Autonomy and Foreign Policy: 
the Brazilian Case on the Fight Against 
Terrorism in the Lula administration

Autonomia e Política Externa: 
o caso brasileiro na luta contra o terrorismo durante o governo Lula

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Abstract

This paper examines Brazilian Foreign Policy during Lula’s administration and how the concept of autonomy has shaped Brazil’s stance on alleged terrorist activities within its borders. By using the Neoclassical Realist approach, this article explores how autonomy has allowed for Brazil to oppose the pressures of the United States’ led Global War on Terror between 2003-2010. Autonomy has worked as an intervening variable that allowed for Brazilian Foreign Policy, to some extent, to take its own direction in matters of security.

Resumo

Esse artigo examina a política externa brasileira durante a administração de Lula e como o conceito de autonomia moldou o posicionamento do Brasil sobre supostas atividades terroristas em seu território. Usando da abordagem do Realismo Neoclássico, esse manuscrito explora como o conceito de autonomia permitiu o Brasil de opor as pressões advindas da Guerra ao Terror estadunidense entre 2003-2010. A autonomia funcionou como uma variável intermediária que permitiu a política externa brasileira, até certa medida, de traçar seu próprio caminho em questões de segurança.

Palavras-chave: Brasil; Guerra ao Terror; Governo de Lula; Realismo Neoclássico; Estados Unidos.

Keywords: Brazil; Global War on Terror; Lula Administration; Neoclassical Realism; United States.

Introduction

On July 9, 2009, during a hearing, Jorge Felix, the former Head Minister of the Institutional Security Cabinet of Brazil, made a statement on the possibility of terrorism in Brazil. He stated that ‘even if a problem were to appear, we won’t admit that the problem exists’ (WikiLeaks 2009a). This announcement
reflects the position of many in Brazil's senior level government and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) regarding the likelihood of terrorism and its related activities in Brazilian territory. In one sense, Brazil participates in international multilateral arrangements to combat terrorism; in another, Brazil does not see terrorism as an imminent threat to its security or even as part of its reality. The reason for what Lasmar (2015) designates as 'denialism' (‘negacionismo’), are multiple as the concept of terrorism involves wide-ranging issues, from the political-ideological sphere to ethnic and religious spheres. According to Welsh (2013), Brazil resists on criminalizing terrorism due to its historical experience of dictatorial repression of civil liberties. In personal comments via e-mail (2016), former Strategy Analyst for the Brazilian Strategy Secretariat (SAE), André Woloszyn, pointed out that part of this denialism stems from a reactive rather than preventive culture embedded in Brazilian defense doctrine. The argument made in this work is that the reason why Brazil is reluctant to acknowledge the alleged existence of terrorist related activities on its soil is due to the tradition of autonomy\(^1\) in Brazilian Foreign Policy (Política Externa Brasileira – PEB). That is, the search for autonomy in PEB has allowed Brazil to be an important player within the global arena; however, it has also permitted its foreign policy agenda to charter its own course, which may mean opposing the guidelines or preferable behavior set out by the establishment, in this case, the United States (U.S.). Therefore, the questions that this work attempts to answer are: Why does Brazil have such an ambivalent posture in its foreign policy when it comes to the Global War on Terror (GWT), to the extent that it is reluctant to publicly acknowledge any alleged presence of terrorist related activities in the country? Does autonomy drive the content of foreign policy in national security questions? As aforementioned, the answers could be manifold. This research will focus on the role that autonomy has had in conditioning PEB, during Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva's administrations (2003-2010), on the issue of terrorism, which means, in part, Brazil's refusal to comply to the United States GWT discourse and the militarized agenda that comes with it.

It is important to note that the purpose of this work is not to prove or refute any existence of terrorism and/or terrorist related activities in Brazil. The intention is to deliver an impartial awareness of some of the findings in order to illustrate consequently, how Brazil has responded to them. This purpose will be carried out by addressing the centrality of autonomy as a driver of PEB and how it has led Brazil, for the most part, to oppose the GWT. This will demonstrate how the premises of the chosen theoretical framework, Neoclassical Realism, that of both independent and intervening variables constraining foreign policy decision-making, have shaped Brazil's stance on the issue of terrorism. Priority will be given throughout this work to the domestic intervening variable of autonomy as an idea in PEB culture throughout Lula's presidential terms.

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1 For the purposes of this paper, autonomy will be defined “as the freedom of maneuver that a country has in its relations with other states and in its participation in international politics” which, according to Saraiva reflects the tendency in PEB tradition to refrain from participating in agreements “that may come to limit future alternatives” (Saraiva 2011: 55).
Theoretical framework: Neoclassical Realism

In order to explain the role that autonomy has had in shaping PEB on the issue of terrorism, it would be wise to benefit from a theoretical framework that recognizes how systemic pressures — in Brazil’s case, pressures that are represented in large by U.S. interference in its security agenda — can shape domestic processes within states. In addition, the framework must also acknowledge that domestic processes are transformed into constraints which will influence the states’ ability in responding to systemic pressures (Taliaferro 2006). This is why a theory of Foreign Policy, and not one of International Relations is more suitable to illustrate the case in hand, as the latter is able to explain outcomes of international events, but not motives of variations in outcome. The former can reveal why different states or same states at distinct historical moments will act differently under the same systemic pressures (Zakaria 1999). That is, why they will have ‘different intentions, goals and preferences towards outside goal’ (1999: 14). For instance, historically the presence and influence of the U.S. in Latin America have been decisive factors in the foreign policy and security calculation of countries in the region. However, states have responded differently to this preponderance; Colombia, due to its doctrine of Respice Polum (‘look towards the North’), has sought international policies in tune with U.S. guidelines for much of the 20th and 21st centuries (Santos 2010). Brazil, on the other hand, has pursued a foreign policy that has alternated between alignment and distancing towards U.S. foreign policy throughout the 20th century and a more assertive autonomous stance in the post-Cold War period (Oliveira 2005). Therefore, Neoclassical Realism (NCR), as a theory of foreign policy, would be fit to explain how autonomy in PEB has influenced its positioning towards international terrorism and the GWT. This is because scholars of NCR have explained a wide variety of foreign policy decision-making cases as the theory takes into account systemic variables, cognitive variables and domestic variables (Rathbun 2008).

