



JOURNAL OF
GLOBAL STUDIES

ISSN 1518-1219

<http://www.meridiano47.info>

Maria Helena de Castro Santos

Universidade de Brasília,
Instituto de Relações Internacionais,
Brasília – DF, Brazil
(mhelena@unb.br)

 ORCID ID:
<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5019-370X>

Rebeca Mansur Vieira

Universidade de Brasília,
Instituto de Relações Internacionais,
Brasília – DF, Brazil
(rebecamansur94@gmail.com)

 ORCID ID:
<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1809-1513>

Acknowledgments

CNPq Productivity Grant 1-B; Institutional Program for Scientific Initiation Scholarships – PROIC-CNPq-UnB.

Copyright:

- This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided that the original author and source are credited.
- Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto e distribuído sob os termos da Licença de Atribuição Creative Commons, que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que o autor e a fonte originais sejam creditados.



The process of political transition on post-Arab Spring Libya: foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC), tribe, militias, and civil war

O processo de transição política na pós-Primavera Árabe Líbia: mudança de regime imposta por estrangeiros, tribo, milícias e guerra civil

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.20889/M47e21018>

Submetido em 25 de junho de 2020

Aprovado em 15 de setembro de 2020

Abstract

Is it possible to export democracy by force? This article deals with this question as applied to the NATO/U.S. military intervention in Libya, in 2011, during the Arab- Spring uprisings and its aftermath. We will test and refine the Foreign Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) model using the qualitative methods of case study and process-tracing. By doing this, we will be able to identify independent variables not anticipated by the FIRC model, unveiling the actual, extraordinarily complex social-political cleavages of the country that hinder democratization and conduce to civil war.

Resumo

É possível exportar democracia pelo uso da força? Este artigo refere-se a essa questão, tomando como caso empírico a intervenção militar da OTAN/Estados Unidos no Líbano durante os levantes da Primavera Árabe em 2011 e seu seguimento. Propomo-nos a testar e refinar o modelo da *Foreign Imposed Regime Change – FIRC* utilizando os métodos qualitativos de estudo de caso e *process tracing*. Tais métodos permitem identificar variáveis independentes não antecipadas pelo modelo FIRC, desvendando as reais e complexas clivagens sócio-políticas do país que inibem a democratização e abrem caminho para a guerra civil.

Keywords: Libya; Arab Spring; NATO/US military intervention; Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC); Libyan Civil War; Militias; Tribes.

Palavras-chave: Líbia; Primavera Árabe; Intervenção militar da OTAN/Estados Unidos; Mudança de Regime Imposta por Estrangeiros; Tribos; Milícia.

Introduction

In the year 2011, Libya participated in the uprising of the Arab Spring against its decades-old dictatorship ruled by Khadhafi and fought for a new and pluralized regime. The country successfully

took down the old regime, with the international assistance of the U.S., leading NATO forces, and quickly built transitional democratic institutions. In a short period, political parties emerged, elections were in progress, and politicians were drafting a new constitution, all this in a society that has had no prior experience with a democratic regime. Nevertheless, in the year 2014, civil war erupted in the Libyan territory leading to political chaos.

This paper will analyze how the transitional government backfired to a civil war, referring to the Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) literature. FIRC points out the main factors for a successful foreign military intervention towards regime change: previous democratic experience, an adequate level of economic development, ethnic and religious homogeneity at the target countries level, and an institutional type of intervention by the intervener.

The paper intends to refine the findings of the FIRC literature, which utilizes quantitative methods of analysis, by making use of qualitative tools – case study and process tracing. The case-study method requires good in-depth knowledge of the cases (YIN, 1994). Process tracing is a within-case method to trace sequential processes and establish intervenient variables. Rather than aiming to control independent variables and isolate the effect of each one on the dependent variable, following the logic of regression analysis, process-tracing takes into consideration the combined effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable (cf. COLLIER, 2011; GEORGE & BENNETT, 2005).

Through a case study and process tracing, we seek to identify the main actors and analyze their political interrelation and actions, to unveil the process of transition and its rupture into civil war. Beyond the FIRC's variables, we will focus on the role of tribes and militias in this process. The Libyan society is mainly based on tribal structures, and tribal relations are a pivotal point in the politics and economics of the region. Tribal ties have always been present in Libyan politics and were used by incumbents as a political instrument to maneuver the government's interests. Militias have been part of political life, especially in Khadhafi's time, who encouraged citizens to arm themselves. Their number skyrocketed during the Arab Spring. We will also regard religious homogeneity beyond the Muslim branches, such as Sunnis and Shias, but, instead, as (radical) jihadists and (moderate) non-jihadists.

The paper will be divided into two sections. The first one will examine the FIRC model of analysis and its variables while applying it to Libya. The second section will approach how the tribal structure, the militias, their links with the cities, and the religious split between jihadists and non-jihadists influenced the 2014 civil war, and why they should be considered essential variables to explain civil unrest.

Foreign Imposed Regime Change

The Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC)¹ literature analyzes military-imposed regime change and indicates necessary independent variables so the intervener could promote regime change.

1 For a good revision of the FIRC literature, see Castro Santos and Teixeira (2017).

Castro Santos and Teixeira (2017), after analyzing the different FIRC's definitions offered by various authors of this literature, came to the following main characteristics of those definitions:

(1) the removal by an external actor of autocratic leaders and/or autocratic political institutions by the use of force; (2) the imposition by an external actor of a new leader or the restoration of a recently overthrown ruler to office; (3) the playing by the intervening external actor of an important role in the establishment, promotion, and maintenance of a new democratic political system in the target state. (p. 6)

We here adopt the same definition indicated in Castro Santos and Teixeira (2017): "...we will consider a democratic FIRC the external intervention that includes at least the first characteristic listed above" (p. 6).

Downes and Montén (2013) tested the main findings and hypotheses of the leading authors of this literature, offering a final model of internal and external variables conducive to successful regime change. These authors' focus was on the intervention results in altering the leaders of the countries and building new democratic institutions, as well as on the country's transition to a consolidated democracy. They analyzed a significant number of interventions aiming for regime change during the 20th century and even as early as in the 19th century. "Each of these studies contains more than 1,000 cases of intervention (p. 101)." Downes and Montén (2013) concluded, however, that the use of military force has not been deemed historically successful. The observed countries, which experienced FIRC, seldom demonstrated little democratic change, not being able to have a successful transition to a consolidated democracy. On the contrary, most of those countries remained autocratic (DOWNES & MONTÉN, 2013, p. 100-103).

