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Paradigm and method in Plato's *Statesman*^{*}

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Abstract: The *Statesman* is unique in the particular emphasis it places on paradigm: crafting and presenting two distinct paradigms, in great detail and at some length, but also turning to define and explain paradigm itself as a method that can help us progress from what is familiar to us from perception and experience, to what is unfamiliar and may “exist” only in the realm of ideas and thinking. In this paper I wish first to examine the Stranger’s explanation of paradigm, to see what it is and how it functions. Then, I wish to examine in turn the two paradigms the Stranger offers, the myth and the account of weaving: to see whether and how they fit his explanation of what a paradigm is; to explore how the Stranger employs each in his search for the being and the definition of the statesman; and to consider what each paradigm helps disclose that we might not have as easily discovered without them. The final question will be: what does the *Statesman*’s highlighting of the being and use of paradigm have to teach us about how we might advance toward knowledge of “the greater things.”

Keywords: Plato, *Statesman*, Paradigm, Myth, Weaving

A great deal of attention has been given to the method of division (*diairesis*) used by the Eleatic Stranger in both the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. This is not surprising, as the Stranger employs division extensively: at the beginning of the search for the sophist (*Sph.* 218a-231b); at the beginning of the search for the statesman (*Stat.* 258b-267c); as well as later in the *Statesman* in the articulation of the art of weaving. Relatively less attention has been given to the Stranger’s employment of paradigm, even though paradigms play a significant role both in the search for the sophist and in the search for the statesman. In the *Sophist*, for example, the Stranger begins the task of discovering the definition of the sophist by proposing they employ the angler as a paradigm to help them discover the sophist, who is something greater (*Sph.* 218d-e).¹ And in a seemingly analogous

¹ This seems to stand in sharp contrast to the *Republic*, where Socrates proposes they seek justice first in the city, and then in the individual, for “perhaps there would be more justice in the bigger and it would be easier to observe closely” before turning to seek it in the individual (*R.* 368e-369a). Viktor Goldschmidt

move in the middle of the *Statesman*, he presents the art of weaving as a paradigm to help him and Young Socrates identify and define the statesman, claiming it has the same business as statesmanship (279a).² What most serves to draw attention to paradigm, and to suggest that this too plays a significant role in the search for knowledge, and more particularly in the discovery of *eide*, is that the Stranger pauses the search for the statesman in the *Statesman* to discuss what a paradigm is and how it functions. While this fact alone highlights the importance of paradigm, what the Stranger says in the course of that discussion underlines its importance even more. For one, as he prepares to explain what a paradigm is, he declares that "It is difficult to indicate any of the greater things adequately without using paradigms" (277d1-3). Then, as he concludes his explanation, he makes an even stronger statement: "For how else ... might anyone ... attain to even some small part of the truth and acquire intelligence (*phronesis*)" (*Stat.* 278d8-e2). In this paper I wish to examine the Stranger's account and use of paradigm in the *Statesman*: first to understand what a paradigm is and how it is supposed to function to help us advance toward truth and knowledge, and then to investigate how the Stranger employs the two paradigms he constructs—the myth and the art of weaving—in the search for the statesman.³

(2003, p. 54, n. 5) in his monograph on paradigm in Plato, notes of this passage in the *Republic*: "'plus grande', non pas au sens de 'sujet majeur', mais: plus saisissable, 'plus grosse'; le qualificatif a ici son sens propre et non, comme dans le texte du *Politique*, axiologique."

² "What paradigm might there be, then, that has the same business (*pragmateia*) as statesmanship, and is most small (*smikrotaton*), which, by laying it down (*parathemenos*) beside (statesmanship) would suffice for us to find what we are seeking?" (*Stat.* 279a7-b1).

³ Eve Browning Cole (1991) anticipates some of the argument of this paper, claiming that both the myth and the weaving discussion "when interpreted together ... jointly generate a set of substantive theses about the structure and foundations of political philosophy" (p. 195). The myth, Cole argues, highlights "the inadequacies of the reversed-cosmos with its inhuman human tenants," while the weaving paradigm "points up some of the most central features of one kind of political *techné*, and generates a vision of human political life" (p. 205). What I wish to examine is how the Stranger's creation and employment of paradigm helps us arrive at these insights.

Paradigm, defined

A paradigm (*paradeigma*), as the Stranger describes it and as the word itself indicates, is created by taking something cognized and familiar, laying it down beside (*para-*) something not cognized and unfamiliar, and then pointing out (*-deigma*) the similarities: how the unfamiliar contains or includes the familiar. To illustrate and explain what a paradigm is and how it functions, the Stranger offers as example and model⁴ the art of spelling (*grammatike*) and the experience of learning to spell. He describes how, when children are first learning to spell, they begin with short, easy syllables and words and soon are able to “perceive sufficiently each of the letters in the shortest and easiest syllables and are capable of pronouncing true things about those” (277e6-8). But then, he continues, “when they encounter them again in different syllables they are in doubt and are deceived” (278a2-3). To correct this ignorance, it is necessary first to bring the children back to the letters and syllables that they correctly opined, then to place these next to those that are not cognized, and then “to point out the similarities in both weavings” (278a8-b2). In this way, he concludes, those original short, easy syllables become paradigms (278b4-5).

Because the Stranger speaks of perceiving or discerning each of the letters in the short easy syllables, some have read this passage to mean that the simple and familiar cognized thing that will be turned

⁴ How “*paradeigma*” should be translated has been a cause of some discussion among scholars, with most choosing to translate it as “example.” Stanley Rosen (1995, p. 81-97) offers an extensive analysis of whether “*paradeigma*” should be understood as example or model and concludes that, in the *Statesman*, “paradigm” is functioning more as a model since the paradigms the Stranger offers outline the properties that define what makes something the kind of thing that it is (p. 81). Mary Louise Gill (2006, p. 1, 3) similarly prefers “model,” and describes it as displaying a particular structure, which can help us advance toward “a more difficult case”; Ruby Blondell (2005, p. 52) calls it “a complex and systematic model or example.” John Sallis (2021, p. 122), while acknowledging that paradigm can serve both as model and as example, goes on to state, “However, if a model is used in order to understand something else that is greater (or more general), then we today would sometimes call it an example” (p. 122, n. 5). I believe that when the Stranger employs a paradigm to point out structural similarities between two things, he is using it as a model. In contrast to Sallis, I wish to argue that it is precisely as a model (with order and structure) that a paradigm can help us advance toward the “greater things,” which I will discuss further below.

into a paradigm is a single letter.⁵ As he describes how one employs a paradigm to become more knowledgeable about spelling even long and complex words, however, the emphasis is not on individual letters but on structured composites: syllables (278a8-b1). For while the letter “a” may be found in myriad words, it is not knowledge of the letter “a” per se that allows someone to advance their knowledge of spelling, but rather when they recognize that long, complex words contain syllables that are familiar from shorter and simpler words.