Coined by Gideon Rose, NCR combines theories of classical realism (Hans Morgenthau) and neorealism (Kenneth Waltz) (Rose 1998). According to Taliaferro (2006), NCR incorporates a complex model of state-society relations, which is constant in classical realism, with neorealism’s conception of an anarchical international system that is permeated by the relative distribution of material power. In other words, the condition of NCR that derives from Neorealism corresponds to the structural pressures and the normative necessity of a determinate type of behavior in order to respond to these constraints or incentives; there is a ‘correct’ form of state behavior regarding a particular circumstance. NCR identifies the factors and dynamics of constraints that do not lead to such an expected normative behavior and these elements, according to the theory, usually are rooted in the domestic order and in ideas/ideologies (Joaquim 2012). As contended by Wivel (2005), NCR explains why states behaved differently under the same systemic pressures. This makes NCR, for the most part, a theory or approach of ‘error’ in the behavior of states in foreign policy (Schweller 2006). Anarchy, therefore, is a primary, albeit indirect determinant of state behavior, whereas factors such as decision-making process and ideas that influence it are a secondary but nevertheless direct determinant of state behavior. In other words, the structure encourages and constrains but does not determine, by itself, state behavior (Joaquim 2012).
Extremely relevant to the present endeavor is Kitchen’s (2010) approach to NCR, in which he explains that NCR is about understanding when and how ideas may intervene at the unit level processes of grand strategy development. The author believes that grand strategy fits NCR’s requirement as strategy entails the study of state’s attitudes towards the international environment and what type of behavior they will choose in order to respond to the international realm while attaining their external political goals. This is where the role of ideas falls into place: ideas fit in NCR theory in the sense that they mediate systemic pressures by working in the process of foreign policy and strategy formation (Kitchen 2010). Goldstein and Keohane (1993) identify ideas as being beliefs held by individuals; they draw a ‘typology of belief’ that provides an understanding of how different worldviews or ethical ideas held by individuals can lead them to particular ideas. Kitchen contends that ideas may fill gaps in policymakers’ notion of interests and they “can establish the framework within which interests are pursued and resolve uncertainty about how to pursue them” (Kitchen 2010: 129).

Furthermore, according to Kitchen (2010), NCR treats ideas as objects with force, that is, ‘element of power’. However, as opposed to material power, ideas are both dependent and variable to the individuals and institutions that hold them and are not inherent nor fixed. Because individuals and institutions carry with them the ideas that are contained in a broader cultural context in which states are in, they are often blinded by any alternative course of action which explains why some states act differently from one another and ‘contrary to the structural imperatives of the international system’ (Desch 1998: 167).

NCR assumes a rational actor model of foreign policy decision-making in which ordering preferences is a hallmark of purposive behavior. That is, the decision maker is expected to rank the preferences they are seeking to obtain according to a degree of satisfaction that will be delivered to the country as a whole by achieving these goals (Dodge 2015). However, NCR integrates systemic and unit level variables and as such, the strength of the theory lies on its conceptual framework that encourages political scientists to address practical concerns of foreign policy decision-making. This allows for departures from rationality, in this case caused by those intervening variables at the domestic level, and it emphasizes the responsibility of “national leaders for their actions” (Oneal 1988: 621).

It could be argued that NCR ‘blackboxes’ the state wherein decision-makers, bureaucracies and other domestic players are left out of the decision-making process. NCR adds to the rationalist and systemic analysis intervening variables. These intervening variables, as aforementioned, are primarily domestic constraints and will get in the way of states maximizing the utility of the result. What is important to emphasize is that even though NCR is not a departure from rational actor model nor structural realism, the theory takes into account the fact that foreign policy decision-making is also contingent upon the ability of governments to extract and mobilize national resources and upon the perceptions of decision-makers (Rathbun 2008, Schweller 1999, Taliaferro 2006, Rose 1998).

Finally, NCR recognizes that processes within states are influenced not only by systemic pressures and considerations of power and security but also that processes are equally influenced and guided by ‘ideological bias, domestic politics and prevailing ideas.’ (Kitchen 2010: 133). Therefore, for the purposes of this work, NCR is an appropriate conceptual framework to use in order to understand
the role that the idea of autonomy and other historical identifications had during Lula’s PEB on the issue of terrorism.

Reflections of ambivalence: Brazil and terrorism

Brazil’s efforts in the fight against terrorism

The Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) (2016) defines international terrorism (the one referred to in the present work) as incidents in which the consequences and ramifications clearly transcend national borders, that is, when victims, executors, location and means of perpetration involve more than one country or nationality. The alleged terrorist related activities present in Brazilian territory are also part of what is denominated in the field of security studies as ‘New Terrorism’. It relates to the increase in terrorist organizations, mainly in the Middle East, and it is defined by its high degree of religious extremism and violent radicalism, to some extent a byproduct of a partial and distorted understanding of the Islamic religion (Woloszyn 2006). The New Terrorism, therefore, is associated to what is defined, albeit a controversial definition, as religious terrorism, identified as terrorist acts by perpetrators whose motivations and objectives have a predominant religious character or influence; that is, the religious imperative for terrorism defines current terrorist activity (Hoffman 2006).