Downes and Montén established internal and external variables to analyze the chances of a successful democratic transition. Their model's internal variables refer to specific conditions of the target countries at the time of intervention, which affects the forced regime change to succeed or fail in implementing a democratic government. They are good economic prosperity, ethnic and religious homogeneity, and previous experience with democracy. The external variable is the type of intervention conducted by the foreign actor, associated with the intervener's actions in implementing the regime change. Two types of interventions are identified: the leadership intervention, when only the autocratic leader is removed, allowing the population to build a new regime by itself; and the institutional intervention, when besides ousting the authoritarian leader from power, the intervener actively participates in the crafting of new democratic institutions. Only the second type is considered conducive to democratization.

Chart 1. The FIRC Model

Economic Prosperity	Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation	Previous Democratic Experience	Type of Intervention
Low (-) High (+)	Heterogeneity (-) Homogeneity (+)	No (-) Yes (+)	Leadership (-) Institutional (+)

Source: Based on Downes and Montén (2013).

Chart 1 on FIRC's variables will analyze which of them were present in Libya before the 2011 uprising and which type of intervention the foreign interveners implemented.

Libya's FIRC

The External Variable

Leadership Type of Intervention. A variable deemed essential to understanding why Libya transition was not successful is the type of intervention opted by the Obama administration – that of the leadership type. According to Downes and Monten (2013, p. 106), in this type of leadership, the intervener removes the state's primary leader but does not enforce democratic institutions and selection procedures. The authors defend that this type of intervention is unlikely to stimulate any democratic change.

In 2011, Libyans initiated the uprising against the regime, and Colonel Khadhafi commanded to repress the civilians that protested against his rule violently. The international community noticed such brutality, and the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 to enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians.

The Obama administration was initially hesitant in intervening in the country. However, the United States accepted to lead NATO forces to implement the UNSC resolution and, going beyond the resolution mandate, proceeded to oust Khadhafi from power. Contradicting previous

U.S. President Obama believed that the Libyan people should choose their leaders and build their institutions. Thus, his administration contacted the moderate group of Muslim rebels and assisted them in taking down the Colonel. In October 2011, the rebels were able to depose Khadhafi with international support, eventually being free to create their institutions and select their leaders.

The authority that the Obama administration opted to support was the National Transitional Council (NTC), which quickly emerged in February 2011, days after the uprising. As indicated above, the United States led the ousting of Muammar Khadhafi from power, but did not remain to directly build new institutions, deciding the strategy of "leading from behind." By this strategy, the U.S. indirectly pressured the NTC and the moderate rebels they were assisting in creating democratic institutions (cf. CASTRO SANTOS & TEIXEIRA, 2014 and 2017). The U.S also counted on European allies to aid the Libyan transition. However, such partners showed little initiative for the task at hand (FRIEDMAN, 2014).

Another critical United States' intervention in Libya was in 2016 when it heeded to the request of the recently established UN-backed Parliament to comply with the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) put up in 2015. The Agreement is a U.N. deal signed by warring factions, which sought to accommodate the existing rival Parliaments – the Government of National Salvation (GNS) and the House of Representatives (HoR) – into one unified Parliament and government. The Presidency Council (P.C.),² created by the LPA, requested the U.S. to assist in combating the Islamic State,

² The development of this third power center and its belligerent coexistence with the GNS and HoR will be dealt in more detail in the second section of this article.

which has taken advantage of the instability caused by the 2014 civil war. The Obama administration opted to support the UN-backed Parliament and fight terrorism with airstrike campaigns without implanting ground forces (“no troops on the ground”).

Although the Libyan people had the freedom to elect their leaders and build their institutions, the newly born government struggled in maintaining order and the rule of law in the country. The state’s security apparatus was almost nonexistent and highly depended on aligned militias to keep control. The armed groups and their complex interrelations with the tribes, the cities, and the Islamist groups were an obstacle for the Libyan government to implement stable institutions. Instability was installed and eventually led to civil war, with three competing and conflicting power centers.

The Internal Variables

Economic Prosperity. Libya experienced significant profits with oil revenues in the 1973 oil crisis. Thanks to the prices boom, Khadhafi had the financial means to fulfill his aspirations for the country by exporting the commodity and using the profit gained to develop the country.

Many scholars classify the oil-producing states as rentier states. According to the rentier state theory, this kind of state does not collect revenue through the population’s taxation but instead depends on externally generated rents (BENLI ALTUNISIK, 2014). Luciani (1990) defended that countries that rely on oil for at least 40 percent of their economic income are categorized as rentier states. It was identified that between 1972 and 1999, Libya had a 58% of financial dependence on oil revenues.

The Khadhafi regime sought to solidify itself in the mid-70s with the Jamahiriya³ system. Because the rentier state itself collected oil revenues accumulated abroad, Libya “achieved societal autonomy, free to create its clientelist networks by buying allegiance outright instead of negotiating with the people” (BENLI ALTUNISIK, 2014). Without political participation, this structure of patronage became the link between state and society.

However, when the oil prices declined in the 1980s, along with the international sanctions imposed on Libya⁴ and the inefficiency of its bureaucracy, the regime failed to competently create and establish policies to confront the global oil crisis in the 90s. The state’s institutional incapacity combined with Khadhafi’s fear of losing power to hinder the implementation of needed reform policies (BENLI ALTUNISIK, 2014).

At the time of the uprising in 2011, Libya had survived the Western trade embargo and the oil crisis. Among his attempts to halt Libya’s economic downfall, Khadhafi opened its economy and introduced measures to liberalize it. Consequently, Libya’s economic situation gradually improved. The country’s GDP was 87.14 billion U.S. dollars in 2008, and in 2010, the GDP per capita was almost 12,000 USD (WORLD BANK, 2011). Whereas, during multilateral sanctions (1992 to 1999), the country’s GDP per capita most significant downfall was \$5,717 in 1995 (UN DATA, 2010).

3 The Jamahiriyya was a political system marked by consultation, rather than representation, which aimed at restructuring the political, economic, and social relations associated to a distributive state.