Explaining paradigm through the example and model of syllable is suggestive of what qualifies something to serve as a paradigm. First it is important to note that a paradigm is constructed. The object that is made into a paradigm is something familiar from perception and experience. In the case of spelling, we begin with spoken words. But in order to serve as a paradigm, the familiar has to be rendered in terms of art. Articulating the spelling of that familiar spoken word lifts it out of experience and into art.⁶ Herder, weaver, and “shepherd

⁵ See Taylor (1961, p. 216) and Bronstein (2021, p. 94-114). M. L. Gill (2006) notes the structural aspect of paradigm (p. 1), but then speaks of individual letters as paradigms (p. 8): “A child knows the letter A in the word ‘cat.’ But he is confused about that very same letter in a more complex word.” Sallis (2021, p. 121) describes the paradigm of paradigm as “sets of *letters*—that is, elements of logos,” which seems to point to the syllable rather than the individual letters, but then goes on to say that the goal is knowledge of the elements (letters). Shinro Kato (1995, p. 169-171) likewise notes the emphasis on syllable in the *Statesman*’s discussion—in contrast with *Tht.* (201c8-206b12), *Sph.* (252e9-253a12), and *Phlb.* (18b3-d2), which focus more directly on letters. Regarding the Stranger’s presentation of syllable as a paradigm of paradigm, Kato notes, “A paradigm functions as a paradigm as far as it is grasped as a logically structured whole, and this quality makes it suitable to guide our investigation” (p. 165). In the end, however, he too suggests it is the elements we are seeking to discover (p. 171). I agree with Goldschmidt (2003) that individual letters are unknowable: “L’élément ne se connaît qu’en fonction des combinaisons” (p. 72); the “combinations” are syllables (p. 69, sec. 22).

⁶ Seth Benardete proposes that “learning to read (which includes and involves recognizing how words are spelled) is very likely to be our first experience of art itself, in which what we already know—the language we speak—appears in a form we do not recognize” (Benardete 1984, III.105). This is richly suggestive of what is involved in making something into a paradigm: even before we are in a position to employ a paradigm to discover something new, we must take a step from experience to art, just as Aristotle suggests in *Metaph.* I.1, 980b26-981a30. Christopher Gill (1995, p. 292), describes the Stranger’s dialectical process in the *Statesman* as beginning with a “defamiliarization of the concepts involved,” and

of the people” are all familiar to Young Socrates from his experience. The Stranger’s detailed descriptions of these are not. But these detailed descriptions—“spellings”—are what is needed for the Stranger to transform these familiar things into paradigms.⁷ Further, as suggested by “syllable,” a paradigm is a whole which is composed of elements and which has a determinate order and structure. If we consider that the units that are found in long complex words are often roots that have a specific meaning, we may anticipate that in the case of paradigms as well, the composite structure will also point to a meaning.⁸ The import of using syllable in the *Statesman* to explain paradigm becomes clearer if we compare it with the Stranger’s discussion of *grammatike* in the *Sophist* (253a-b). For in the *Sophist*, where the Stranger is speaking of the “spelling” of Being, the focus is on knowing the nature of the “letters” (elements) themselves, and on which letters can be combined or mixed with which other letters and which cannot be mixed together. This is something one would need to consider if they were constructing a language *de novo*. The *Statesman*’s discussion of *grammatike*, by contrast, begins from the standpoint that one already has (speaks) a language, has a rudimentary knowledge of spelling, and wants to build on that to become a more expert speller. Translating this to how the Stranger applies the paradigm of spelling to the search for the statesman: one has experience of the world and of beings, the “spelling” of certain simple, familiar beings is easily available and accessible, and, once these have been pointed out, one can then employ the familiar spellings as one seeks to master the “spelling” of greater and more complex things. To focus on the part of *grammatike* that concerns the construction and spelling of syllables and offer that as an example

then later connects this with the Stranger’s use of “methodological ‘example’” (paradigm, p. 305), which seems an apt characterization of the Stranger’s artful articulation of what is familiar from experience.

⁷ It does not seem that Young Socrates has wondered, prior to his encounter with the Stranger, what the “spelling” of these familiar things is. Once presented by the Stranger, the “spelling” seems clear enough that Young Socrates is able to grasp it, and the Stranger may then proceed to employ this “spelling” as a paradigm.

⁸ If one considers many of the prepositions that abound in complex longer Greek words, the structured unit may be two syllables rather than one (for example, *kata*, *ana*, *para*). Though these “units” can stand alone (analogous to the favored example of “cat” in the literature), they can also appear as parts in longer, more complex words, as noted also by Kato (1995, p. 169).

and model of paradigm in a dialogue where what is sought is the statesman, a kind of being (*eidos*) with a structure and a meaning, therefore, seems both helpful and appropriate.⁹

The myth as paradigm

Perhaps in part because the Stranger's discussion and explanation of paradigm comes after he has presented his myth, perhaps because the myth, as the Stranger admits, is very large and therefore not the small and even trivial thing that he emphasized at the beginning of the *Sophist* makes something appropriate to serve as a paradigm (*Sph.* 218d-e, *Stat.* 279a-b), some scholars have questioned whether the myth truly is a paradigm.¹⁰ And yet, we hear the Stranger say immediately after the myth that they set down the myth in order to point out (*parathemetha ... hina endeixato...*) the one for whom it is suitable to have the care of human nurture in accordance with the paradigm of shepherd and cowherd (275b1-6). And, as he is preparing to introduce his explanation of paradigm he says, "in the belief that it was fitting for the king to make up great paradigms, we raised up an amazing bulk of the myth" (277b1-5). While, admittedly, the myth is quite big, that for which it is meant to serve as a paradigm, namely, the king and statesman, are "bigger" yet. "Big" and "small," however, as this passage suggests, seem to indicate something other than size. For the "greatest things" are not necessarily large in magnitude; they are "greatest" because they belong to the invisible realm or the realm of ideas, and not to the

⁹ One clearly becomes an expert speller by mastering a cache of syllables and then becoming adept at noticing those syllables in longer (i.e., bigger), more complex words, as is illustrated in advanced spelling bee competitions. It is intriguing to think that this is also how one may advance from something from the realm of perception and experience to those "greater things" that are beyond perception and experience, like an idea or *eidos*, and are available only to thought.

