, and ancestral gods to Ilium after the destruction of Troy – as the legend had it – could be identified as the most” pious” of all ethnic ancestors – to their own

\(^{13}\) DELEUZE and GUATTARI, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 208.
\(^{14}\) Supra, n. 2 in fine.
\(^{15}\) COOGAN (ed.), The New Oxford Annotated Bible, p. 2047.
\(^{16}\) Ibid., p.1981.
eyes – granted them legitimacy to dominate the peoples they conquered. Roman domination was therefore based on division (we and the others), division on uniqueness (we above all others), and uniqueness on the logic of a subordinative oneness (others have no other choice but to submit to Rome). Paul reacts to this and opposes to Rome’s all-exclusive universalism an all-inclusive universalist ideal based on a counter-legend, namely: the biblical legend of Abraham, who, unlike Aeneas, abandoned his father and his father’s gods “to follow God in trust that he would receive a new posterity.” In like manner, Paul opposes Christ, “whose death [and resurrection] made possible the incorporation [to Israel] of ‘many nations’ as Abraham’s descendants,” to Augustus, the prototype of all Roman emperors “whose vengeance against his father’s murderers secured peace for all who share[d] ritually in his sacrifice.” Notice that Rome perverts a preliminary binary structure to make it fit its imperial agenda: “with Rome or against Rome, to which you will sooner or later submit,” and that this means that sooner or later everything will become “One.” Paul adds his own twist to this very perversion: there is no difference between enemy and friend, as we are all equally justified by God, i.e. we are all “One” to begin with. Thus Paul’s all-inclusive Oneness replaces Rome’s all-exclusive Oneness – one type of Oneness substitutes for another one, that is.

Accordingly, given that relations are both symbolic (connective) and signalic (types of signs), and given that any sign has life only within a sign system (as Saussure has it), I should like to argue that

(1) Roman universalism is a type of semio-cannibalism, since it is the Other’s relation to the Roman self that is “eaten” in it, “digested,” and finally rendered “inexistent” by the latter, which relies on the idea of an all-exclusive Oneness; and yet it is, at the same time, a symbolic variant of what is commonly defined as “substantialist cannibalism” (in reference to the material ingestion/suppression of someone’s physical substance) insofar as the Other thus consumed is finally suppressed (only Rome remains);

(2) Paul’s universalism, by melting all differences and turning them into nothing at the outset, is also a type of semio-cannibalism, in which the Other’s relation to the Christian self is likewise “eaten,” “digested,” and declared “inexistent,” albeit one which relies instead on the idea of an all-inclusive Oneness; and yet it is, at the same time, another symbolic variant of what is

18 Ibid., p.137.
19 Through the belief in the saving qualities of Christ’s death and resurrection, and hence in his role as σωτήρ or “saviour.”
generally described as “substantialist cannibalism” inasmuch as in it, too, the Other thus consumed is ultimately erased (only God prevails);

(3) the type of semio-cannibalism the Europeans brought to America and elsewhere, which supplied the logic to their colonial endeavours (“this people must be civilised in one way or another and to one extent or another ad majorem Dei gloriam”), represents the exact combination of both.

**Capitalist Cannibalism and the Counter-logic of Alterity**

Today it is not so much about making the Others fully “human” as it is about selectively suppressing some aspects of their Otherness while keeping others as folklore so as to make them full “global citizens,” i.e. capitalist consumers. The strategy has changed, but the logic has not.

In fact capitalism can be said to be another semio-cannibalist variant – and one with Christian roots, as well. For just like in the Christian eucharist bread and wine lose their qualities and transform into something else: the body of Christ, thereby changing their intrinsic value for a new acquired value which is, moreover, eaten, capitalism transforms all things into commodities by making them lose their use-value, which is replaced by an exchange-value that makes them equivalent to one another and which is consumed in turn. In this sense Andrew Cole shows that, to elaborate his theory on “The Fetishism of Commodity and Its Secret” in *Capital* 1.1.4, Marx drew not so much on Hegel’s philosophy of right, as Marcuse claimed, as he did on Hegel’s early theological writings on the role of the eucharist in medieval Christianity. Thus, for example, in *The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate* (a text from 1798) Hegel attributes to the eucharist (*i*) the introduction of a radical shift in the value of things (bread and wine transform into something else), (*ii*) its transformation into what Marx will later call an exchange-value (the body and the blood of Christ), and, most importantly, (*iii*) the arrangement of such semiotic operation (*i* + *ii*) as the magnetic pole of all social life – its constituent and most constitutive ritual in anticipation of the celestial banquet promised to the pious in the afterlife. Undoubtedly, *i* and *ii* exceed the cultural boundaries of Christianity, as any currency stands for an abstract semiotic operator; but Christianity’s emphasis on *iii* is unprecedented despite the fact that various kinds of

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21 Perhaps one day the term “globalisation” will be seen as what it is: an euphemism for what Guattari, as early as 1979, i.e. long before terms like “global” and “globalisation” became current coin (JAMES and STEGER, “A Genealogy of ‘Globalization,’” p. 418), called “Integrated World Capitalism” (in the preparatory materials for a lecture in Namur, Belgium (GUATTARI, *Soft Subversions*, p. 229-243).

ritualisations of the type $i + ii$ can be found elsewhere. In fact, in medieval Christianity all turned around the eucharistic axis mundi – just like it does nowadays around the stock market in Wall Street. Furthermore, participation in $iii$ was viewed as helping (hu)mankind to transcend the corruption of flesh (i.e. nature as the locus of sin) and hence to have it regain its original Adamic condition, whereas capitalism amounts to an improved version – or to a system upgrade, to use the language of cybernetics – of this very model,23 inasmuch as participation in the eucharist of the market, wherein capital substitutes for Christ, amounts to a fully realised (i.e. actualised) eschatology (= temporal and modal upgrade) that helps now (all) humankind (= inclusive upgrade) to transcend its wants (i.e. nature as the locus of necessity) and thereby become free.