4 Libya’s involvement in several terrorist acts subjected the country to an extension of US unilateral sanctions and of United Nations multilateral sanctions.

Meanwhile, only the elite benefited from the economic situation. In fact, in the year of 2010, the unemployment rate was still as high as 18.4% (ILO, 2016) and jobs with low wages were widespread, the inflation rate reached 14.16% (WORLD BANK), and there was a significant degree of inequality due to the clientelist policies adopted by the regime⁵.

All in all, we can say that by the time of the Arab Spring outburst, Libya enjoyed a certain amount of economic prosperity. This variable could then be considered to reach a medium-low value in terms of the FIRC model.

Previous Democratic Experience. Another preexistent variable considered in FIRC's literature is a democratic experience in the target country before the regime change. The population of Libya did not have democratic experience during Khadhafi's time nor before that. With its strategic geographical location in the Mediterranean, Libya has always been other nations' target and has suffered countless invasions during its history. Conquered by different empires, it became an Italian colony in 1912. In 1942, the Allies controlled the former colony and established independence and a monarchy under King Idris al-Sanussi (VANDEWALLE, 2012).

The monarchy suffered a *coup d'état* in 1969 by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) led by Khadhafi, who implanted the Jamahiriya system, aspiring to create a stateless country Libyans could govern themselves. However, the Jamahiriyya's pillars were structured in a way that prevented political mobilization. After the attempted 1975 coup, the Arab Socialist Union, a structure of local, provincial, and national assemblies, was dismantled. The regime created the General People's Congress (GPC) as a formal platform for citizens to participate in politics. Yet competence and authority were limited and restricted to the revolutionaries' agenda.

The regime maintained stability by controlling the economy and distributing economic benefits, so political silence became a must-have. Khadhafi was "able to prevent a coalescing of political interests based on purely economic resources" (VANDEWALLE, 2012, p. 128). Thus, especially the Libyan elite absorbed the benefits of the oil economy but politically stood cowed and silent. Meanwhile, those who were not associated with the government were marginalized economically and politically and eventually repressed.

In the years before the 2011 uprising, Khadhafi promised more political freedom to improve Libya's status in the international community. However, political rights and civil liberties remained restricted, and political parties and freedom of assembly were still deemed illegal. Before the uprising, 2010 Libya's Freedom Rating, Civil Liberties, and Political Rights were all classified as 7, the worst rating a country could receive (FREEDOM HOUSE, 2011).

Although Muhammad Khadhafi defended that its people should govern Libya and aspired to mobilize its population politically, the country was managed according to the autocratic leader's plan. Political participation was made impossible by the Jamahiriya system. Thus, the Libyan population had no previous democratic experience before the NATO intervention. Regarding the FIRC model, in Libya's case, it will be considered as unfavorable.

5 A GINI coefficient during the Khadhafi era in the 2000's for Libya is not available.

Ethnic and Religious Homogeneity. The prominent ethnic identity of today's Libya is the Arabs/Berbers. More than 90% of Libyans identify themselves as Arab or an ethnic mix of Arab and Berber. At the same time, the rest of the population belongs to other ethnicities, the nomadic Tuaregs, and the Tehbu tribes in the south, and the Berbers Amazighs (USAIP, 2012).

The dominant ethnicity, Arab/Berbers, is concentrated in certain cities and regions. The leading Arab cities of current Libya include Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata, Zawiya, Sabrata, Khums, al-Bayda, Darna, Tobruk. The Berber/Amazigh minority, who have not entirely adapted to Arab culture, are mainly found in the western region, in the coastal areas of Zuwara and the Nafusa/Western Mountains (cf. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes and Islamists, 2014). The Tuaregs, composed of black indigenous tribes located in southern Libya, are concentrated in Kufra and Sabha. The Tehbu population originates from oil-rich provinces and lucrative trafficking and transit routes from sub-Saharan Africa to the Mediterranean North (cf. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes, and Islamists, 2014).

The non-Arab ethnicities, along with the Berbers Amazighs minority, were marginalized during the Khadhafi regime. Not surprisingly, these ethnicities took arms against the autocratic leader during the 2011 uprising.

Libya also possesses a high level of religious homogeneity. The Arab conquests and migration in the fifth and seventh centuries eventually spread Islam in North Africa. Moreover, 96,6% of the current population of Libya is Muslim Sunnis (CIA World Factbook).

Social fragmentation is crucial in understanding political cleavages in the target countries because it frequently leads to civil war. Libya, however, at first sight, seems to be ethnically and religiously homogeneous. Which divides were then responsible for the irruption of civil war?

To begin with, there is a deep division among the Sunni Muslims. Despite Islamist groups have existed since the monarchy, the tension between Islamists and non-Islamists, or secularists, became palpable with the uprisings due to power disputes (cf. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes, and Islamists, 2014). We cannot say, therefore, that Libya is characterized by religious homogeneity, and we cannot say either that the FIRC's ethnic-religious fragmentation variable is positive in the case of Libya.

Moreover, the dispute for power between tribes, militias, cities, Islamists, and non-Islamists tells a significant part of the story. Those are variables not taken into consideration by the FIRC literature. In the next section, we will analyze those aspects in more detail.

As shown below, in Chart 2, Libya would not be a successful case of democratization, according to the FIRC model (DOWNES & MOTEN, 2013). This model states that none of the four variables indicated should be absent. In the Libyan case, the leadership type of intervention and the lack of democratic experience should work against democratization. Economic prosperity reached a certain level but favored only the political elite. The high ethnic-religious homogeneity would then be the only FIRC variable present in Libya that would work against civil war. We indicated above, however, that the religious homogeneity was only apparent.

Chart 2. THE FIRC Model Applied to Libya

Economic Prosperity	Ethnic and Religious Homogeneity	Previous Democratic Experience	Type of Intervention
+/-	+	-	Leadership (-)

We will argue at this point that even if the FIRC model proved right in general terms when it comes to Libya, it missed the social-political cleavages that matters: a tribal society, split between Islamists and non-Islamists and suffering the increasing impact of armed groups and militias upon political stability. To better understand the irruption of civil war in Libya, the next section will consider the effect of those variables not considered by the FIRC model.