¹⁰ Melissa Lane, who sees a close connection between the angler paradigm in the *Sophist* and the weaving paradigm in the *Statesman*, and the Stranger's characterizing both of those choices as something small and, in the case of the angler, even trivial, expresses a deep skepticism about designating the myth a paradigm. For one, it is too large; for another, it takes on too big a topic, "displaying trappings of divinity and cosmology" (Lane 1998, p. 21-61; 122). At the same time, she believes the myth to be pivotal to the Stranger's argument (p. 100-101, p. 121-123), just not as a paradigm.

visible realm that is available to perception and experience. Though bulky and long, the myth the Stranger crafts draws on elements from perception, experience, and imagination.¹¹ The images presented in the myth are familiar and available even to a youth to understand. And in this sense they are “small.” Whereas the *eidos* of the statesman the myth is intended to orient us toward is one of the “greater things,” which can only fully be grasped by logos (see 277c3-5, 286a5-7).¹² Paradigm, not in the case of spelling per se but in the way the Stranger employs it especially in the search for the “greatest things” (*eide*) in the *Statesman* in particular, provides a bridge between the realm of perception and the realm of mind and understanding. With that said, let us take up the Stranger’s

¹¹ As Mitchell Miller (1980, p. 58) states, “by ‘the greater (beings) ... the stranger refers to beings which cannot be understood by simple recourse to perceptual experience.” Goldschmidt (2003) offers numerous examples of how the process of dialectic in general, and the employment of paradigm in particular helps us to go from the realm of the visible to the realm of the invisible and concludes: “il nous mène du visible à l’invisible” (p. 120). Holly Moore (2016) describes paradigm as a “psychagogic resource” that helps lead us from “the ‘dream world’ of our experience” to “the ‘waking world’ that holds the intelligibility of that experience” (p. 308; p. 314). M. L. Gill (2006, p. 9) speaks of “material stuff as physical components mixed together” in contrast with “an abstract concept like knowledge,” which involves “conceptual components somehow combined.”

¹² This could mean simply that Young Socrates in particular has never encountered a statesman, thus has no perception to refer to, and must work his way toward understanding the statesman’s being through logos alone. Plato, however, seems to be indicating something stronger than this: perhaps the statesman is outside of everyone’s (or almost everyone’s experience), an ideal to strive toward, the reality of which might have occurred either rarely or never. What is available instead, both to Young Socrates and to us, are claimants to the title “statesman” (such as diviners, priest-kings, and sophists: 290c-291c), as well as mythological descriptions (“shepherd of the people”). This suggests that the correct definition of statesman can only be arrived at by sifting and carding through false accounts and progressing toward the truth, a process that can proceed only with and through logos. The myth offers us a first step toward the spelling of this “greater thing” by articulating the “spelling” of something “small,” or rather, familiar, a logos that still contains elements of perception, employing as it does images in its account. The weaving paradigm will provide a more complex “spelling” than the myth inasmuch as it details things that cannot be identified with an image or a perception, things such as ends (for the sake of defense) and structures (co-causes and causes), all of which are part of the production of a woven product but are not themselves visible to the perceiver of the woven product. As such, the weaving paradigm takes us further into the noetic realm and therefore closer to things of which there is no perceptible example or illustration.

description of what a paradigm is and how it functions and examine how the myth indeed may be understood to be and serve as a paradigm.

The original divisions (*diatreseis*) defined the statesman as a kind of herder (herd-nurturer). For his myth, the Stranger takes this account, reproduces it in the form of a story portraying in pictorial form the effective meaning and being of what the *diatreisis* proposed,¹³ and makes shepherd and cowherd, and herder in general, into a paradigm (see 275b1-6). Depicting in detail the “spelling” of herder, the myth makes clear that “herder of the human herd” fits the paradigm—which is to say has the same “spelling” (structure and meaning)—as cowherds and shepherds.¹⁴ Cowherds and shepherds are superior to their flock and herd, which are composed of beings different in kind than themselves; a herder of human beings, therefore, must be a being other than and superior to human beings: he must be a god.¹⁵ Cowherds and shepherds are also all-sufficient

¹³ As in his description of the art of spelling, so too in his introduction of the myth, the Stranger emphasizes that Young Socrates is not too far removed from childhood (277d-278b, 268e: in the first passage, the Stranger speaks generally of “boys,” *paidas*; in the second passage, he cites Young Socrates as not being many years past “child’s play,” *paidia*). Though he later asserts that images are inadequate to explain adequately “the biggest and most honorable things” (286a1-3), he also states that “it is difficult to indicate sufficiently the greatest things without making use of paradigms” (277d1-2). This suggests that paradigms are essential for at least the beginning steps toward knowledge for everyone, inasmuch as we all begin ignorant rather than knowledgeable.

¹⁴ Politis (2021) argues that the paradigm of cowherd and shepherd is illuminative of part—although not all—of what a statesman is, rather than serving to make clear, as I am arguing, that herder is the wrong “spelling” for the statesman and that, as Weiss (whom Politis cites, p. 578 with n. 7) states, nurturer and shepherd point to “the divine herdsman and nurturer,” and not to the human statesman (Weiss, 1995, p. 216). Politis’s reading implies that the myth merely adds some clarification and refinement to the account of the statesman produced by the initial *diatreseis*. I wish to argue, with Weiss and many others, that, rather, the myth is offered as a substantive corrective to that earlier account, as the Stranger himself indicates when he says, at the conclusion of the myth: whereas “we were asked for the king and the statesman from the present revolution and becoming,” we instead “spoke of the shepherd of the onetime human herd from the contrary circuit, and, what’s more, of a god instead of a mortal” (274e10-275a1).