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, Brazil immediately invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), an Organization of American States (OAS) collective defense and solidarity agreement (OAS 2016). Additionally, Brazil has collaborated in anti-terrorism efforts, which have been mainly undertaken by the Brazilian Federal Police Department (DPF) and ABIN, in which the former worked closely with U.S. government and other countries’ law enforcement bodies to assess and prevent potential terrorist attacks, with a specific focus on the 2014 World Cup preparations (US 2015). To date Brazil has ratified over twelve international conventions on terrorism, most notably the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism (2002) (MPF 2016).

Regionally, in the financial realm, Brazil is part of GAFILAT (2010) the Latin America money laundering division of the Financial Action Task Force, established with the purpose of combating terrorism financing (FATF 2010). Among other regional multilateral agreements signed by Brazil in matters of combating anti-terrorism are the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (OAS 2009), the 3 + 1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security together with the U.S. as well as Mercosur’s Subgroups (Lasmar 2015, OAS 2016). In the domestic financial sector, perhaps the most important organization responsible for combating the financing of terrorism is the Council of Financial Activity Control, part of Brazil’s Financial Intelligence Unit (COAF 2015).

In matters of legislation, the main references for combating terrorism in Brazil, during the period analyzed, are those related to the constitutional text and to other infra-constitutional orders (Cepik 2010). The 1988 Brazilian Constitution repudiates terrorism and considers it an ineligible act for amnesty appeal (Casa Civil 1988). On the infra-constitutional level, the National Security
Act of 1983 is still an operative judicial instrument for combating terrorism (Cepik 2010, Casa Civil 1983). Until 2016, there was no consensus in the Brazilian Congress on a proper legislation, and as such terrorism in Brazil was not typified as a criminal offence in its legal system, meaning there was no specific legislation for terrorism and its legal definition (ABIN 2016).

This brief overview of the main anti and counterterrorism (CT) international conventions and of Brazilian domestic apparatus demonstrates Brazil’s participation and endeavor in the GWT. Brazil is considerably committed internationally to the fight against terrorism, led by the U.S. and its allies. Internally, Brasília has included anti-terrorism and CT mechanisms, albeit secondarily, in its security and foreign policy agendas. However, as Ferreira (2012) argues, Itamaraty publicly assumed, under Lula, a position of ‘denialism’ towards any possible existence of terrorist cells in Brazilian territory while it engages internationally in agreements related to this issue. This stance sheds light on the ambivalence of Brazil’s position in face of U.S. demands and its own (Brazil) autonomous foreign policy.

**Terrorism in Brazil: possibilities and ‘deniability’**

The fact that from the period of 2001 to 2014 Brazil was not threatened by any international terrorist organization does not mean that Brazil is not susceptible of being a target of this sort of aggression in the future, as argued by Lasmar (2015). International sporting events such as the 2014 FIFA World Cup increased Brazil’s visibility abroad, as part of its continuous international insertion, therefore increasing its vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the inexistence so far of terrorist attacks on Brazilian soil, does not necessarily mean terrorist cells or terrorist related activities are equally non-existent. The terrorist attack is only the tip of the iceberg; it is the outcome of a chain of rational decision-making and planning of activities that range from recruitment to vigilance (Lasmar 2015). Although Itamaraty and the Brazilian government assumed a position of ‘denialism’ towards the possibility of existence of terrorist related activities in Brazil, there is mounting, albeit controversial, evidence that Brazil is not immune to these activities. There is officially no terrorism in Brazilian soil, however “several Islamic groups with known or suspected ties to extremist organizations have branches in Brazil and are suspected of carrying out financing activities” such as the head of the Jihad Media Battalion, Khaled Hussein Ali (WikiLeaks 2009b). It is now publicly known that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has, in many occasions, warned the Brazilian government of the presence of terrorist activities in its territory (WikiLeaks 2008a, 2008c, 2009c, 2013). ABIN and DPF focused their efforts in the areas of São Paulo, the Triborder Area (TBA) of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay and the TBA of Brazil, Colombia and Peru as well as the Colombian and Venezuelan borders (WikiLeaks 2008a, 2009a). Additionally, the same report concluded that the DPF will often arrest individuals with links to terrorism, but will charge them under non-terrorist related crimes to avoid calling attention to the media or spur, even further, any divisions of opinions in the Brazilian Congress. Coming to terms with the existence or possibility of terrorism in Brazil is made difficult by the fact that although some Brazilian agencies are invested in CT, such efforts are overshadowed
by the structural, material, and financial limitations of these agencies, by the legal vacuum that hinders their effective performance, and by the historical difficulty of accessing some of Brazil’s culturally diverse communities (Buzanelli 2005). These impediments are reflected by an international position of objection by the Itamaraty towards allegations of terrorism in the Brazilian territory. This hesitation, or ‘denial’ is correspondent to Brazil’s foreign policies that seek autonomy under the flag of an international image and tradition of peacefulness, or at worst, neutrality (Lasmar 2015). By adopting this posture, Brazil attempts to uphold a position of autonomy in the GWT led by the U.S.