Libyan socio-political cleavages: tribes, militias, and cities

Khadhafi's initial ambitions for Libya at the beginning of the 1969 Revolution, after disposing of the Sanussi monarchy, was an Arab nationalist stateless country where the people governed themselves and enjoyed political mobility and economic equality. The oil revenues were the leading economic component to establish his vision of egalitarianism and development. He desired to take down inefficient bureaucracies and weaken tribal and regional elites. However, during the four decades of Khadhafi's regime, the mechanisms that maintained his rule were patronage and retribalization. The dictator co-opted tribes from Tripolitania that were not allied to the monarchy and, through patronage, could sustain their loyalty. Those tribes who did have leverage over the others were Khadhafi's tribes, Qadhadhfa, also the Warfalla and the Maqahra. Being loyal to the regime, they held high political positions, received economic benefits, and were the backbone of the security apparatus, weakening the national army. These strategies to support his regime contradicted his previous goals and marginalized tribes from Cyrenaica, which in the past were linked to the monarchy (cf. VANDEVALLE, 2012).

An informal organization in the *Jamahiriyya* that served as a security mechanism was the People's Social Leadership Committees. The Committees consisted of heads of families or prominent individuals loyal to the regime. Their purpose was to help maintain social stability by controlling members of tribes and families aligned to the government. This Committee system was a powerful instrument that was used by the regime to balance the political system.

Through these Committees, the tribes' political function was able to get formalized and represent tribal interests. In these platforms, tribal leaders were responsible for the subversive behaviors of their tribe members. Meanwhile, political mobilization across tribal divides, through political parties or civil society organizations, remained illegal. Moreover, "state formation, urbanization, and economic transformation had, in many ways, perpetuated tribal loyalties rather than undermined them. The disruptive nature of Libyan state formation allowed individuals to remain loyal to their tribes" (LACHER, 2011, p. 4).

It is crucial at this point to understand the tribal role in Libyan society. Although tribalization diminished, tribal ties continued part of Libyan identity. Tribal identities represent a collective sense of thinking and acting in the country (VARVELLI, 2013).

Tribes, families, and cities complexly intertwined themselves in urban areas, supporting either Khadhafi's regime or the rebels. According to Lacher (2011):

(...) urbanization saw communities settle in cities according to parentage, with close relatives settling nearest to each other. While this pattern inevitably faded over the past decades, it remained sufficiently strong for districts of major cities to side with the regime or the revolutionaries, depending on the tribal community dominating the neighborhood. Nevertheless, in contrast to the hinterland, tribal loyalties have historically been weaker in cities with a longstanding urban history, including Tripoli and other towns of the western coastal strip and Misrata and Benghazi, where prominent families played a leading role.

Khadhafi also envisioned a country in which individuals were free to arm themselves, encouraging tribes to have their military councils and contributing to the national army's emaciation. Therefore, tribes and cities already possessed the experience and armed fighters by the uprising of 2011. Not only did Khadhafi loyalists have their militaries, but also other prominent tribes and cities, such as Misrata and Benghazi, bore their own armed and experienced personnel. Many had the fighting experience even before the Khadhafi era, in disputes to gain colonial freedom and other historical wars (see VANDERVALLE, 2012). The fact that these existed during Khadhafi's regime is essential to understand how the tribes and Islamist groups quickly organized many militias after the Arab Spring.

By the beginning of 2011, when the Arab Spring uprisings began, negative sentiment towards the Khadhafi regime quickly emerged. Those who have been relegated along the four decades of the Colonel's reign, tribes from Cyrenaica and Islamist groups, rebelled against his rule and rapidly organized a transitional council (the NTC) to make way new form of government.

The eastern region, one of the marginalized areas by Khadhafi, was the first to initiate the uprising and establish a new government alternative. The National Transitional Council (NTC) was mostly made up of the descendants of former monarchical elites of Cyrenaica. During the revolt, many military and tribal leaders created means to protect their own against the repressive acts of the regime to control the rebels. Those were the leaders also responsible for creating the NTC.

Local councils and armed militia groups began to arise throughout the other regions of the country to contest the Khadhafi rule on a city-by-city basis. This movement mainly emerged from pre-existing groups within the Libyan society, based on regionalism, tribe, locality, and ideology (LACHER, 2014). Throughout the uprising, those small units evolved into military brigades and councils to, along with individual military and tribal leaders, protect the population and cities against the regime.

The NTC quickly emerged in Benghazi and soon relocated to Tripoli, operating as the official national government. However, it struggled to maintain legitimacy and control over the Libyan territory while the innumerable armed groups followed their agendas. Meanwhile, with U.S. leading NATO foreign military assistance, rebels could arm themselves, including having access to the former government's weapon stocks when Khadhafi's security sectors collapsed.

Due to the NTC's inability to execute territorial control over the country, the local militias took up the task. They established their authority upon their regions or cities of origin, as an informal option to implement order until the creation of new institutions and a new constitution. In the beginning, the militias focused on securing territorial control and did not yet possess a clear political agenda (LACHER, 2014). However, when the militias and armed groups became more robust and more influential after the fall of the former regime, they, as indicated, started acting upon their interests and agendas.

Another type of armed group found in Libya, which has its roots in ideology, is the Islamist militias. An Islamist is a member of an ideological movement devotee who desires Islam to dictate through sharia all aspects of society, from the economy, politics, and culture, to social relationships (cf. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes, and Islamists, 2014). Those adherents to this radical ideology aim to establish a theocratic Islamic state.

Radical jihadi cells were first created in the 1970s and were ignited by Afghanistan vs. Soviet War. The veterans for Jihad against the USSR later opposed Kaddafi's injustices, creating the largest opposition group, the former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Not surprisingly, this opposition group triggered massive repression from the Khadhafi government. In the late 1990s, the government initiated negotiations for reconciliation and to cease violence. As a result, many were released from prison in the early 2000s, and several of them were critical for the success of the 2011 uprising and eventually participated in the political transition. Thus, the former LIFG members formed political parties, ran in elections, and served in prominent political positions in government. However, the younger generation of jihadists did not agree with the participation of these former LIFG members in the transition process. They possessed a more radical ideology and categorized democracy as un-Islamic (FITZGERALD & TOALDO, 2016).