¹⁵ 271e5-7: “a god (*theos*) was in charge of the human herd and grazed them, just as human beings now, being another more divine animal, graze different genera inferior to themselves.”

for their herd (see 268a-b). For a single being to be all-sufficient for a herd or community, either the needs of the members must be simple and easily met, or the ruler (herder) must have a supernatural ability to meet a complexity of needs for a multiplicity of individuals.¹⁶ Keeping true to the paradigm of shepherd and cowherd, the Stranger's myth presents the human herd as having the simplest of needs. Thus in the myth, the time when a god rules and provides everything spontaneously for his herd is a time when there is never any perceived lack or need, no toil or labor, and human beings are reduced to animals, feeding.¹⁷

The Stranger, however, does not only want to make clear what a herder of human beings is and is like. He wants also to make clear the cosmos (world) in which such a ruler might actually be found. To keep with the analogy of spelling, we might say the Stranger looks beyond the "syllable" (herder) to the whole "word" (world) of which it is a part and to which it belongs. Thus he situates the ruling divine shepherd in a cosmos that moves in reverse of the world we inhabit:¹⁸ a cosmos where time moves backwards, and becoming unravels.¹⁹

¹⁶ Suggestively, this same challenge arises in the debate between rule of knowledge and rule of law (292a-302b, especially 294a10-b6 and 295a9-b2).

¹⁷ Calling this age "the age of Cronos" points to Hesiod's account (*Op.* 108-126). Hesiod calls this age "golden," and some scholars argue that, for Plato also, the age of Cronos is golden, pointing to the Stranger's query whether the "human beings" in the age of Cronos, having no need to toil, might perhaps be spending their time philosophizing, discoursing with each other and with the beasts. If so, he suggests, then they would be a thousandfold happier than human beings in our current age (272b8-c5). As Ferrari (1995, p. 393) and Blondell (2005, p. 37) note, however, the unraveling of becoming in the age of Cronos (born old, "grow" young) indicates there is no memory or learning or any indication of logos. All the beings, "human" and otherwise, seem to be able to do in the age of Cronos is to "fill themselves with food and drink" (272c6).

¹⁸ At 272b3, the Stranger speaks to Young Socrates of the current life or cycle, "the one which, being present in it (*paron*), you yourself have perceived."

¹⁹ There are numerous and conflicting interpretations of the myth. The standard reading of the myth understands it as consisting of two ages: the age of Cronos, when gods rule, and the age of Zeus, when the cosmos and the beings within it are left to rule themselves. Brisson (1995, p. 349-363), Rowe (1995), and Carone (2005, p. 124-145) challenge this reading and argue that there are really three ages—the age of Cronos, an in-between age when the cosmos is left on its own, and the age of Zeus, another age ruled by a god. One question raised by these competing readings is whether the myth offers a model of divine rule that we should be striving to imitate and achieve, whether the rule of a god reduces human

This broadening of the picture (from “syllable” to “word”) is an important part of the Stranger’s argument: in order to understand properly the *eidos* of the statesman and the importance of recognizing that he is a human being and not a god, it is necessary to understand the structure (cosmos) and nature of the world to which the statesman belongs and in which he, of necessity, lives.

It is important to note at this point that the Stranger’s myth tests the boundaries of the applicability of the art of spelling as the model and explanation of paradigm. For words are simply constructions. In theory, one can creatively construct longer and more complicated words by combining a variety of syllables. But, as the myth underlines, *eide* are of and in the world, and not only do the *eide* have an order and structure, the world itself does as well. And it is for this reason that, to correctly identify *eide*, one must also recognize and take into consideration the world in which they are located, the whole of which they are a part. While the art of spelling offers a model for understanding order and structure, and intriguingly suggests that there are common “spellings” across the totality of nature, making it possible to advance from simple to more complex, more concrete to more abstract, if one focuses on seeking these common spellings across particulars,²⁰ the many layers of the myth as paradigm suggest

beings to animals, feeding, or whether the rule of a god is an image of despotism, reducing us perhaps not to animals but to slaves (as Miller argues, 1984, p. 43-54). Another disagreement is whether the myth decisively eliminates the “herder” model of the statesman, as Blondell (2005) and Skemp (1952) strongly argue, or whether the herder model persists to the end and is, in fact, part of the definition of the true statesman, as Weiss (1995), Lane (1998), and Politis (2021) argue. A comprehensive analysis of the myth lies beyond the scope of this paper, but what has framed my reading of the myth, and led me to the interpretation I have outlined in this paper is: (1) the Stranger’s articulation of the “great” mistake the myth illuminated, which contrasts two ages, one when a god rules, and the other, which is found in our current age, where a human (mortal) rules (274e10-275a2); (2) his speech about the purpose for which he laid down the myth, which was to show “to whom it belongs to have the care of human nurture in accordance with the paradigm of shepherd and cowherd” (275b1-6), which is to say, the divine shepherd; and (3) the discussion of paradigm, to which the passage at 275b points.

²⁰ At 285a-b the Stranger speaks of the importance of guarding against “combining into the same things that are vastly different” (285a4-5) on the one hand, and failing to notice the kinship across things that at first glance look vastly dissimilar (285b3-6), which seems to echo his suggestion of how paradigm can help us notice similarities when, initially, we are overwhelmed by difference (reading first 278c8-

a function and employment of paradigm beyond a particular structure or “spelling,” one that is inclusive also of the whole (cosmos) of which that particular structure or *eidōs* is a part.²¹

To return to the myth: the Stranger has not completed the task for which he introduced the myth paradigm simply by showing what a herder-statesman really means and what cosmic world order such a ruler of human beings fits within. Rather, I wish to suggest, he wants to make clear to Young Socrates and us how far from the world we live in are the divine herder in particular and the age of Cronos in general. He therefore adds to his myth an account of a different age, “the age of Zeus,” an image of our own time (272b1-3). Then, laying down the “age of Zeus” alongside the age when the god and divine shepherd rule, he makes this image and account of life as we know it into a paradigm. And it is this, I believe, that transforms the myth into “a great paradigm” (277b4). With this “great paradigm,” the Stranger points out not only how mistaken was the original proposed “spelling” for the statesman, he also suggests in turn that we were looking in the wrong place (at the wrong whole or “word”), and that if we are truly to discover the statesman, we need first to understand that he is a human being, not a god, and as such is to be found in the world that we inhabit (see 274e-275a). This corroborates the suggestion above that it does not suffice to understand the “spelling” (structure) of a part by itself. In the age where a god rules and there is no need, no work, and, as the Stranger indicates, no mind, the very cycles of becoming—birth, growth, death—must be suspended (in the myth they are actually reversed).²² If it is the statesman we are

d6, as describing the problem, and then his description of how paradigm can be used to solve it: 278a5-c6).