In turn, discontentment and pressures from the U.S. government towards Brazilian positioning is apparent in reports released by the American Embassy in Brasília from 2007 onward. One of the reports declared that Brazil, mainly its senior officials that want to conform to the ruling political party, the Workers Party, “has proven difficult” to engage in the TBA 3+1 mechanism. This is because Brasília disapproved of the CT language promoted by the U.S (WikiLeaks 2009d). Consonant to the mindset among many in the circles of power within the Brazilian government, Jorge Felix described that the risks that Brazil faces of having a terrorist attack are rather low

“...because of our external policy, our domestic characteristics, our international projection, our image of a positive peaceful country with various ethnicities and religions interacting peacefully in harmony” (WikiLeaks 2009c).

Similar reports have repeatedly emphasized the existence of two separate discourses that run in the Brazilian government. The first one is that of Brazil’s growing efforts to cooperate with the U.S. in CT. The second one, is how, politically, Brasília constantly refused to acknowledge and continuously protested claims made by U.S. authorities that individuals linked to terrorist groups operate and transit in Brazilian soil. Lisa Kubiske, former Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Mission in Brazil, reported that Brazil condemns U.S.’ accusations of being unfounded and of having a negative impact on local Muslim communities and tourism (WikiLeaks 2007, 2008b, 2009a, 2009c). Other concerns coming from Brasília are Brazil’s stark dictatorship experience (1964-1985) where former President Dilma Rousseff was labeled a terrorist leading to her imprisonment and torture. Brazilian senior officials also fear that with anti-terrorist legislation, legitimate social movements, such as the Landless Worker’s Movement, might be branded as terrorist organizations. Additionally, officials in Brasília worry that CT legislation could be directed at Arab-Brazilians living in the Brazilian TBA city of Foz do Iguaçu, making it a divisive issue (WikiLeaks 2009c). What causes a further point of antagonism between the U.S. and the Brazilian governments is that the latter considers Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), as legitimate political parties whereas the former has designated them as Foreign Terrorist Organizations since 1997 (US 2016). Woloszyn (2006) points out that the Brazilian Congress as well as most legislators and general public stand with the ‘it can’t happen here’ mentality and there is an overall lack of understanding about the implications of terrorist activities (WikiLeaks 2008b). Furthermore, Brazilian Armed Forces (FFAA) have been historically reticent when it comes to engaging in joint military operations with the U.S.
military for fear of a breach in Brazilian national sovereignty (Ferreira 2012). Kubiske (WikiLeaks 2009c) contends that the argument of Felix, and like him that of other Brazilian government officials, essentially goes in the direction that: Brazil is a racially, ethnically, and religiously harmonious society and engages in correct and non-threatening foreign policy. As a result, their thinking is that Brazil cannot be a target of terrorist organizations and in order to maintain this position it should not engage in confrontational foreign policy.

On the issue of legislation, Brazil has also come under U.S. scrutiny, and Washington addressed unashamedly its discontentment in noting that the failure of Brazil to typify terrorism as a crime represented the “single biggest inadequacy” when it came to Brazilian CT efforts (WikiLeaks 2009c, 2008c). While the DPF, and some members of Congress, agreed on the need for CT legislation, there was an enduring lack of will within senior levels of government (including former President Lula) and Itamaraty to expend the political capital to advance a more solid legal framework on CT (WikiLeaks 2008b). Kubiske further argues that (WikiLeaks 2009d), the argument of Itamaraty remained that they were willing to participate in conversations about terrorism out of ‘solidarity’ with the U.S., “but that terrorism is not a Brazilian problem”. Overall, the mindset in the Brazilian government and in Itamaraty and their subsequent negative rhetoric and inactivity frustrated the U.S (Viana 2010). This is because, as Kubiske admits, the U.S. was interested in changing the rationale of senior Brazilian officials concerning the issue of terrorism for the political advantages that cooperative engagement with Brazil, a regional leader and growing global power, might bring (WikiLeaks 2009c). In turn, sectors of the Itamaraty, such as the Office of Transnational Crime and General Secretariat, were displeased with U.S. interference. These sectors have been publicly critical of an increased cooperation between the Brazilian government and the U.S. in various areas, particularly of increased U.S. presence in the TBA (WikiLeaks 2007). Political scientist Marco Cepik (2010), argues that Brazil did enjoy an adequate legal framework for combating terrorism and terrorist activities domestically. However, the state’s institutional and material limitations continue to obstruct the applicability of these laws. This is explained by a posture of ‘equidistance’ by the Brazilian government in exercising a greater commitment to the establishment of legal initiatives that will effectively combat terrorism.

In October 2009, Itamaraty acknowledged for the first time that terrorists might become interested in Brazil because of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro (Viana 2010). In February 2016, the Brazilian House of Representatives approved a bill that typifies terrorism as a legal offense. This was partly due to Congressional demands in the eve of the Olympics games. Additionally, international organizations, namely the UN, pressured Brazil warning that it would be included in the list of countries with a high risk of financial instability – as a punishment if it refused to advance its legislation in the matter of terrorism. However, social movements and any form of protest conducted by these movements were excluded from the bill. By protecting social movements from being targeted by the bill, Brazil reinforced the evident discrepancy in its positioning that ranges from international engagement and ‘denialism’.