One should note that the Islamists were not the ones who initiated the uprising, yet they took an essential part in the conflict. Most of the militias that fought in the rebellion had an Islamist and/or Jihadi background. Although they were not able or willing to build institutional support and efficient organizational structures or institutions, the Islamist groups succeed in Libya's political scene. They were, at first, the only political force with a national plan, different from the rest of the local political actors in Libya.

The NTC eventually resigned in November 2011, and a new interim cabinet – the General National Congress (GNC) –, incorporated members of other regional and tribal militias and was responsible for establishing elections for a new political body – the House of Representatives (HoR) – that would elaborate a new constitution. The new interim cabinet, the GNC, made it possible for

tribal institutions to be represented in the new democratic framework, representing their interests. In this way, tribal leaders had access to national decisions and were no longer mediators of only the regional and local levels.


Although the new cabinet allowed more representation, some tribes were excluded due to their past allegiance to the Khadhafi regime and faced persecution since the uprising. In May 2013, a political-exclusion law passed, which prevented individuals associated with Khadhafi to enter public life. Also, minorities protested for more cultural inclusion in the new constitution (FREEDOM HOUSE, 2014).

Meanwhile, the GNC, like the first transitional political body – the NTC – also faced difficulty establishing territorial control and securing the country from local extremist groups. These jihadists radical groups, located mainly in the Gulf of Sirte and in the northeast region, tried to weaken tribal ties, reiterating a common bond of Islam among all Libyans. By their turn, the tribes, in general, contributed to affirming a traditional vision of Islam, but a moderate one, diverging from extremist views. Therefore, the tribal system can be considered the most reliable counterweight to radicalism. This moderate tribes' role has caused cleavages between radicals and tribes on the more legitimate law (*urf* vs. *sharia*)⁶. Radical powers, moreover, tried to undermine the traditional tribal role, warning against nepotism and favoritism as anti-Islamic results of tribalism (VARVELLI, 2013).

With the 2012 election for the representatives promoted by the GNC, militias gradually gained strength, given the support they had from politicians' members of this interim body and other prominent political forces. Libya's main political parties, created after the uprisings, at the time did not have their armed groups, so they affiliated themselves with militias based on kin, region, and tribe, as well as religious and ideological differences (cf. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes, and Islamists, 2014). The political parties themselves were constituted by tribal, regional, and religious affiliation. This led to the creation of numerous political parties. However, only a handful of parties had candidates across the country, such as the Muslim Brotherhood Justice and Construction Party and the Salafist Al-Watan party (GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & BARR, 2015).

Patronage and exclusion bounded the armed groups with political actors, just like Khadhafi's political tactics in the old regime. Libyan politicians drew alliances from militias to advance their agendas, and militias secured politicians and ministries to assure their power. Many militias and politicians settled scores, marginalized, and isolated the remnants of the Khadhafi era. An example of such behavior was the above mentioned Political-Exclusion Law of 2013, which targeted officials who had served the Khadhafi regime. (cf. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes, and Islamists, 2014).

6 *Urf* is the known term for the communal law established by the tribal system in Libya. *Sharia* is the religious law of the Koran.

Chart 3. The Building-up of the Civil War

In February 2014, Libya held national elections for a Constituent Assembly, which would draft a new constitution and municipal council elections in April. Besides, the GNC was expected to transfer its power to the elected House of Representatives (HoR) in the middle of the year. As was mentioned before, during this transition period, many tribes created alliances among themselves. The region of Cyrenaica, which was politically marginalized by the former regime, pledged tribal

alliances to Khadhafi's era exiled-general Khalifa Haftar. Through this alliance, the Libyan National Army (LNA) was created as a coalition of tribal and militias which supported Haftar. The general led an operation in May 2014, known as Operation Dignity, which sought to eradicate Islamists and tribes that were once affiliated to the former regime.

Along with the LNA, militia forces from Benghazi fought in Operation Dignity. Haftar argued that Islamists overran the GNC and that many politicians were linked to Islamist militias (cf. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes, and Islamists, 2014). Because of the Operation, the GNC agreed to eliminate party lists and forced all candidates to run as independents (GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & BARR, 2015). This weakened the already frail political party system.

In the following month, as a response to Operation Dignity, the coalition known as Libya Dawn was formed. It was constituted of both Islamist and secularist militias, factions from Tripoli and Misrata, and other places in western Libya, and included members from the Amazigh minority.

The tension between the two groups scaled up a month before the June 2014 elections for the new HoR parliament. Violent clashes followed up, and consequentially few people showed up for the polls. The results were unfavorable for the Islamists groups, and they soon contested the results (FITZGERALD & TOALDO, 2016). Tripoli, the site of the GNC and where the polls took place, was soon invaded by militias who opposed the election's result, which led the elected Parliament of the HoR to take refuge in the eastern city of Tobruk. Meanwhile, the Islamist militias remerged the old GNC and later renamed it the Government of National Salvation (GNS). In mid-2014, Libya found itself in a civil war with two parliaments, each one claiming to be the rightful authority in the country.

Even though the international community recognized the more secularist HoR as the elected and official authority, Libya remained decentralized and stateless. Searching for a solution to the chaos, in December 2015, an UN-backed government was borne out of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), known as the Presidential Council (P.C.). The P.C. was created to act as the central authority and supreme commander of the armed forces. Its base was in Tripoli. The intention was for the P.C. to preside over the Government of National Accord (GNA), the unified government, where the GNS was to become a consultative body and the HoR, the legislative body (FITZGERALD & TOALDO, 2016).

The GNS eventually lost control over relevant institutions along with the civil war. Most of the members of the GNS transitioned to the State Council, one of the consultative bodies under the LPA. However, the group that has caused more difficulty in accepting the P.C. as the primary and sole authority in Libya was the group of politicians based in Tobruk and al-Bayda, because they refused to cooperate with Islamist groups. Thus, both sides put significant obstacles for the unified government: on the one hand, by the HoR's concerns about GNS politicians' links to Islamist militias and, on the other, by the GNS allies demand the exclusion of the Libyan National Army of General Khalifa Haftar from the new government (COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 2017).

Moreover, the HoR, which was to become the legitimate legislative authority under the Agreement, failed to pass a valid constitutional amendment to establish its jurisdiction. Instead, it opted to endorse the rival government of Abdullah al-Thinni, which operates from the eastern Libyan city of al-Bayda. Both towns of Tobruk and al-Bayda are controlled by the anti-Islamist general Khalifa Haftar, who


led the 2014's Operation Dignity and is still in command of the Libyan National Army (LNA). Since then, the HoR has continuously rejected the government proposed by the P.C. (FITZGERALD & TOALDO, 2016).