²¹ This “lesson” appears to carry over both to the constructing of the art of weaving preparatory to using it as a paradigm to find the statesman, and then in the application of the paradigm to locate and identify the statesman. In the case of the art of weaving, the artful activity of plaiting together warp and woof is situated within the broader context of all the activities that contribute to the final production of the woven product. In the case of the city, not only does the Stranger seek to locate the statesman among the many arts and artisans in the city, after finding him, he indicates the very particular place and role of the statesman within the cosmos of the city as a whole.

²² For an earlier story from which the Stranger may be drawing, see Hesiod, *Op.* 109-121. See also Homer’s *Odyssey*, where at least some of the individuals Odysseus encounters in his travels—Kalypso, Circe, the Phaiakians—are either

seeking, we need first to understand that he is a human being, not a god, and as such is to be found in a world of becoming, need, and labor, a world where human beings live in cities, develop and practice arts, and must provide their own care (see 274e-275a).

As the Stranger describes it, a paradigm (laying one thing down beside another) may be employed both to point out a mistake as well as to discover or disclose the truth.²³ In the end, the principal function of the myth as paradigm is corrective: it shows we have the wrong "spelling" (*eidos*) for the statesman. In order to show this, it had to move beyond the "syllable" of "shepherd" and show the whole (world order, "word") in which herder of humans properly belongs. But then, the Stranger brought in a second paradigm, not an account of shepherd, but an image of the world we inhabit, the world as it is in reality. This helped further underline how mistaken "herder" is by pointing out how dissimilar is the world to which a divine herder belongs from the world we live in. In addition, it pointed out that they must look to the world we live in to find the statesman. This in turn makes yet a further point, namely, that when one is seeking knowledge of the world, one should not discount or ignore what experience and knowledge they already have of the world. The very abstract and "scientific" looking *diaireseis* the Stranger employed to arrive at the original definition of the statesman encouraged Young Socrates to forget his own experience; the discussion of paradigm and the way paradigm is employed in the myth remind him to remember it.²⁴

explicitly or implicitly divinities inasmuch as they live without needing to toil. In the case of the Phaiakians in particular, Homer says of the orchard of Alkinoos, "Never is the fruit spoiled on these (trees), never does it give out," and then goes on to describe an endless summer harvest (*Od.* VII.117, 112-131).

²³ That is, to show "the other as being other than the rest, and the same as the same" (*to men heteron hos ton allon heteron on, to de tauton hos tauton*: 278b6-c1).

²⁴ As Goldschmidt puts it (2003, p. 120), "Partout, le paradigme témoigne que nous sommes des êtres incarnés.... Il commence par nous 'ramener' aux choses les plus banales de notre vie quotidienne et nous les fait observer."

The art of weaving as the paradigm for discovering the true *eidos* of the statesman

Once one realizes one has a false opinion and therefore is ignorant (see 278d8-e2), the next step is to move toward the truth (279d1-3). For this next, positive step, the Stranger proposes a new paradigm, the art of weaving woolen cloaks. In contrast to the principally corrective function of the myth paradigm, we expect the account of the art of weaving woolen cloaks to provide a positive model to help direct us to discover and understand the true account (*eidos*) of the statesman.

The choice of an art as paradigm for the statesman is no surprise, for the myth, in pointing out the falsity of herder, highlighted that political life, and therefore statesmanship, is situated in a time and a world where human beings develop and employ arts to address their lacks and needs. That is to say, “the entire community of human beings” over whom the statesman exercises his care and rule (276b7-c1) is a community of arts and artisans.²⁵ The Stranger selects the art of weaving to serve as paradigm for the statesman because, he says, it is the smallest paradigm with the same “*pragmateia*” as statesmanship (279a7-b2).²⁶

The Stranger’s account of the art of weaving has two distinct parts. The first is specific to the art of weaving woolen cloaks in particular, and identifies (“spells”) it in terms of an end (*telos*:

²⁵ Like the *Republic*, therefore, the *Statesman* explicitly identifies statesmanship and the political life with a community of artisans. Unlike the *Republic*, the *Statesman* contextualizes its account of statesman between two poles: it brings it in from the fields (not shepherd) and down from the heavens (not god). See Aristotle, *Politics* I.1253a2-4: having just said human being is a political animal, Aristotle then states that the one who is “without a city (*apolis*) by nature rather than by chance, is either a ‘mean’ sort (*phaulos*) or superior to man.”

²⁶ What is meant by “*pragmateia*” is not immediately obvious, though at the least it would seem to mean the manner of the statesman’s rule, the particular action involved in that rule (see 275a8-10). Blondell (2005, p. 55) suggests, “The model of the weaver, who transforms the herdsman’s products into artefacts, is uniquely well suited to serve as a further commentary on the inadequacy of the definition of the ruler as a herdsman. It is no coincidence that the king’s raw material is produced by the shepherd, or that his craft supplies the kind of protection absent—because unnecessary—under the divine shepherd’s rule.”

defense against nature), the nature of the product (an envelopment), and the mode of production (weaving: 279c7-280e4).²⁷ The second part of the Stranger's account of weaving presents a structural analysis of the art as a whole and of the many different kinds of activities that contribute to the production of the final woven product. This is the part of the account of weaving the Stranger employs first, using it as a heuristic paradigm to locate the statesman and distinguish him from his many contenders.