It is important to observe a dual fagocitation at stake here: first, bread and wine in one case, and anything from the wind to a tree’s bark to child labour force, etc. in the other case, are eaten up and turned into something else: Christ’s body and capital, respectively; secondly, the latter is ritually eaten by the believers/consumers24 without its stock ever diminishing even when it does not exactly grow.25 And so everything is semiotically (rather than “metaphorically”) cannibalised and made One. For capitalism26 begins by removing all reality from the things themselves and by putting them into circulation on a single “plane of equivalence” under the law of an abstract principle that makes them all exchangeable.27 In other words, capitalist semiotics function by

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24 That capitalism, too, is a question of belief should be obvious by now. See e.g. PIGNARRE and STENGERS, Capitalist Sorcery; MOERAN, “Magical Capitalism.” HORNBORG (“Submitting to Objects,” p. 255-256) draws an interesting parallelism thereof: “The import of fetishes as Spondylus shells to ancient Cuzco helped the Inca court to convince the emperor’s ten million subjects that his ritual communication with his father Inti (the Sun) was the prerequisite of agricultural productivity, and that it was entirely appropriate to reciprocate by spending significant amounts of their time working his fields and building his terraces. […] Modern power relations based on economic and technological accumulation are […] like premodern power, dependent on the ability of social elites to extract obedience and labour energy from the myriad human beings who provide them with the means of asserting these demands […] They continue to operate only as long as the people they control can be persuaded, by magic and/or coercion, to subscribe to the claims to power offered by the elite. At this moment in history, these claims hinge, for instance, on the promises of continued economic and technological growth, and of global sustainable development. […] History tells us that, in the long run, coercion alone will never suffice to maintain a power structure, rendering magic superfluous.” See also SEGOVIA, “El nuevo animismo,” p. 45-49.

25 See SAUNDERS, “Does Capitalism Require Endless Growth?”

26 Which is not merely a mode of production based on the exploitation of human labour force and natural resources plus the ideological “superstructure” that legitimises such exploitation, to put it in classic Marxist terms: it is also – or perhaps first and foremost (cf. GUATTARI, Lines of Flight, p. 33-34, 63; Qu’est-ce que l’écosphérie?, p. 149) – a “semiotic operator” that produces meaning.

27 Cf. GUATTARI’s reference (in The Three Ecologies, p. 29) to how “the imperium of a global market that destroys [any] specific value systems […] puts on the same plane of equivalence: material assets, cultural assets, wildlife areas, etc.,” and HEIDEGGER’s allusion (in his Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, p. 3-4) to the way in which by virtue of the modern Ge-stell “everything washes together into the uniformly distanceless.” See further GEVORKYAN and SEGOVIA, “Earth and World(s),” where, among other things,
abstracting, aligning, and subordinating to a One – one may call this the three basic semiotic functions of capitalism and its transcendental arithmetics, as shown in the diagram below:

The three basic rules of capitalist semiotics: things (a cloud, a double square, a multidirectional arrow *qua* arbitrary representatives of the ontological plurality in which reality consists) lose their specificity and are aligned on a single plane of equivalence for their generalised exchange and subordinated as exchangeable things to the law of a shared (i.e. common to all of them if variable from one to another) exchange value.

This, moreover, explains the difference – repeatedly stressed by Guattari – between capitalist and *animist* semiotics.\textsuperscript{28} If, as I have said, capitalism removes all reality from the things themselves and puts them into circulation under the law of an

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\textsuperscript{28} Cf. GUATTARI’s contrast between “capitalistic facticity” and what he calls (twice) “a provisionally-indispensable return to animist thinking” (already in a text from 1985 included in *Soft Subversions*, p. 324 n.6, and, later, in *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, p. 268 n.33). Guattari’s references to animism are, on the other hand, relatively abundant: twenty-eight from 1969 to 1992, visibly increasing around 1989 and including too Guattari’s coauthored works with Deleuze.
abstract principle that makes them all exchangeable,

29 animism’s first axiom is, instead, a generalised transitivity that makes everything alive in its own way and in its own right, and the world a collection of diverging, embodied, transversal, and shifting living perspectives on what I therefore propose to call an “animist continuum” – whereas totemic relationality, it could be argued, delimits specific “sections” in the animist continuum without dissolving its inherent complexity, since totemic worlds are multiple by definition. Animism, one could then say, is the art of allowing and exploring singular ontological configurations in a smooth or non-striated space – and therefore a rhizomatic art. One, furthermore, in which there is always an Other, in fact many others, since no perspective can claim to be the only one. Viveiros de Castro:

the Other […] appears [here] as a condition of the field of perception: the existential possibility of those parts of the world that lie beyond actual perception is guaranteed by the virtual presence of an Other that perceives them; what is invisible to me subsists as real by being visible to an other. Without an Other the category of possibility disappears; [and] the world

30 collapses […] An Other is thus no one (neither subject nor object) but rather a structure or rela-tion – the absolute relation that provides concrete actants with their rela-tive positions as subjects or objects, as well as their alternation between the two positions: the Other refers (to) me to the other I and the other I to me. The Other is not an element within the field of perception; it is the principle that constitutes such a field, along with its content. The Other is thus not a specific point of view to be defined in relation to the subject (the “point of view of the other” in relation to my point of view or vice-versa), but rather it is the possibility that there may be a point of view at all – that is, it constitutes the concept of a point of view.