With the country divided into three parliaments, the thousands of active militias in Libya have aligned themselves with one of such parliaments, even though the military councils act upon their interests and agenda. The country is split between Islamists, secularists, and those in favor of the UN-backed Parliament, which intends to unify the fractured nation.

In February 2015, thanks to the country's security instability and failure to establish law and order, the Islamic State, also known as Daesh, encountered a haven to settle its presence in the coastal city of Sirte in February 2015 (COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 2017). Throughout the year of 2015, ISIS continued to conquer critical checkpoints in Libya. In May 2015, it seized the al-Qardabiya Air Base and the Great Man-Made River irrigation complex. Moreover, ISIS proceeded to carry out executions, strictly control of Libyan media and internet, and impose physical penalties to those who opposed the regime (BECCARO, 2020).

Consequently, the GNA, backed by the United States., launched offensives to recapture territories seized by the Islamic State (BECCARO, 2020, p. 11). By the end of 2016, local armed groups, along with U.S. air and drone strikes – a campaign requested by the UN-backed parliament–, mostly removed Daesh fighters from the city of Sirte, the main territory the organization held until then. The jihadist organization, however, maintained its presence in other areas of Libya.

Chart 4. The Three Current Libyan Parliaments



In fact, in 2018, Tripoli suffered three attacks by the Islamic State, such as to keep substantial insecurity and lack of confidence in the country's structures, notably those dominated by the GNA and the LNA (TRAUTHIG, 2020). In 2019, ISIS began to focus its activities in Southern Libya, frequently attacking LNA checkpoints, such as Zillah and Qatron (TRAUTHIG, 2020). Consequently, in September of this year, the United States carried out several airstrikes targeted at the ISIS bases in Southern Libya (The New York Times, September 2019).

Today, the Islamic State is still operating in the country. It manifests itself via special attacks on institutions connected to the state and on less prominent but more frequent activities in desert regions (TRAUTHIG, 2020, p. 19).

Meanwhile, General Haftar and his forces have enforced control over their stronghold in eastern Libya and have been advancing westward since May 2017. After taking over the central oil ports in September 2016, the LNA was victorious in Benghazi and established control over the oil infrastructure in this region. This victory was completed after a three-year campaign to dominate the city and dislodge rival Islamist militias from vital military bases in the country's central and southwestern regions. "Haftar's ability to navigate Libyan tribal dynamics enabled him to take control of most of Libya's oil infrastructure." (ESTELLE & PARK, 2017). Haftar's intolerance of Islamists, however, turns out to restrict Libyans' political options, pushing part of them to seek the support of violent Islamist groups.

The United Nations Security Council has declared, in 2018, that regarding the Libyan crisis, its top priority was to uphold presidential and parliamentary elections in 2018. Agreements were set up between the two prominent leaders of the country, Fayez al Sarraj (GNS) and Khalifa Haftar (LNA). Nevertheless, the UN-backed PC was incapable of guaranteeing freedom of assembly and speech and of overseeing a safe election, deeming that it was still dependent on local militias for providing its security (MIDDLE EAST EYE, 2018). As a result, elections have been postponed since then.

Today, besides the recurrent attacks by the Islamic State, Libya still faces intense internal conflict as well. One of the most recent sources of internal instability was the assault in 2019 by General Haftar and the LNA to Tripoli, ousting the GNA from the city. Afterward, mass graves were discovered in Tarhuna, a territory near Tripoli that worked as a stronghold for Haftar's forces. In March 2020, however, the GNA launched an operation to take Tripoli back from Haftar. Another important source of instability in the present dispute over the city of Sirte, once seized by ISIS, between LNA and the GNA (UN NEWS, 2020). This city is not only a strategic point but also one of great symbolism since it is the birthplace of Muammar Gaddafi.

Moreover, international influence turns an already complicated situation into an even more complex one. According to António Guterres, the United Nations' current Secretary-General, "the conflict has entered a new phase, with foreign interference reaching unprecedented levels, including in the delivery of sophisticated equipment and the number of mercenaries involved in the fighting." (UN NEWS, 2020, p. 3). These foreign countries, besides the Western countries, included Russia, Egypt, Turkey.

Overall, fighting continues to fracture Libya, as the various rebel and militia groups have divided the country among political, ideological, and tribal lines. The intended unity government has not been able to bring together the warring factions and reestablish stability in Libya. The war has generated many deaths and human rights violations on both sides, along with a massive flux of refugees. It has also cost the country's oil infrastructure to deteriorate, which is the economic lifeblood of Libya.

Conclusions

The main actors who initiated and persisted in the Libyan Civil War are about the same who were marginalized by the Khadhafi regime. After years of repression from the former government, the Arab Spring gave to Islamist groups and tribes from the region of Cyrenaica the opportunity to actively lead the ousting from power of the oppressive leader and establish a new Libya in which they would be in control. The regime change, however, was interrupted by civil war, which prevails until today.

Applied to Libya, the Foreign-Imposed Regime-Change model indicates that three of the four variables identified as necessary to the democratic institutional building were absent in the country: economic prosperity, previous democratic experience, and the institutional type of intervention. In this sense, the model proved right.

Notwithstanding, it is worth making some comments on the only variable favorable to democratization, present at the time of the foreign military intervention: the very high Libyan homogeneity in ethnic and religious terms, more than 90% and almost 97%, respectively, of the total population. According to the FIRC model, it is reasonable to suppose that this remarkable homogeneity would work against internal conflicts. However, this was not what has happened.

The qualitative methods of the case study and process tracing applied to the Libyan transitional process indicated that there were deep socio-political cleavages in the post-Khadhafi regime not anticipated by the existence of a tremendous ethnic-religious homogeneity. To begin with, a closer investigation showed that the religious homogeneity was only apparent, despite the 96,6% adherence of the Libyan people to the Sunni branch of Islamism. In fact, since the Arab-Spring uprising, the population as a whole has been divided between radical Islamists and non-Islamists, which interacted with other divides such as the tribal nature of the country, the grievances of tribes put aside by Khadhafi, the increasing number of militias and the complex and dynamic interrelation between all these variables and the cities.