The Stranger introduces the second part of his account of weaving by noting a challenge to the weaver from those who claim they too contribute to the production of the woven product.²⁸ In response to this challenge, he turns to identify and articulate the totality of arts that contribute to the producing of the final weaving, beginning by distinguishing two classes: co-causes (*sunaitiai*) and causes (*aitiai*). Co-causes are those arts that produce the tools necessary for the various other contributing arts to do their particular tasks; causes are those arts that work with the wool²⁹ and contribute to the producing of the woven product itself (281d8-e5).³⁰ Since it is among the causes that the artful activity of weaving belongs, as it is

²⁷ The *diairetic* procedure the Stranger uses to define the art of weaving mirrors closely how he set out to define the angler in the *Sophist*, as well as how he proceeded with the *diaireseis* in the first part of the *Statesman*. In fact he even references and borrows the first cut from the *Sophist* divisions. In the *Sophist*, however, the Stranger's first division of the totality of the arts is between those that craft or produce (*poietike*) and those that acquire (*ktetike*) (*Sph.* 219a8-d2), whereas in the *Statesman*, those two classes are combined and presented as characterizing all the arts (*Stat.* 279c7-8, though he replaces "*poietike*" with "*demiourgein*"). No longer interested in exploring the distinction between acquisition and making, the Stranger now can pursue a different set of divisions, one that begins by focusing on ends (for the sake of...) rather than on kinds of action that are the focus in the *Sophist*. For an extensive analysis and discussion of the similarities between angler and weaving, see Lane (1998, p. 21-61).

²⁸ It is notable how the mention of rivals accompanies either the construction and presentation of a paradigm or its employment across the dialogue (267c-268c; 280e-281d; 289c-291b; 303e-305e).

²⁹ Hence the name "*talasiourgike*," "the art of wool-working," the Stranger assigns to them collectively.

³⁰ Thus, in contrast to the myth paradigm, which led up to the need to contextualize the "syllable" of herder of human beings in the greater context and cosmos to which it properly belonged, the weaving paradigm from its very construction situates the activity of weaving within the context and whole of which it is a part.

this activity that produces the woven product itself, it is on the causes that the Stranger focuses his attention.

The first step in the process of wool-working is preparing the materials: taking apart what was originally matted together, which he calls *diakritike*. Only after this has been done is it appropriate to combine the materials (called *synkritike*) to produce the final woven product.³¹ Then, before concluding this structural account of the art of weaving, the Stranger adds one more element: the architectonic, supervisory art of weaving (*hyphantike*) that “stands over” and directs (*ten d’ epi toutoi technen ousan*) the entire process (283a3-4; cf. 279a7-b2).³² In the end, the art of weaving is comprised of three classes or categories and not only two: co-causes, causes, and an architectonic or supervisory knowledge.

Having completed the account (“spelling”) of the art of weaving (*hyphantike*), the Stranger is ready to use it as a paradigm, first to help locate and identify the statesman among all the other artisans and arts in the city, and then to explain the statesman’s knowledgeable activity (*pragmateia*). He begins with co-causes.³³

³¹ For, the Stranger suggests when he is applying the paradigm to describe statesmanship’s “weaving,” every synthesizing knowledge (*synthetiken epistemen*) “casts away as best it can the bad materials and takes up the suitable and good” (308c1-7).

³² I believe the Stranger’s use of “*epi-*” here is intentional and important. I offer “architectonic” in the sense articulated at 259e-260b, which is associated with “*prostattein*” and “*epitaxis*,” “*epitaktike*,” and “*epitattein*” (260a6, a10, b3-4, c3, c6, d8). Architectonic oversight and direction not only fits the role the Stranger is ascribing to the art of weaving here at the end of his structural analysis of the art, it is also strongly suggested in his account of the statesman, especially from 303e to the end. For this, see also Miller (1980, p. 106), Weiss (1995, p. 220), El Murr (2021, p. 239), Blondell (2005, p. 53).

³³

Co-causes		Causes	
(i)	the raw materials (he calls them “the first-born species”);	(i)	slaves;
(ii)	tools;	(ii)	exchangers, merchants, retailers (whom he categorizes as “free”);
(iii)	containers;	(iii)	heralds, all those wise in letters (i.e., reading, spelling), and some <u>undefined</u> group “who
(iv)	supports;		
(v)	defense (where the particular art of weaving is situated);		

Since neither we nor the Stranger expects the statesman to be among the co-causes of the city, that he begins with co-causes suggests that, just as with the second part of the account of weaving, he is not seeking the statesman (a part, "syllable") in isolation but is rather seeking him within the cosmos (whole, "word") of which he is a part.

The first thing we might notice here is that, though the list of the co-causes in the account of weaving was offered in abbreviated form (281e7-9), the Stranger's articulation of the co-causes of the city offers a much more comprehensive outline of the different kinds of arts and activities within the city and the role each plays in the whole. This serves to make several points clear. First is how much larger and more complex the city is than the art of weaving. For one, weaving is but one art within one class of the co-causes of the city (defense).³⁴

(vi) playthings (where he appears to situate all of music, writing, and the fine arts); and (vii) nourishment/nurture (into which class he places farming, hunting, gymnastics, medicine, and cooking) (I follow the order presented in the summary at 289a7-c2; the fuller description and explanation of each of these categories is presented from 287c10 to 289a5)	are omniscient in accomplishing many other jobs involved in the office of learning"; (iv) diviners and interpreters (from gods to humans); (v) priests (ministers), knowledgeable about what humans should offer to gods (prayers and sacrifices); (vi) kings selected by lot; (vii) "the greatest enchanter of all the sophists" (289d10-290c6)
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³⁴ In addition, the shepherd who tends the sheep, which produce the wool, is also identified among the co-causes, the class that the Stranger calls "the first-born species" (288d, 289a). But see also the Stranger's provocative statement when he places all tools into the first classification of co-causes of the city: "and yet we are trying to accomplish something difficult, separating this class (tools) from the others; for whoever said that any of the things that are is a tool of some one thing, seems to have spoken something plausible" (287d6-e1).