The ambivalence in how Brazil positions itself in matters of terrorism echoes two trends in PEB, within the ‘asymmetric axis’ of Brazilian diplomacy (Ricupero 1995 cited in Alden and Vieira 2005:...
1084). First, Brazil is an active participant in the 21st century and overall accepts the established international world order, in view of its cooperation with the UN and the U.S. Nevertheless, Brazil assumed, particularly under Lula, a position of distinctiveness in the international realm, where it praises its autonomy and ability to be a beacon for multipolarity and South-South cooperation (Alden and Vieira 2005). Brazil’s search for autonomy in its foreign policy fueled the public denial by the Brazilian government and Itamaraty of any terrorist activity in the country. Therefore, systemic pressures are salient and Brazil conforms to some extent to U.S. guidelines. Nevertheless, the second trend, which is the focus of this work, generates a conflict between Brazil and the United States’ GWT, which has constrained, for better or for worst, Brazilian participation in it. This has been enabled by an autonomy focused foreign policy pursued in the post-Cold War period, and most significantly in the post-9/11 administrations of Lula.

**Autonomy and foreign policy under Lula**

According to Burges (2009), the tradition in PEB set out by Baron of Rio Branco (1902-19012) in Itamaraty is one of strict respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in other states international agendas. This has also guided Itamaraty’s policies on national and regional security issues. Burges explains that, the actions of transnational threats and actors such as drug-traffickers and terrorist groups presented the main threats to states in the region. As argued by Burges

> “Here Itamaraty’s reliance on national sovereignty resulted in a policy stance that sought to exclude these ‘new threats’ from Brazil, treating the issue as an internal matter that could be addressed in a coordinated, although individualized, manner” (2009: 156).

Burges contends that despite the transnational nature of the ‘new threats’, Itamaraty’s reluctance to abandon traditional ideas that drive foreign policy, namely the precepts of sovereignty, “acted as a brake on the sort of leadership that might cope with these challenges” (2009: 156).

One of the underlying changes in PEB during Lula’s administration was the priority given to South-South alliances with regional and non-traditional partners as a means of shaping the principles and direction of the international system while reducing its asymmetries with the use of ‘soft power’ (Nye 2005) and multilateralism (Alden et al. 2010). This ‘autonomy through diversification’ trend guided Lula’s foreign policy for Brazil. A deeper insertion of Brazil into international regimes would not only allow for the country to increase its bargaining and negotiating power with developed countries (e.g. Brazil’s leadership in United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti), but also would allow Brazil to also oppose developed countries’ agendas, namely that of the U.S. (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009).

According to Ribeiro (2006), PEB culture, which is shaped by a combination of autonomy and pragmatism, does not simply assume a ‘reactionary’ stance vis-à-vis external pressures coming from

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2 New threats‘ englobe issues of a ‘global strategy concern’ and are hierarchized according to the interests of U.S.’ security agenda (Saint-Pierre 2007).
great hegemonic centers wherein Brazil would merely adjust to their controlling interests. PEB is a result of skilled domestic political efforts to absorb and adapt to such impulses, turning them into goals or situations to resist, fight and/or negotiate by mutual concessions. This is concomitant with the principles of NCR in which systemic demands alone do not condition foreign policy behavior. Domestic intervening variables (in this case that of autonomy embedded in PEB) and culture of both state and society, will constrain the directions of foreign policy (Taliaferro 2006). The principles of NCR mirror Brazil’s ambivalent stance regarding international terrorism, where it paradoxically supports international fora and conventions related to the issue, however simultaneously, its position of ‘denialism’ reflects its decision of not completely abiding by the discourse of the GWT (Lasmar 2015). This is evident when former U.S. President George W. Bush requested from Lula, on the eve of Lula's electoral victory, support in the GWT. Less than a year later, during a seminar in New York, Lula harshly criticized pressures from the U.S. and its endeavors in the GWT and opposed repressive measures, or measures that could lead to coercive employment, in dealing with terrorism (Aith 2002, Sinjus 2003).

Alternatively, Alsina Junior contends that PEB is not solely conditioned by its ideational structure, but also by its material capabilities. That is, PEB’s non-confrontational nature reflects a debility in Brazilian material power and inability to mobilize the necessary resources (2009), resonant with NCR (Taliaferro 2006), in order to tackle security issues internally. It is important to note and to argue that there is also an unwillingness, to some extent, in PEB to mobilize its limited material resources that relates to the role of autonomy. The GWT promotes the coercive use of state power in order to combat terrorism. An alignment with its rhetoric, symbolized partly by the consolidation of an anti-terrorist legislation nationally, could have potentially required a more prominent role from the FFAA. This is evidenced in Colombia after the country adhered to U.S.’ security agenda through Plan Colombia (Rodrigues 2012) — in combating terrorism.

Therefore, choosing military action to fight terrorism and other ‘new threats’, as proposed by the GWT, could be understood by other South American nations as a sign of ‘hegemonic pretentions’. This could consequently undermine Brazil’s commercial partnerships with regional nations, specially within Mercosur. This is in part why Brazil does not classify FARC as a terrorist group as it would imply the acceptance of GWT guidelines for the region and a military response to it. Brazil would have been equally compelled to identify Hezbollah as a terrorist group and its activities in Brazilian territory as that of terrorism. This could in turn call for military action and stronger interference of the U.S. in Brazilian security and foreign policy agendas, leading Brazilian foreign policy in a contrary direction of its traditional search for autonomy (Ferreira 2012). Even though Brazil’s material capability represents an intervening variable that constrains its anti-terrorism efforts, the ideational constraint in its foreign policy, symbolized by autonomy, also impinges on PEB’s decision-making on the issue of terrorism. Additionally, this scenario does not solely depict domestic factors, as intervening variables, that direct PEB’s position towards U.S. presence in the region and its militarized agenda. Viewing from the lens of NCR (Lobell et al. 2009), this also mirrors, in a broader sense, how in the long-term South American balance of power attends to the region’s own dynamics in which the
U.S. does not necessarily have constant incentives to impinge (Brigagão and Proença Junior 2002). This allows Brazil to exercise its role of ‘regional hegemon’ (debatable notion) through its tradition of appeasing diplomacy, which became more evident with Lula’s autonomy through diversification foreign policy (Brigagão and Proença Junior 2002).