31 The recovery of the possible through the exploration of a Multiple not-subdued by any One is precisely what animism permits against capitalist semio-cannibalism. A subsequent conceptual step would be to transit from the question of the “possible” to that of the “compossible,” and to do so through the exploration of two other conceptual figures: Dwelling and Care. Yet here I would like to examine how – to paraphrase Viveiros de Castro – the Other qua the “concept of a point of view” and thereby –

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29 Which means that its “deteritorialising” vectors (on which see DELEUZE and GUATTARI, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 500) work to “subject” and “fix” what they paradoxically decode (GUATTARI, Lines of Flight, p. 36). Cf. DELEUZE and GUATTARI, The Anti-Oedipus, p. 36-37 where this fact seems to be overlooked).

30 I.e. the coexistence of many qua Many whatever their possible articulations: every world is by definition a pluriverse.

31 VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, The Relative Native, p. 10.

32 SEGOVIA, “El nuevo animismo.”

33 Such is the purpose of a forthcoming book coauthored with Sofya Gevorkyan, provisionally titled Dionysos and Apollo in the Anthropocene. See further GEVORKYAN and SEGOVIA, “Post-Heideggerian Drifts,” as well as GEVORKYAN and SEGOVIA, “Earth and World(s),” On the concept of “compossibility,” see GEVORKYAN and SEGOVIA, “Paul and the Plea for Contingency in Contemporary Philosophy.”
one may add – Alterity or Twoness supplied its logic to the type of (counter-)semiotic cannibalism the Europeans encountered upon arriving in the “New World.” That, for instance, of the Tupinamba of coastal Brazil, which can be characterised as the “initial case in point”\(^{34}\) of what, writing on the European arrival a little further north, in the Caribbean Islands, Philip Boucher calls “cannibal encounters.”\(^{35}\) Most of what follows thus applies to them.

**Rethinking Ritual Exo-cannibalism**

What, then, was Tupinamba cannibalism about? That is to say, what exactly did the Tupinamba aim at incorporating by eating an other? To understand it a preliminary clarification on the essence of Amazonian ritual exo-cannibalism is in order. For it is not enough to distinguish between “cannibalism as a dietary practice […] [and] cannibalism as a religious sacrament,”\(^{36}\) which moreover begs the question of whether originally-Christian terms can be of any help to examine non-Christian realities; nor is it enough to claim that “cannibalism [cannot] be treated in isolation […] [but] must be tested against other social phenomena, such as mortuary beliefs, kinship systems, […] and worldviews,”\(^{37}\) which is, this time, too general a claim. Hence I would like to put forth the following characterisation:

\[(a) \text{ regardless of its setting, Amazonian ritual exo-cannibalism presents a common structure:}\]

\[\text{(b) it is not so much about eating someone (even if that happens, no one pretends to deny it) as it is about incorporating something (let’s call it “x”) by means of eating someone (“x’s bearer”);}^{36}\]

\[\text{(c) the something in question is always something else and something more than that someone’s physical substance}^{39}(\text{even if the latter is materially incorporated, as well);}\]

\(^{34}\) VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, *The Inconsistency of the Indian Soul*, p. 4.  
^{35}\) BOUCHER, *Cannibal Encounters*.  
^{37}\) Ibid., p. 9.  
^{38}\) KILGOUR (*From Communion to Cannibalism*) aptly points to “incorporation” as being the key figure at play in any form of cannibalism (whose variants she extends to include literary and, more generally, cultural forms of cannibalism). Fine. But what is thus incorporated: someone, something, both albeit differently? Also, her emphasis in that the distinction between eater and eaten is both absolute and unreciprocal and yet fades in the process of ingestion – which is explored further, from a postcolonial perspective, in GUEST’S edited volume *Eating Their Words* – does not help to understand the relevance of the exchange itself in which any incorporation ultimately consists.
(d) and since the eaten is always-already in a certain relation to the eater (before being eaten, that is) “x” is that relation (henceforth R1).  
(e) this means that ritual exo-cannibalism is, in the last instance, a question of relational logic;  
(f) it also means that the consumption of “x” makes the relation of the eaten to the eater (R1) undergo a new relation (henceforth R2);  
(g) arguably, then, ritual exo-cannibalism is a second-order relation, or the relation of a relation;  
(h) finally, given, once more, that any relation is both symbolic and signalic, and that any sign has life only within a sign system, it is possible to affirm that Amazonian ritual exo-cannibalism is a form of semio-cannibalism.

We must now discover what R1 and R2 are.