The human and material costs of war in Libya are not easy to obtain, partly due to a media clampdown by the Libyan government. However, some figures can be provided.

New America, a think tank located in Washington, calculated air, drone, and ground strikes against Libya since the US/NATO intervention in the civil war. Various foreign countries (Western and non-Western) and local factions (especially the two leading contenders, LNA and GNA) operated those strikes. It came to more than 4,600 the number of strikes counted, from 2011 to

March 2020. It is worth noting that the bulk of the 550 American strikes (air and drone) since 2012 were concentrated in the second half of 2016. Those were authorized by Obama's Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG), to destroy ISIS's stronghold located in the coastal city of Sirte, upon request of the Government of National Accord (GNA), the unity government to be (data are from New America and Airwars, 2020).

Deaths because of strikes were significant. New America and Airwars data also indicated the number of civil deaths, between 637 and 930, and between 1,225 and 1,543, the number of combatants deceased during the period 2011-March 2020. Moreover, the U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported that civilian casualties (deaths and injuries) increased 45% in the first three months of 2020 as compared to the last months of the preceding year, due to the recrudescence of war in the previous years. In this context, the U.N. Refugee Agency (UNHCR) calculated in 401,836 the number of Libyans internally displaced. In 5,709, the number of vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers departed from the country since November 2017.

The effects of war on the Libyan economy were devastating. Before the civil war, Libya produced 1.8 million barrels of crude oil per day. Between 2004 and 2010, the country's GDP increased, on average of 5.5 per year, reaching US\$ 12,064 per capita. After a few months of conflict, however, in July 2011, the country's oil production plummeted to 22,000 barrels per day. As the Libyan economy was significantly dependent on oil exports, the GDP annual rate change went down from 2.9 in 2010, to -60.0 in 2011, and GDP per capita plummeted to US\$ 5,554. The country suffered a deep recession during the next three years when oil production was approximately only 0.6 million barrels per day, and GDP per capita reached its lowest point since a decade ago, US\$ 4,035. However, in the next two years, oil production surpassed 1 million barrels per day, and GDP grew around 21%.

Notwithstanding, the recrudescence of war, beginning April 2019 with the recent conflict in Tripoli, nearly shut down oil production and exports. Libyan's GDP per capita in 2019 was US\$ 7,700 (cf. IMF, 2012; World Bank, 2019; World Bank, 2020). *Al Shahid*, an independent media vehicle that monitors the Middle East and North Africa, estimates that the damages and closures of the oil fields provoked losses around 130 billion dollars, and oil theft reached 1 million dollars each year, oil being the bulk of the Libyan economy.

In the face of these vast materials and human costs, international aid for development reached merely US\$ 303 million (USAID, 2020).

Despite those massive costs in the Libyan war and the NATO/ US and their allies' efforts, they could not stop the civil war and much less improve the democracy indexes of the country. In fact, in 2011, as indicated, Libya scored 7 (the worst non-free score) by Freedom House and -7 (autocracy) by Polity IV, while in 2019, the Freedom House index was 6,5 (still not Free, with a slight improvement). Polity IV, 2018, did not indicate a score to Libya, classifying the country as failed/occupied.

Today, the U.N. is in close contact with the two military leaders on both sides of the conflict toward renewed terms for a ceasefire in Libya. Trump has joined this movement, fearing that Egypt would be willing to send ground troops there to impose a rout of the American ally, Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the National Liberation Army (The Guardian, June 2020). Moreover, Trump is at odds

with the belligerent situation in Libya. Two American allies in the region, Turkey, and Egypt, took opposite sides of the war, disputing influence in the area.

The truth of the matter is that neither the US/NATO interveners and their allies nor the FIRC literature considered the social-political characteristics and history of Libyan society. The poorly thought out interference and lack of understanding of the country's political, societal, and religious cleavages cost the lives of many Libyan citizens and brought more conflict and disorder to the region. Today, Libya's situation is undoubtedly one of a civil war. This provided an opportunity for foreign extremist groups, from which the Islamic State is the best example, to flourish and establish safe havens in the territory, profoundly fracturing the country. The prospects for a unifying government to democratize and stabilize Libya are today quite bleak.

References

- AL SHAHID, July 2020. "The Human and Material Cost of The War in Libya." Available at: <<https://alshahidwitness.com/human-material-cost-libya-war/>>. Accessed on: 07/20/2020.
- BECCARO, A. (2020). "ISIS in Libya and beyond." 2014–2016. In: *The Journal of North African Studies*, 1–20. DOI:10.1080/13629387.2020.1747445
- BENLI ALTUNISIK, Meliha. Rentier State Theory and the Arab Uprisings: An Appraisal. *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Volume 11, No 42, p. 75-91, 2014.
- BENNETT, Andrew. Process Tracing and Historical Explanation. Chapter 10. In: George, Alexander and Andrew Bennet, *Case Studies and Theory Development*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005.
- CASTRO SANTOS, Maria Helena de; & TEIXEIRA Ulysses Tavares. Is It Possible to Export Democracy by the Use of Force? Military Interventions in Iraq and Libya. Prepared for the Panel "Foreign Policy Challenges of the 21st Century" of the FLACSO/ISA Joint International Conference: "Global and Regional Powers in a Changing World," Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 23-25, 2014.
- CASTRO SANTOS, Maria Helena de; & TEIXEIRA Ulysses Tavares. What Case Studies Tell about Foreign Imposed Regime Change that the FIRC literature does not: the cases of recent American military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. The International Studies Association 58th Annual Convention, Baltimore, Maryland, Feb 2017.
- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), The CIA Factbook in Libya. Available at: <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html>>. Accessed on: 12/05/2017.
- COLLIER, David. "Understanding Process Tracing." In: *P.S.: Political Science and Politics* 44(4): 2011, pp. 823-30.
- COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. Civil War in Libya. Global Conflict Tracker, December 5, 2017. Available at: <<https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/civil-war-in-libya>>. Accessed on: 12/05/2017.
- THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, War in Libya? Why Two U.S. Allies Are on a Collision Course? Available at: <<https://csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2020/0710/War-in-Libya-Why-two-US-allies-are-on-a-collision-course>>. Accessed in: 07/20/2020.