According to Hirst (2006) after 9/11, the security interests of the U.S. and South America were directly affected which inevitably reverberated through U.S. relations with Brazil. During the 2002 Conference of Ministers of Defense of the America in Santiago (US 2002), new tensions emerged between the U.S. and Brazil in face of the demands made by Washington in terms of security policies for the region, particularly those of combating terrorism. This is because PEB has maintained a non-interventionist stance, as part of its search for autonomy, whereas, according to Hirst, the U.S. has sought the promotion of a liberal democracy in the Americas as a means to justify its interference in political domestic affairs of countries in the region. Therefore, even though Brazil avoided an alignment with the U.S. defense agenda, it nevertheless reassured its support for the GWT (e.g. participation in international conventions) (Hirst 2006).

Another important factor that directed Lula’s PEB since the 2003 OAS Special Conference on Security in Mexico was the concept of multidimensional security. At this Conference, OAS signatory countries adopted the Declaration on Security in the Americas, a document representing the culmination of a decade of discussions on a hemispheric approach to security that would include concerns beyond the traditional political-military scope (Ramacciotti 2005). The newly adopted concept of multidimensional security incorporated the ‘new threats’ such as drug-trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, among others. The underlying idea in the Declaration was that security concerns in the Hemisphere have a ‘diverse nature and multidimensional scope’ and therefore, a hemispheric concept of security should consider the different security challenges and priorities faced by each state (OAS 2003). Pagliari (2006) argues that the position adopted by Brazil during the Conference was that the concept of multidimensional security should encompass the sub-regional particularities in matters of security while respecting the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. However, the Conference shed light on another point of disagreement and distancing between Brazil and the U.S. regarding the ‘new architecture of inter-American system’. Even though Brazil accepted the concept of multidimensional security and a new role for regional armed forces, it opposed the proposal presented by the U.S. delegation in the Conference, in which Armed Forces and national police forces would cooperate in the fight against drugs, terrorism and migration, as part of this new system (Villa and Viana 2010). Ultimately, Itamaraty disagreed with the U.S. that a role for regional armed forces should be used primarily to combat drug traffic and terrorism. As Villa and Viana explain, Brazil aspired to affirm its autonomy and neutralize the U.S. military goals in the region. Brasília’s stance aimed at avoiding any internal crisis at escalating towards political instability in South America and was backed by Itamaraty’s discourse of ‘non-intervention without indifference’, a role played by Brazil that entails (together with democracy, political stability, economic integration and regional security) searching for a “political initiative facing the United States” (Villa and Viana 2010:94). Furthermore, the emphasis on security as a fundamental aspect of the
regional integration project represented a thematic shift in Lula's government in comparison to other administrations. It also demonstrated that, for Brazil, inter-American institutions and hemispheric concepts of 'new architecture of security' are not sensitive to regional and autonomous perspectives (Villa and Viana 2010).

Furthermore, Brazil’s position can be analyzed through NCR’s premise which states that the system structure is still the preeminent variable. A state would have to possess a quasi-monopoly of power in the international system in order to pursue a grand strategy “that went against its interests as defined by that structure” (Kitchen 2010: 139). Emerson (2010) argues however, that U.S.’s effort to impose its GWT paradigm on Latin America, which could be seen as systemic constraints, did not in fact succeed. This is explained by a generalized shift away from U.S. policy for the region and towards a resistance to neoliberal economic model and emergence of a sociocultural mindset that supported leftist governments, such as that of Lula in Brazil (2010).

In this sense, Brands (2010) explains that Brazilian grand strategy under President Lula was rooted in an ambivalent view of the international system. On the one hand, Brazil has benefited immensely from U.S. economic and commercial preponderance and the U.S. ‘defense umbrella’ over the Western Hemisphere has allowed Brazil to enjoy considerable levels of safety from external threats. Nevertheless, Brazil still perceived the international system as unequitable and condemned U.S.’ unilateral exercise of power (2010). This ambivalence was also present in Brazil and U.S. relations, reflecting on the former’s stance on terrorism. Both the U.S. and Brazil desire stability in Latin America and in the international arena. This is evident in Brazil’s cooperation with the U.S. in matter of terrorism, such as the works of ABIN and DPF and participation in international conventions. Yet Brazil, during Lula’s administration, viewed the U.S. in the broader geopolitical sense as an impediment to the increased influence it sought, therefore opposing and ‘weakening’ U.S. presence in Brazil was key to an autonomy driven foreign policy (Brands 2010). Furthermore, Emerson (2010) contends that the rejection of the Washington led economic policy sheds light on a relationship between political actors and societal forces that allows for governments in the region to pursue independent foreign policy decisions on economic and security issues. Emerson notes that the regional resistance to the GWT was neither automatic nor futile as structuralist approaches (neorealism) argue. Lula did emphasize the strengthening of FFAA during his administration. As underlined by NCR, material factors remain the principal determinants of grand strategy (Kitchen 2010). However, as NCR equally argues, domestic variables such as perceptions of decision-makers and ideas of society and institutions, as part of a broader cultural context, account for the unpredictability of relying purely on a systemic analysis (Kitchen 2010, Rose 2008). According to Emerson, the resistance to systemic pressures, are revealed by citizenry sentiment and political leaders/governments’ policies that oppose U.S. policy prescription, which in turn have played “a key role in legitimating an independent policy approach” (Kitchen 2010: 55). Additionally, Brazilian grand strategy culture, that of an image of ‘greatness’ and the idea that Brazil should be established among the global elite has guided much of its policy setting (Brands 2010, Lima 2010).
Although Brazil frequently engaged in soft-balancing as a natural maneuver under structural pressures after 9/11, the country’s sense of the systemic structures is typically one of danger, as described by Brands (2010). It is perceived as an obstacle in Brazil’s quest for development and insertion in the international system. However, the systemic structures are also understood as an opportunity for Brazil. Brazilian officials recognized during Lula’s administration that the U.S. is a dominant player in the international system. Nevertheless, officials believed this declining status allows for emerging countries like Brazil to play a more assertive role in agenda setting and multilateral arrangements, such as the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa forum (BRICS) (Pecequilo 2008).