“Although their preferred victim was an adult man of valor,” writes Viveiros de Castro, “the Tupinamba killed and ate anyone who fell into their hands”. From this it can be inferred that it was the other’s “enmity” – i.e. the distinctive position of any other qua Other, which, evidently, is all the more salient in a menacing other – the Tupinamba aimed at incorporating; and it can also be deduced, therefore, that the other, for the Tupinamba, was “not extended matter but intellectual relation.” In other words, what the Tupinamba ate when they ate an Other was that Other’s “Otherness.” Or R1. But what happens when one eats an “enemy” (read: anyone who is not a consanguine; anyone, therefore, who is a true other, and hence too a potential affine)
and thereby incorporates that enemy’s enmity? Very easy: one “changes into... an enemy.”\textsuperscript{46} In this sense, underlines Viveiros de Castro, “a cannibal transformation [...] [is] [...] the contrary of an identification – it amounts literally to an identification to the contrary.”\textsuperscript{47} Or R2. It may be objected that, before eating her/him, one is already the enemy’s enemy. Yes. But this feature is exponentially intensified: by eating an enemy the killer becomes an even-greater enemy, or, more exactly, he becomes to a higher degree what he already is. Thus he transforms into twice an enemy. For – the Tupi-Guarani Arawete are a case point here – the eaten does not exactly dissolve into the eater\textsuperscript{48} but remains symbolically next to him (as a peculiar, because of immaterial, type of affine) partaking in both his life and his afterlife, which means that, in the end, enmity is not just exponentially intensified (more on it below), but reshaped otherwise. A brief disclaimer: should the reader find all this too relational, too rational, too abstract, too immaterial, I ask her/him not to forget that, usually, the killer does not eat the killed enemy\textsuperscript{49} – that, more often than not, the cannibal is someone else (namely, the killer’s relatives).

This said, I should also like to stress that, more generally, Amazonian ritual exo-cannibalism seems to fulfil four overlapping functions, two of which (α, δ) look contingent (occasional), whereas the other two (β, γ) look necessary (universal):

\begin{itemize}
\item[(α)] An individual eschatological function which, in the end, proves to be
\item[(β)] a social function relative to the making of a group’s epic and the cult of its heroes as memorable ancestors.
\item[(γ)] A social function relative to the binding of the group around the group’s heroes and values, as per the dialectics of war and revenge.
\item[(δ)] A social function relative to the maintenance of a dynamic distribution of power between the two main constituents of the group, e.g. men and women in uxorilocal societies.
\end{itemize}

Let’s now examine them:

\textsuperscript{46} VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, \textit{From the Enemy’s Point of View}, p. 286.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 286 (emphasis original).
\textsuperscript{48} Another problem for Kilgour’s hypothesis, on which see n.38 above.
\textsuperscript{49} VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, \textit{From the Enemy’s Point of View}, p. 292-293, \textit{contra} LESTRINGANT, “Le cannibalisme des ‘cannibales’.”
(α) After killing an enemy, the killer symbolically “dies.” He fasts for several days and mourns his enemy’s death, until the “spirit” of his enemy returns to him in his dreams and wakes him up bestowing him with new names and songs. From then onwards killer and victim form a sort of dissymmetrical unity (only a component of the enemy’s spirit stays with the killer) and, upon the killer’s physical death, ascend together to the sky, where the gods do not dare to eat the killer, since he has already died (symbolically, after killing his enemy) and no one dies twice, which means he is now immortal; plus he has transformed into an even-more-powerful enemy (by symbolically incorporating his enemy) who is feared by the gods themselves. The structure, then, is that of an “other-becoming.” Twofold: in respect to a “human” enemy (which the killer somehow becomes) and in respect to the gods (those divine cannibals/enemies that eat…)

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50 I follow here VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, From the Enemy’s Point of View, p. 238-249. Consequently, what follows is mostly applicable to the Arawete. Nonetheless, as Viveiros de Castro himself acknowledges, it would not be difficult to find analogies in other Tupi-Guarani groups and beyond these; moreover, the logic of Arawete ritual exo-cannibalism may well provide the interpretative key one needs to understand Tupinamba ritual exo-cannibalism (p. 272).

51 I am, of course, hesitant to use this word, which I employ here for simplicity’s sake – a false simplicity upon due scrutiny. See VALENTIM, Extravagunidade e sobrenatureza, p. 220: the concept of utupé among the Yanomami, which is frequently indistinctly translated as “image” or “spirit,” denotes at the same time: (1) the “innermost part” of a thing, of which the thing is but the “copy”; (2) a “copy” of something else which is not the thing but its “ancestor”; (3) something that is inherently “many” rather than one; and (4) something that happens to be simultaneously “different-and-not different” from that of which it is the original, from that of which it is the copy, and form its many possible variations. In short, the original is here turned into a copy, the unique transformed into a multiple, and the same changed into the other and vice versa, following a principle of “vice-diction” (to borrow from DELEUZE, The Fold, p. 67-68) that allows contradictory qualities to be simultaneously expressed, as it happens with polyphonic music in contrast to logic (on which see JANKELEVITCH, Debussy et le mystère de l’instant, p. 18: “Only music can express infinitely ambiguous things, as, unlike logic, music must not opt between things which are incompatible or contradictory: it can bring forth and develop, with the help of polyphony, several independent lines of discourse” [my translation]).

52 In a reversal, therefore, of Diomedes’s and Patroclus’s fate, for Diomedes’s audacity (which is another name for his ὁμιλία) is stopped by Apollo, and Patroclus’s, stopped at first by Apollo, and then countered by the god by means of provoking the hero’s death (HOMER, The Iliad, 5.432-44; 16.702-11; 16.783-822).