- DOWNES, Alexander, & MONTEN, Jonathan. “Forced to be free? Why the foreign-imposed regime change rarely leads to democratization?”. In: *International Security*, v. 37, n. 4, 2013.
- ESTELLE, Emily, & PARK, Min Young. “Fighting Forces in Libya: July 2017”. In: *Critical Threats*, July 28, 2017. Available at: <<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/fighting-forces-in-libya-july-2017>>. Accessed on: 04/02/2017.
- FITZGERALD, Mary; & TOALDO, Mattia. A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players. European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016. Available at: <http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict>. Accessed on: 11/13/2017.
- FREEDOM HOUSE. Libya: Freedom in the World, 2011. Available at: <<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/libya>>. Accessed on: 11/30/2017.
- FREEDOM HOUSE. Libya: Freedom in the World, 2014. Available at: <<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/libya>>. Accessed on: 11/30/2017.
- FREEDOM HOUSE. Libya: Freedom in the World, 2019. Available at: <<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/libya>>. Accessed on: 11/30/2017.
- FRIEDMAN, Thomas L. Obama on the World. New York Times Op-ed Columnist, August 8, 2014. Available at: <<https://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000003048414/obama-on-the-world.html>>. Accessed on: 11/30/2017.
- THE GUARDIAN, June 2020, Donald Trump joins calls for Libya ceasefire. Available at: <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/10/donald-trump-joins-calls-for-libya-ceasefire>>. Accessed On: 07/29/2020.
- GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, Daveed; BARR, Nathaniel. Dignity and Dawn: Libya’s Escalating Civil War. International Center for Counterterrorism: Netherlands, Feb. 2015.
- INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (ILO), Trading Economics. Libya Unemployment Rate, 2016. Available at: <<https://tradingeconomics.com/libya/unemployment-rate>>. Accessed on: 11/20/2017.
- INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (FMI), Libya Beyond the Revolution: Challenges and Opportunities, staff team led by Ralph Chami. Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2012. Available at: <<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2012/1201mcd.pdf>>. Accessed on: 07/29/2020.
- LACHER, Wolfram. Families, Tribes, and Cities in the Libyan Revolution. In: *Middle East Policy Council*, Vol. XVIII (4), 2011. Available at: <<http://www.mepc.org/families-tribes-and-cities-libyan-revolution>>. Accessed on: 09/23/2017.
- LACHER, Wolfram. Fault Lines of the Revolution. German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), May 2014, p. 9-11, 17-18.
- LUCIANI, Giacomo. Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework. In: *The Arab State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- MIDDLE EAST EYE, Rights group warns against rushing Libyan elections; U.N. says vote is ‘priority’, March 22, 2018. Available at: <<http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/rights-group-warns-against-rushing-libyan-elections-un-says-vote-priority-307921690>>. Accessed on: 04/22/2018.

- NEW AMERICA, The war in Libya, 2020. Available at: <<https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/airstrikes-and-civilian-casualties-libya/appendices>>. Accessed on 07/18/2020.
- OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL FOR REFUGEES AND STATELESS PERSONS. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes, and Islamists. 2014. Available at: <<https://www.refworld.org/docid/54afd8be4.html>>. Accessed on: 07/28/2020.
- THE NEW YORK TIMES, September 2019, Military Again Strikes ISIS in Southern Libya. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/world/africa/strikes-isis-libya.html>. Accessed on: 07/02/2020.
- UN NEWS, Time is running out for Libya, U.N. chief warns Security Council, July 8, 2020. Available at: <<https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/07/1067961>>. Accessed on: 07/10/2020.
- UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT MISSION IN LIBYA (UNSMIL), Civilian Casualties Report, January 1 – March 31, 2020. Available at: <<https://unsmil.unmissions.org/civilian-casualties-report-1-january-31-march-2020-1>>. Accessed on: 07/28/2020.
- UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE AGENCY (UNHCR), July 2020. Available at: <<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/lby>>. Accessed on: 07/28/2020.
- UN DATA. 2010. Per capita GDP at current prices – U.S. dollars. Available at: <<http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=libya&d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3A101%3BcurrID%3AUDS%3BpcFlag%3A1%3BcrID%3A434>>. Accessed on: 07/16/2018.
- UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID), 2020. Available at: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/LBY?implementing_agency_id=1>. Accessed on: 07/28/2020.
- USAIP, Special Report S300S. TARKOWSKI TEMPELHOF – M. OMAR, Stakeholders of Libya's February 17 Revolution, January 2012. Available at: <<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/136141/SR%20300.pdf>>. Accessed on: 07/28/2020.
- TRAUTHIG, I.K. “Islamic State in Libya: from Force to Farce.” In: *International Centre for the Study of Radicalization*. London: King's College London Press, 2020.
- VANDEWALLE, D. “A History of Modern Libya.” 2nd Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- VARVELLI, Arturo. “The Role of Tribal Dynamics in the Libyan Future.” In: *The Institute for International Political Studies*. Analysis No. 172, May 2013. Available at: <https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/analysis_172_2013.pdf>. Accessed on: 09/25/2017.
- WITHNALL, A. “Isis ‘loses control of Sirte’ as Libyan pro-government forces say battle is over.” In: *Independent*, Dez./2005. Disponível em: <<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/isis-sirte-libya-pro-government-forces-say-battle-for-city-is-over-a7456481.html>>. Accessed on: 09/09/2019.
- WORLD BANK, Libya's Economic Update, April 2020. Available at: <<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/publication/economic-update-april-2020#:~:text=As%20a%20result%2C%20real%20GDP,to%20be%20negative%20in%202020.&text=As%20a%20result%2C%20GDP%20growth,before%20stabilizing%20around%201.4%25%20thereafter>>. Accessed on 07/29/2020.
- WORLD BANK, 2019, Data. Available at: <<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?end=2018&start=2011>>. Accessed on: 07/29/2020.

WORLD BANK, 2011. Libya: GDP. World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. Available at: <<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=LY>>. Accessed on: 10/23/2017.

WORLD BANK. Libya: Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %). World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. Available at: <<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG?locations=LY&view=chart>>. Accessed on: 11/20/2017.

YIN, Robert. Case Study, Research: Design, and Methods. Thousand Oaks, Ac: Sage Publications, 1994 (caps. 1, 2 e 5).