In this sense, the opposition to the GWT within various Latin American states is made possible by a convergence of regional beliefs, e.g. creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), founded on the Washington Consensus’ debilities and on the rise of political leaders and ideas that prioritize independent policy (Emerson 2010). Therefore, Emerson contends that Washington should recognize the divergence between the growing policy autonomy in Latin America and the militarization of its regional approach on the issue of terrorism. Since PEB has been essentially guided by autonomy (Saraiva 2011), its decisions go in the direction of a critical appraisal (and opposition) towards U.S. pressures to fully comply the GWT and its guidelines (Emerson 2010). In other words, contrary to what structural realists would expect, autonomy as an intervening variable in PEB constrained Brazil’s ability to respond to systemic pressures. The idea of autonomy influenced Brazil’s foreign policy decision-making in matters of terrorism both domestically (‘denialism’) and internationally (support of anti-terrorism conventions).

Amaral (2007) explains that the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) represents a general synthesis for U.S. foreign policy in the context of the GWT. In the NSS, the representation of a post-9/11 international environment as one characterized by an omnipresence of a terrorist threat, allows for an increase in historically unilaterally driven U.S. foreign policy, now represented by the GWT, and in demands and justifications for a greater U.S. engagement against terrorism around the globe (Amaral 2007). This endeavor included a new form of engagement with South America as it expresses its concern with the existence of terrorist cells in the region (NSC 2002). NSS rhetoric is even more salient when considering the American Embassy in Brasília reports analyzed in the previous section. The reports expressed U.S. concern and discontentment over Brazilian government and Itamaraty’s ‘denialist’ stance on the existence of terrorist related activities in Brazil and demonstrated how Brazil has also come under scrutiny of the U.S. for its lack of CT legislation, since recommendations for a broader legislation have languished from 2006 onwards (WikiLeaks 2007a, Lasmar, 2015). In this sense, according to Amaral (2007), the representation of South America as institutionally and economically fragile is responsible for driving, justifying and enabling a fresh U.S. foreign policy approach towards the Western hemisphere. Consequently, Brazil’s ‘denialist’ positioning on the issue of terrorism represents, what Raza (2005) calls, a movement of ‘isolating’ itself as much as possible from the American GWT while attempting to avoid any political or financial costs. He argues that this is partly explained by the fact that U.S. presence in the region — particularly in the Paraguayan town of Mariscal Estigarribia where 400 U.S. troops arrived in 2005 alarming the Brazilian military
and government officials — is generally seen in a negative light by Brazil and other Southern Cone countries. This is because the issue of preventing strategic terrorism is economic-political-social and not military and ideological (Raza 2005).

In light of this, the idea of autonomy in PEB, played a role in Brazil’s efforts to counterbalance U.S. pressures over terrorism (e.g. ‘denialism’) and regional conflicts (e.g. Brazil’s refusal to adhere to Plan Colombia). Consequently, the National Policy of Defense (PND) was created in 2005 (amended in 2012) (Casa Civil 2005). Within PND, recommendations on terrorism and on other threats exclude, albeit not entirely, the use of coercive military means in combating them, reiterating the traditional principle in PEB of peaceful conflict resolution (Cunha 2010). Celso Amorim (1999: 97-99), former Minister of Foreign Affairs during Lula’s presidency, declared that PEB and diplomatic traditions “which tend to consider the use of force as a last resort option, are also expressed by a proactive attitude of preference for dialogue and negotiation” as means of conflict resolution. This document, according to Svartman (2014), marked a critical view of U.S. strategy and brought the search for autonomy to the forefront of PEB and defense strategy. Another Brazilian initiative was the South American Defense Council (CDS), created in 2008 under the authority of UNASUR. One of the main reasons behind Brazil’s leadership in the conception of the CDS were the intensification of apprehensions among South American countries due to a militarization of U.S.’GWT agenda in the region (Battaglino 2009, Fuccille 2014). As Amorim contended throughout Lula’s administration “We are a region where military spending is proportionally very low...we do not participate, neither wish to participate, in military alliances [Iraq War led by U.S.] of questionable compatibility with UN principles” (Amorim 2003).