53 VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, From the Enemy’s Point of View, p. 269-270.

54 I am also hesitant to use this word. Allow me to draw in this case an example from Tumbuka, a Bantu language. Two nouns stand in it in semantic opposition to one another: wantu (sing. munthu) and wazungu (sing. muzungu). As per their morphology and semantics, these nouns belong in the first and second noun stems (classes) existing in Tumbuka, which include “agent” nouns. Non-Bantu, Western, speakers take wantu to be an ethnonym: the ethnonym for “Bantu” (wanthu = the Bantu). Conversely, they take wazungu to denote the “white people,” and thus to be another kind of ethnonym, though a less-precise one (inasmuch as “white” is more extensive a category than Bantu). From this standpoint, therefore, wantu and wazungu denote, if somewhat unevenly, two different “human types”; that is to say, they denote possible subdivisions of a common genus: “human.” Yet it would be hard to persuade a Tumbuka speaker of this – unless s/he are forced to replace Tumbuka with a different language, English for instance. For wantu in Tumbuka does not mean the “Bantu,” nor does wazungu mean the “white people.” Wantu (“bantu”) means, more simply, the “people.” Like in most indigenous contexts, three categories must be carefully distinguished here. First, there is – to use a pleonastic paraphrase – the “true (or real) people”: those who speak like you and do things in the way you do them, i.e. your own group (the “people”). Then there are those who “look like (true) people” without being “(true) people,” i.e. other groups that have a similar if not identical language to yours, etc. And, finally, there are the “others”: those do not “look like (true) people” cannot be said to be “(true) people.” Wazungu is the Tumbuka term for such “others.” Consequently, wantu and wazungu are deictics that do not function as two logical subdivisions (or species) of the same genus. They stand, instead, in an inverse relationship. In fact, the wantu have more in common with their totems, in which they transform, than with the wazungu. See further SEGOVIA, “Ontologies and Ecologies of the Otherwise.”
whoever arrives to the sky, except the heroes). The latter transformation can be seen as a variation on the ancient-Greek notion of κλέος – or the other way round, of course; or, even better, the two things can be viewed as variations on a shared idea, to wit: that renown amounts to immortality – which is what is being thought here.55

With this, though, we move from the domain of individual eschatology (the pursue of glory as immortality) into (β) the domain of the making of a group’s epic, which entails the cult of its hero-ancestors for a number of generations – until their memory fades away.

(γ) And it goes without saying that, during the heroes’ lifetime, and especially immediately after their death – particularly if it is a violent death, i.e. a cannibal death – the group gathers around the values incarnated by their deceased heroes, whose revenge the group seeks, thus keeping the war machine uninterruptedly functioning, among other things to avoid assimilation, i.e. to stress and defend their difference.56 And it is interesting to observe that from quite early on, despite all, Amerindian cannibalism was perceived, at least by some Europeans, as relating to the interplay of honour and revenge rather than hunger or gluttony.57

(δ) Lasty, it may happen that, additionally to everything said so far, ritual exo-cannibalism introduces a counterpoint in the gender-distribution of uxorilocal groups, as it occurred with the Tupinamba, who kept the uxorilocal principle (generally men, rather than women, are the ones to circulate through marriage) but with an important nuance: war prisoners were married to the groups’ women and then killed and eaten, so that their wives were re-married with their own brothers, who thereby managed to stay home instead of moving to their spouses homes, with each great Tupinamba warrior moreover taking several wives.58

I will return to this additional social motivation later on, as we must now consider the question of whether the “other-becoming” mentioned apropos α – which is the crucial point for us at this juncture and whose logic can be translated into the formula: “That which I shall be is all that I am not”59 – represents an alternative or a

55 Like CLASTRES (Chronicle of the Guayaki Indians, p. 15-59) proves that the notion of bayja functions as a notional “centre of vibrations” that allows life and death to resonate in the minds of the Aché qua complementary existential vectors, i.e. as a concept in the Deleuzian sense (DELEUZE and GUATTARI, What Is Philosophy?, p. 23).
58 VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, From the Enemy’s Point of View, p. 293-298.
59 Ibid., p. 253-254.
variant to the formula of the savage cogito: “I am that which I am not is not.”\(^{60}\) I would decidedly opt for the second option. For the savage binary cogito is always there anyway: there is me, the enemy and, above us both, the god who is both my enemy and my enemy’s enemy and vis-à-vis whom we can also become enemies, just like below us there is the jaguar who is our enemy too.\(^{61}\) The cannibal cogito simply adds to this a dynamic perspective: “Man is something between two Others […] but [his] destiny is achieved only elsewhere”;\(^{62}\) for “the human condition is pure potency and dissimilarity with itself”\(^{63}\) – i.e. “thrown projection” (geworfener Entwurf), and therefore too an “enigma” (Rätsel), to put it in Heideggerian terms.\(^{64}\)

To sum up: despite implying a material ingestion, ritual exo-canibalism is a question of logic in which the position of the Other is exchanged but never suppressed. Conversely, in the European (Roman Christian, colonial, and capitalist) case(s), cannibalism’s metaphoric nature conceals a substantialist premise: albeit symbolically, the Other is fully erased, that is to say, eaten.