Further, though the account of the art of weaving looked complete and self-sufficient when it was first presented, situating it in the economy of the city makes clear its partiality and dependency. For weaving needs wood and wool, as well as merchants and perhaps even slaves. But since none of these is directly connected to the art itself (the art of weaving makes use of them but does not itself oversee or direct those who produce or supply them), they were not included in its description. Statesmanship, however, which the paradigm of weaving is meant to aid us in discovering, is clearly “greater” inasmuch as it is comprehensive of and stands over all arts and activities in the city.

The Stranger next turns to list and describe the causes (289c). This step in the application of the paradigm offers a different set of lessons as well as some challenges. First, while all of the causes the Stranger lists are positions and jobs in the city, it is less clear whether and how all of them contribute to producing the final “product.” Certainly the first three—slaves, retailers and merchants, and heralds—do contribute. And yet even here there is a significant difference. For whereas in the case of weaving the causes act serially and in a particular order (one cause must complete its work (e.g. spinning) before the next cause can begin (e.g. weaving)), in the city these three causes act synchronously, independent of each other, and, it seems, without end. Significantly different—in fact, not seeming to fit the paradigm at all—are the last four causes the Stranger names, namely, diviners, priests, lottery kings, and “the greatest enchanter of all the sophists” (290d-291c). For though the carder, comber, fuller, and the ones who produce the warp and the woof were presented as disputants with the weaver (281a-b), the point of their argument was not that they constituted the whole art or even its greatest or highest function, but rather that they too played an important part in the coming-into-being of cloaks and wanted to be recognized for this. The diviners, priests, lottery kings, and sophists, however, appear to be arguing not that they play an important contributing role, but that they are the ones who deserve to be called statesman.³⁵

³⁵ Miller (1984, p. 85-86) connects these final “causes” to Socrates’ impending trial, which suggests an interesting parallel between the threat these groups pose to the true statesman, and the threat actual individuals from these groups posed to Socrates.

Notably absent from the list of causes is the statesman himself. One possible reason for this is that he is to be identified with the architectonic supervisory role that was assigned to the art of weaving at 283a, and as such, when the Stranger gets to him, we will see that he “stands over” the causes and co-causes.³⁶ Or it may be that the Stranger is simply including the statesman among the causes but is focusing on his rivals for the moment.³⁷ What the Stranger's listing of the diviners, priests, lottery kings, and sophists, as well as of all the other causes and co-causes does make clear is that the statesman is a ruler not a servant, his sphere of knowledge and action has nothing to do with the hieratic art, and he must be a knower not a herald, lottery king, or sophist. Since each of these individuals claims to have a certain kind of knowledge as well as a right to be the ruler of the city, both the nature of the statesman's knowledge and his action³⁸ need to be identified and explained.

It is notable how similar this section of the search for the statesman using the weaving paradigm is to the earlier search to clarify the definition of the statesman using the myth: here, as there, the Stranger spells out what the statesman is not, but in the process of doing so, he indicates where we have to look to identify what the statesman is. In contrast to how easily and directly the Stranger was able to detail the causes of the art of weaving, the search for the statesman seems of necessity to proceed by articulating first what he is not, and then to use the lessons learned from that step to begin to search for what he is. Plato might be indicating with this that the arts are well defined and known, but that the statesman is less familiar, perhaps not available to anyone's experience, and therefore we must seek to discover him for the first time. At the very least, he is modeling for us what a genuine search to advance in knowledge

³⁶ Indeed, this does seem to be where the Stranger is heading, although it is not until 303d and following that he begins to make this clear.

³⁷ In fact, it is striking how the issue of rivals has arisen throughout the dialogue—rivals to the herder statesman (267e-268c), rivals to the weaver (281b-d), and now, rivals to the statesman—and at each of the prior times, what followed was something related to paradigm that provided either a correction or a clarification of what had gone before. In the first instance, the Stranger presented the myth; in the second, he presented the second part of the art of weaving, the structural analysis.

³⁸ At 279a8, the Stranger speaks of the statesman's *pragmateia*; at 284c2, he speaks of the statesman as a knower (*epistemon*) of matters of action.

entails and how it must proceed: beginning with identifying first what something is not and then working one's way toward discovering what it is. And this, I would argue, fits with the Stranger's statement at 278d8-e2 that concludes his discussion of paradigm: "For how else [except by employing paradigm], my friend, could someone, beginning from a false opinion attain even some small part of the truth and acquire intelligence?"³⁹

Somewhat surprisingly, as he turns to explore the nature of the statesman's knowledge and knowledgeable action (see 284c2), the Stranger appears to set aside the paradigm of weaving. Instead, from 292a to 303d, as he examines whether the statesman should rule like a doctor, prescribing what is needful for each individual from moment to moment, or whether he should rule as a legislator, with laws, he seems to be echoing some of the discussion and lessons from the myth.⁴⁰ And from 303d to 305e, though the Stranger reintroduces language from the weaving paradigm, identifying general, orator, and judge as "honorable congeners (*suggene*)" of the statesman (303e9-10), besides that reference, there is no obvious connection between the congeners he mentions here and the "*suggenoi*" he had mentioned in the account of weaving.⁴¹ Rather, it is the language from the

³⁹ I follow Benardete (1984) and Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem (2012) here. Skemp (1952), Rowe (1995), Annas and Waterfield (1995, 2005) among others, take this passage in the opposite sense. As Rowe translates it: "how could anyone begin from false belief and get to even a small part of the truth, and so acquire wisdom?" And yet it is the Benardete and Brann translations that best follow from the account the Stranger just offered of how one employs paradigm to advance past mistakes and ignorance and toward knowledge (278c8-d6, with 278c3-6).

⁴⁰ To interpret this section properly, I would argue, requires that we remember the account of the myth, and apply what it had revealed to us about the nature of the true statesman, one who is a human being, not a god, and one who is from and part of the world we live in. This includes recognizing that he, like the rest of us, is not born wise, but must begin from ignorance and work his way toward wisdom. The discussion and employment of paradigm that the Stranger has made central to his search for the statesman seems in turn to model the procedure the statesman himself—as well as anyone who truly desires to know—must employ.