**On What Is at Stake in All This**

The non-suppression of the Other in Amazonian ritual exo-cannibalism, and the Tupinamba resource to the latter to trick the application of the uxorilocal principle on which their kinship relations stood (i.e. the introduction of a counter-axis in terms of gender distribution), puts us in position to briefly analyse the implicit binary classifications on which indigenous conceptual worlds often rely. For, as Patrice Maniglier puts it, any world is “a possible way of making identity and difference,”\(^{65}\) or, as Lévi-Strauss says, a collection of many intersecting “classifications”\(^{66}\) that “proceed

\(^{60}\) The formula is CARNEIRO DA CUNHA’s (Os mortos e os outros, p. 143) apropos the Kraho; but cf. CLASTRES (Society Against the State, p. 173) on the Guaraní.

\(^{61}\) Thus the division: “Nature” – “Culture” – “Super-nature,” which is parallel to that of the “rotten” (Nature as the pre-formal locus where one’s body regresses after dying), the “raw” (Culture as a set of forms which are always-already in the process of being made), and the “cooked” (the realm of the exempla that any culture needs to be made and preserved), on which see ibid., p. 256-269. The terms pre-formal locus, forms, and exempla are my own, and suitable here, I think, even if “nature” must be envisaged, from an altogether-different angle (distributive rather than positional), as an a-centred (i.e. non-hierarchical) collection of differing ontological perspectives (on which see VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, The Relative Native, p. 249-272), which implies that, in the last instance, there is nothing exactly formless.

\(^{62}\) VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, From the Enemy’s Point of View, p. 269.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., p. 269.

\(^{64}\) HEIDEGGER, Being and Time, p. 139, 339 (= Sein und Zeit, p. 148, 371).


\(^{66}\) LÉVI-STRAUSS, The Savage Mind, p. 61.
by “pairs of contrasts [...] [and which] cease when it is no longer possible to establish [any further] oppositions.”

Totemic classifications, for instance; for, as Radcliffe-Brown – who defined “association by contrariety” as “a universal feature of human thinking” – suspected, and as Lévi-Strauss shows, these display “theoretical associations” based on the characteristics of “symmetrically-opposed species.” Or, more broadly, social organisations, which totemic alliances help to vertebrate, and which are ultimately based on the difference between consanguinity and affinity. Individuals, whose constitutive “plural relations” are, as Strathern writes, “first reconceptualized as dual,” and who form a composite “singularity of body and soul internally constituted by the self/other, consanguine/affine polarity,” as Viveiros de Castro in turn emphasises.

Myths displaying twins, like those of lynx and coyote among the Nimipuu and their neighbours or the Proto-Indo-European myth recently reconstructed by Mallory and Adams in which “the universe is created from a primeval giant [...] who is sacrificed and dismembered, the various parts of his anatomy serving to provide a different element of nature,” which may well be one of the oldest myths we know about the reciprocal articulation of nature and culture. Or funeral and fertility rites like those which, from Zimbabwe to Kimberly in Western Australia and the northeast of South Australia, reflect a bemusing regularity when it comes to the employ of binary chromatics (e.g. red/white, red/black, 0/white & black).

It would be a mistake, though, to think that binary classifications are rigid systems. First, they are always flexible enough to admit changes. Second, to avoid

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69 Ibid., p. 114.
70 Rather than a principle of mystical “participation” à la Lévy-Bruhl or “utilitarian” considerations à la Malinowski (LÉVI-strauss, Totemism, p. 80).
71 Ibid., p. 80-89.
72 LÉVI-strauss, Structural Anthropology, p. 132-163.
74 STRATHERN, The gender of the Gift, p. 15.
75 VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, The Relative native, p. 129.
78 LÉVI-strauss, The savage Mind, p. 64-65.
79 As the legend has it. On the making of this legend (to which Derrida and Geertz contributed in different ways), see DEBAENE, “Lévi-Strauss.” Debaene rightly points to a twofold problem: first, in the Anglo-American world, Lévi-Strauss’s thought was rejected before being properly received and discussed; secondly, it has been deemed outdated in terms of ethnographic empirical description and theory understood as a conceptual system or doctrine. There is little to say about the first of these issues, save to stress that by 1966, when Derrida’s lecture at Johns Hopkins University allegedly opened the doors of “post-structuralism” to a good many North-American academics and littérateurs, only Structural
falling into “inertia” binary structures usually display a “permanent” or “dynamic disequilibrium,” as we have seen apropos the nuancing of uxorilocality among the Tupinamba. Third, binary patterns do not overdetermine but from the distance, so to speak, the manifold contingent events in which life ultimately consists. I find Roy Wagner’s ethnography among the Daribi particularly interesting in this respect. “If Americans and other Westerners create the incidental world by constantly trying to predict, rationalize, and order it,” he writes,

...then tribal, religious, and peasant peoples create their universe of innate convention by constantly trying to change, readjust, and impinge upon it. Our concern is that of bringing things into an ordered and consistent relation – whether one of logically organized “knowledge” or practically organized “application” – and we call the summation of our efforts Culture. Their concern might be thought of as an effort to “knock the conventional off balance,” and so make themselves powerful and unique in relation to it. […]

The conventionally prescribed tasks of everyday life, what one “should” do in such a society, are guided by a vast, continually changing and constantly augmented set of differentiating controls […] These include all manner of kin and productive roles, magical and practical techniques, possible modes of conduct for personal deportment. And if the ethnographer finds it difficult to standardize these controls, or catch a "native" in the act of explicitly "performing" one of them, it is because their very nature and intent defies the kind of literalness that “standardization” or “performance” (as well as the ethnographer’s own professional ethic of consistency) implies. They are not Culture, they are not intended to be “performed” or followed as a “code,” but rather used as the basis of inventive improvisation. […] The person who is able to do this well – even to the point of inventing wholly new controls – is admired and often emulated. The controls are themes to be “played upon” and varied, rather in the way that jazz lives in a constant improvisation of its subject matter.

And so we can speak of this form of action as a continual adventure in “unpredicting” the world.

In between the lines of unconscious binary structures, one may add.
Now, it would also be a mistake to fancy that it was curiosity vis-à-vis, say, logical specimens that drew Lévi-Strauss’s attention to binary classifications in the first place. I would like to venture that it was the problem of the constitution of the social, i.e. the problem of the determination of its constituent factors (which is not the same as the description of its constituted features) that led Lévi-Strauss to formulate the notion of “dual organisation” (and other related concepts).

There is a crucial passage in The Elementary Structures of Kinship that reads thus:

The multiple rules prohibiting or prescribing certain types of spouse, and the prohibition of incest, which embodies them all, become clear as soon as one grants that society must exist. But society might not have been. Have we therefore resolved one problem, as we thought, only to see its whole importance shifted to another problem, the solution to which appears even more hypothetical than that to which we have devoted all our attention? In actual fact, let us note, we are not faced with two problems but with only one. If our proposed interpretation is correct, the rules of kinship and marriage are not made necessary by the social state. They are the social state itself, reshaping biological relationships and natural sentiments, forcing them into structures implying them as well as others, and compelling them to rise above their original characteristics. The natural state recognizes only indivision and appropriation, and their chance admixture. However, as Proudhon has already observed in connexion with another problem, these notions can only be transcended on a new and different level: “Property is non-reciprocity, and non-reciprocity is theft... But common ownership is also non-reciprocity, since it is the negation of opposing terms; it is still theft. Between property and common ownership I could construct a whole world.” What is this world, unless it is that to which social life ceaselessly bends itself in a never wholly successful attempt to construct and reconstruct an approximate image of it, that world of reciprocity which the laws of kinship and marriage, in their own sphere of interest, laboriously derive from relationships which are otherwise condemned to remain either sterile or immoderate?

However, the progress of contemporary social anthropology would be of small account if we had to be content with an act of faith – fruitful no doubt, and in its time, legitimate – in the dialectic process ineluctably giving rise to the world of reciprocity, as the synthesis of two contradictory characteristics inherent in the natural order. Experimental study of the facts can join with the philosophers’ presentiments, not only in attesting that this is what happened, but in describing, or beginning to describe, how things happened.\(^\text{84}\)

\(^\text{84}\) LÉVI-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, p. 490 (emphasis added).
It is possible to deduce that it is through kinship, and more specifically through the exogamous *alliance* in which marriage consists, therefore, that *sociality* comes into existence.

But this implies that sociality is, in the final analysis, based on *alliance and reciprocity*:

Nature [...] already moves to the double rhythm of receiving and giving [...] But [...] this rhythm does not display the same aspect in both nature and culture. The characteristic of nature is that it can give only what has been received. Heredity expresses this permanence and continuity. However, in the sphere of culture, the individual always receives more than he gives, and gives more than he receives.

That is to say, through marriage (which is required but not limited by nature) what everyone receives (someone else whom to marry, that is) is given to her/him as a (true) “gift,” since such giving exceeds the principle of consanguinity; and vice versa, through marriage everyone gives her/himself (or is given by others) as a “gift” to someone else. For if nature “assigns to each individual determinants transmitted by those who are in fact his parents [...] it has nothing to do with deciding who these parents will be,” whereas in the case of heredity one can only receive what one has in fact received, and transmit it of necessity, so that

...from the point of view of nature heredity is doubly necessary, firstly as a law – there is no spontaneous generation – and secondly as a specification of the law, for nature not only says that one must have parents, but that one will be like them. As regards marriage, however, nature is satisfied with affirming the law, but is indifferent to its contents. If the relationship between parents and children is strictly determined by the nature of the parents, the relationship between male and female is left entirely to chance and probability.

Thus the peculiar nature of the social relation – and its *freedom*. With this, Lévi-Strauss invites us to look in a direction which is neither that of Hobbes (for whom the “state of nature” amounts to violent competition) nor that of

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85 Cf. LÉVI-strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, p. 30: “[t]he incest prohibition expresses the transition from the natural fact of consanguinity to the cultural fact of alliance.”
86 Ibid., p. 30.
87 Ibid., p. 30-31.
88 For a theoretical complication of this model, which nonetheless preserves its binary structure, see Viveiros de Castro, *The Relative Native*, p. 154-164.
Rousseau (for whom it amounts to peaceful commonality). Deeply interested as he was in Rousseau, Lévi-Strauss nevertheless portrays the pre-social state, i.e. the anteriority to alliance, as a combination of “indivision” and “appropriation.” Obviously, he is subtly merging here Rousseau (“indivision”) and Hobbes (“appropriation”). But he then quotes Proudhon (“property is non-reciprocity, and non-reciprocity is theft; but common ownership is also non-reciprocity, hence theft as well”) to draw a mean point between their respective views. The passage in question has not received as yet due attention. But it makes patent what is it that Lévi-Strauss was looking for through the study of kinship as a social anthropologist heir to Mauss and Durkheim. Furthermore, it shows that a social world in which “collaboration does not exclude rivalry” – to borrow from Tristes Tropiques – is perfectly possible; in fact, it is the “norm” rather than the “exception” therein where the Self-oriented logic of Oneness has not yet eaten up the Other-oriented logic of Twoness, i.e. where Sameness has not yet fatally swallowed up Difference.