⁴¹ The "congeners" in the account of weaving seemed to be all the other providers or manufacturers of some kind of defense, with the weaver being the one who produces a woolen defense (280b3-e4). In that description, the "kin" (*suggenoi*) or congeners stand shoulder to shoulder, equals. But in the case of statesman, general, judge, orator, the statesman stands above, directing them, with his knowledge of the timely.

discussion of the measure of the mean that is important here (283b-284e). Only after he has spoken of the congeners does the Stranger fully bring back in the paradigm of weaving. Declaring first, "we most justly name 'statesmanship' that science that rules over all the other sciences and the laws, cares for all the things throughout the city, and weaves them all together most correctly" (305e2-6), he then suggests that the paradigm of weaving can help make clear "the royal plaiting-together (*sumploken*), what sort it is, in what manner it plaits together, and what sort of weaving it hands to us" (306a1-3).

A complete analysis of the final steps toward the discovery of the "spelling" of the statesman is beyond the scope of this paper. But before turning to review and discuss what the focus on paradigm has revealed to us about the use of paradigm as a method of discovery, I would like to offer in outline some key points that emerge from the Stranger's application of the paradigm to the statesman's action (*pragmateia*). The first thing to note is that the "materials" of the statesman's "weaving" are human beings. This has been a persistent challenge throughout the dialogue. The myth made clear that human beings were different in kind from sheep and therefore required a different model of rule from herding. In this regard, the paradigm of weaving seems to take a step backward: at least sheep are living; their wool however is simply material stuff. One challenge the last part of the dialogue must confront is how to translate the carding and combing of (inert) wool into the appropriate analogous diacritical, preparatory activity for human beings, beings that are not only living but that have mind (however ill-informed or recalcitrant to direction it might be). This challenge carries over to the "weaving" the statesman seeks to effect once the preparation of the "materials" has been completed, as the Stranger speaks of employing both divine and human bonds to effect the royal weaving. But if we consider what he says about the human bonds, for example, which involve marrying unlike natures (courageous and moderate) with each other, he points out in that discussion that the individuals will push against directives to do so, preferring to marry with those who are like, not unlike (310a-d). In the end, the Stranger suggests, it is the nature of human beings that challenges any model of knowledgeable rule. For all its advances over the paradigm of herder, the statesman's "weaving" will consist not in a tightly woven web of virtuous souls, but in a looser web where courageous individuals are assigned to certain

offices befitting their nature, moderate individuals are assigned to other kinds of offices, befitting their nature, the statesman as weaver tamps them together using law and opinions as his shuttle, and the statesman as architectonic supervisor and ruler oversees and directs the whole.⁴² On this reading, the Stranger's articulation of the *pragmateia* of weaving offers an insightful and helpful way to understand the statesman's activity. At the same time, the fact that the statesman's "materials" are human beings and not wool poses an insurmountable barrier to the complete and seamless application of the paradigm to the "greater thing" it is meant to help point out, and leaves us with a challenge that perhaps no paradigm taken from the realm of perception, experience, or the arts can address adequately.⁴³

Concluding thoughts

As we examined the Stranger's employment of paradigm we noted how it employed something familiar in the search for the unfamiliar; how it could point out errors as well as point toward truth; the importance of looking not only at a part/syllable but looking at the whole/word to understand its meaning; and the importance of drawing upon experience rather than setting it aside. But what I would like to return to here at the end is where the Stranger begins: with another look at the paradigm of paradigm, a syllable.

A syllable is first familiar as something spoken (experienced). For it to become a paradigm, we must first cognize its spelling—its structure and order. In the dialogue it is striking how complex and unfamiliar the Stranger renders the familiar and simple examples he chooses as paradigms. Before his encounter with the Stranger, Young Socrates could name and point to examples of shepherd and weaving. In the dialogue, he learns for the first time their "spelling." For to employ a syllable or *eidos* as a paradigm, we must first understand its "spelling." Beginning with something small and familiar, therefore, has two meanings: it must be something in our experience

⁴² For a similar reading of the dialogue's ending, see Benardete (1984, III.146-149, especially 148). For a much more optimistic reading of the statesman's weaving, see El Murr (2021, p. 239-259). See also Miller (1980, p. 106-110).

⁴³ See 286a5-7: "for the bodiless things, being the most beautiful and greatest, can be shown clearly only with logos and with nothing else."

and it must be something whose structure (spelling) we can discern. The first *eidos* the method (path) of paradigm discloses is the *eidos* of the paradigm itself.

The discovered/disclosed structure of the paradigm itself also plays a significant role in its function as paradigm. For actual syllables aside, a paradigm is not employed to point out something similar in looks, another instance of the same. Rather, the Stranger tells us, its chief purpose is to aid us on the path toward discovery of “the greater things” (277d), those “bodiless things” that cannot be grasped adequately through our senses (286a). Articulating something familiar from experience and our senses as a spelled-out structure is the first step in the translation from sense perception to thought: lifting it out of the realm of experience and into the realm of art, and thus preparing and equipping us to begin to uncover the “spelling,” hence *eidos* of the unknown “greater thing.”⁴⁴

It seems essential, therefore, that when the Stranger turns to apply the paradigm of weaving to discover the statesman, he leads with the structural account of weaving. For it is in the articulation of this structural account that the Stranger not only presents a way to understand every art—as consisting of co-causes, causes, and a supervisory knowledge—he also, in describing the causes introduces the categories of diacritics and syncritics. And these, we know from both *Sophist* and *Statesman*, apply not only to the world of artful production, but also to the realm of dialectical reasoning.⁴⁵ Had we time to take the next step, we would want to examine how, beyond the simple, perception-laden image of plaiting warp and woof, the Stranger employs the more abstract and eidetic elements of analysis (*dialuein*), synthesis, and the measure of the mean.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ A further step, illustrated in the search for co-causes and causes in the city, seems to be recognizing the limitations of the paradigm, where and how the object sought is more complex than the paradigm used to point us toward it.

⁴⁵ See *Sph.* 226a-231b, 253c-e; *Stat.* 283b-287b, especially 285d-287b.

⁴⁶ I want to thank George Rudebusch for the opportunity to present the original version of this paper at the 2023 West Coast Plato Workshop, and for the helpful comments and suggestions he offered on later drafts. I also want to thank Emily Hulme for the thoughtful and helpful questions and comments she offered at the conference.

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