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90 LÉVI-STRAUSS, Totemism, p. 99-103; LÉVI-STRAUSS, Structural Anthropology 2, p. 33-43. See also DOJA, “From Neolithic Naturalness to Tristes Tropiques; GUENANCIA, “Rousseau, Lévi-Strauss’s ‘Master.’”

91 After p. 131 of vol. 6 of the French ed. (1897) of Proudhon’s complete works.

92 Cf. the vague references to Lévi-Strauss and Proudhon in MODIANO (”The Legacy of the Picturesque,” p. 212) and PACE (Claude Lévi-Strauss, p. 55), as well as FALLEIROS (”Dialética perspectivista anarcoindigena”) essay on Lévi-Strauss’s binary structures” and Proudhon’s “dialectics,” which fails to realise, though, that the issue at stake is not just the identification of such or such idealative parallelisms and/or genealogies. On Lévi-Strauss and the constitution of the social, see overall ASCH, “Lévi-Strauss and the Political.”

93 LÉVI-STRAUSS, Tristes Tropiques, p. 223. But his earliest paper on it is “Reciprocity and Hierarchy,” where he puts forward the notion of “reciprocal subordination” to account for the dissymmetry of human-divine relations and social-status qualifiers among the Bororo: “A perhaps one-sided analysis of the dual organization has too often put the emphasis on the principle of reciprocity as its main cause and result. It is well to remember that the moiety system can express, not only mechanisms of reciprocity but also relations of subordination. But, even in these relations of subordination, the principle of reciprocity is at work; for the subordination itself is reciprocal: the priority which is gained by one moiety on one level is lost to the opposite moiety on the other” (p. 267-268).

94 See further LEROI-GOURHAN, Gesture and Speech, which represents one of the most original attempts to elaborate a theory of human bio-cultural evolution. Leroi-Gourhan asserts that all “reference systems” of “Paleolithic thought,” as we find them displayed in what is often if improperly called Paleolithic “art,” were “ultimately based on the alternation of opposites – day/night, heat/cold, fire/water, man/woman, and so on” (p. 395-396). He calls it “binary complementarity” (p. 396), and explains through it as well, among other things, spatial distributions (p. 335), social cooperation (p. 151-157), and the “dynamic equilibrium” between security and freedom (p. 338). In his “Introduction” to the English ed., WHITE speaks, in turn, of the “basic binary oppositions” implicit in the “operational sequences” – which are always “more-or-less subconscious,” “unverbalized,” and “unrecognized” – that guided the creation of earliest human “material culture,” “social organization,” and “cosmology” (p. xvii-xviii). Furthermore, Leroi-Gourhan applies the same binary logic to biological evolution in general (p. 26-31). See now also WAGNER, The logic of invention, p. 2-3.
“Tupí or Not Tupí”

But why the fascination with the Other – why the unwritten interdiction to erase it from the landscape of the Same (apart from the fact that by erasing the Other one would lose that very condition and stop being an Other, as well)?

Viveiros de Castro offers something like a response to this question when he contends that among the Piro (and other indigenous peoples) “to be human and to be kin are the same thing,” but that “the production of relatives (consanguines) requires the intervention of non-relatives (potential affines),” so that “a difference is required in order to make bodies by means of other bodies,” that is, Difference is necessary for the making of Sameness. For, as we have seen, any “living person” is a composite singularity in which the soul is the principle of affine alterity and the body the principle of consanguineal identity. And this means that “the body must be produced out of the soul but also against it.” By way of conclusion, then: “difference [is here] a positive principle of relationality, meaning both disjunction and connection, rather than a merely negative want of similarity.”

Therefore, I should like to argue – to end with – that Oswald de Andrade’s famous aphorism: “Tupi or not Tupi, that is the question,” does not exactly reverse the mainstream positional distribution of the terms involved in the colonial imaginary divide (Western or modern culture above, non-Western or extra-modern cultures below) by literally and literally cannibalising Hamlet’s self-centred logic (and ontology) on behalf of the cannibal logic of the Tupinamba. That is to say, it does not substitute one term for another, as proponents of identity politics would be ready to claim. It does something else – and it does much more indeed: it replaces the self-centred logic of the colonial imaginary with an unthinkable (for the modern cogito) alter-oriented counter-logic; as, by virtue of what I have just explained, “Tu-pi,” i.e. to be a Tupi, requires, inevitably, the intervention of a possible Other.

References

95 Compare this statement to the point earlier made (in n.54) regarding the meaning of the term wanatu in Tumbuka.
96 VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, The Relative Native, p. 144.
97 Ibid., p. 145.
98 Ibid., p. 129 (emphasis added); cf. p. 147: “the body is the consanguineal component of the person and the soul is the affinal component”.
99 Ibid., p. 145.
100 Ibid., p. 148 (emphasis added).


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