The PND and CDS, among other initiatives, were a part of Lula’s foreign policy of autonomy through diversification, where Brazil took upon a more assertive approach towards its defense and foreign policy agendas in order to counterweight U.S. power through a South-South engagement (Saraiva 2011). Lula’s autonomy approach raised PEB behavior to that of soft balancing against hegemonic structures, mainly that of the U.S., without rejecting the pillar in PEB of peaceful means of conflict resolution: “Brazil’s great skill is to be friends with everyone” (Amorim cited in Lustig 2010). As Franko (2014: 4) explains, “Brazil’s search for autonomy is a guiding concept in its foreign policy”. However, Franko contends, if Brazil’s notion of and reliance on autonomy has allowed it to take an assertive stance against powerful countries, it has also hindered Brazil’s ability to exercise its influence in foreign relations and global economy. In accordance to NCR (Kitchen 2010) as much as the idea of autonomy is a powerful variable influencing PEB decision-making, material capability is still crucial in order to significantly alter the distribution of power in the international system (Franko 2014). Therefore, Brazil is equipped with limited military and technological capability and expertise. With this, asymmetries in material hard power end up determining much of Brazil’s position in the international system (Frank 2014).

According to Alsina Junior, there is a disconnect between the Brazilian defense and foreign policy agendas. He argues that non-state threats such as international terrorism should be that of the responsibility of FFAA. However, domestic constraints, particularly the unwillingness to
Securitize these threats, render the assessment of such issues to domestic politics, namely the police service (Alsina Junior 2009). This is evident where alleged terrorist related activities in Brazil are monitored by the DPF and ABIN, while the Itamaraty and Brazilian government adopted the ‘denialism’ position. Alsina Junior contends that the very institutional limitations of the country would contribute to the intrinsic difficulties in translating external pressures into public policies capable of responding to these incentives. One of the main impediments that stand in the way of securitizing external threats and that consequently hinder the coordination of defense and foreign policies is the non-confrontationist/peaceful profile by which PEB is defined (Alsina Junior 2009; Bertonha 2010). Hirst contends that even though post-9/11 South America is not considered a high priority region in the U.S. agenda, it nevertheless did not escape the pressures of macro-securitization of threats and the ‘global strategic premises adopted by the United States from 2001 onwards’ (Hirst 2013: 165). This scenario places much of the autonomy preserved by South American countries since the end of World War II at risk, including Brazil. This is due to the increase in U.S. presence in the region such as the aforementioned Plan Colombia or presence of U.S. troops in Paraguay, and to the ideological perceptions of the U.S. that rekindled unilateral interventionist actions and consequently anti-American sentiment (Hirst 2013). Because of these U.S.’s strategic priorities, Brazil attempted, more prominently under Lula’s Presidency, to curb U.S. pressures by conceiving a multilateral foreign policy and defense agenda in order to deal with security and foreign policy issues (2013). Therefore, Silva and Raza (2006) point out that Brazil took a more autonomous approach and methodology towards terrorism than that of the U.S. and Europe. They argue that Brazil assumed a clear position that it was not in favor of allowing the issue of terrorism to override any other foreign policy or political concern (which is what Brazil believes the U.S. did), and it would prefer to consider this agenda in a broader direction.

Finally, Svartman contends that in its relationship with South America, the U.S. reiterated its ‘partnership’ rhetoric, where in the context of the GWT, the U.S. supported Brazilian initiatives, such as the CDS, and leadership in the South American security agenda (Svartman 2014). However, even though the U.S. proposal of ‘cooperative defense’ is established under the recognition of regional leaderships, the process of defining threats, agenda setting, and partnership objectives nevertheless reflect the priorities and approaches of the U.S. security agenda. According to Svartman, this ambiguity allowed Brazil to seek autonomy in its foreign policy and security agenda and solidify its leadership role in South America. Therefore, “unit-level variables are themselves dependent variables of prior structural conditions” (Taliaferro 2006: 484). This means that, by analyzing under the lens of NCR (Kitchen 2010), the systemic forces, represented by the U.S. GWT agenda and the shift in U.S. priorities (Hirst 2006), shaped domestic processes within Brazil. This allowed for Brazil to seek, ever more assertively under Lula, a foreign policy based on autonomy while taking a revisionist, albeit not radical, stance against the institutional structures set by the U.S. (Monteiro 2014). In turn, the

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3 Securitization is ‘...constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 25).
power of an idea (Kitchen 2010), represented in this case by autonomy embedded in PEB tradition and culture, has shaped how Brazil has responded to U.S. pressures and transformations in the international system post-9/11. Most notably with Lula, which sought to preserve its domestic and foreign policy approaches to terrorism from an escalation towards militarization. Therefore, according to Moura, and complementarily to NCR’s framework (Lobell et al. 2009), structural determinations and conjectural determinations should be conjugated in PEB (Moura 1979 cited in Ribeiro 2006: 140). The former delimits the field of action of decision and the latter is given by the decisions and actions of decision-makers. By conjugating the two it is possible to identify both endogenous (e.g. autonomy) and exogenous (e.g. U.S. GWT) factors that condition PEB.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that the ambivalent position in PEB on combating terrorism, that of both international engagement and ‘denialism’, is due to the component of autonomy that has permeated and defined PEB culture, especially during Lula’s Presidency. Furthermore, autonomy has conditioned how PEB directs its security agenda on terrorism, and how Brazil responded to U.S. pressures in the context of the GWT.

It can be difficult to understand issues that are a part of International Security and Defense studies agenda when they are viewed through a foreign policy lens. This is because the direction that states are expected to assume is one in which the priority of ‘survival’ and the search for a position of power in the international system drive foreign policy decision-making, due to the threatening nature of security issues. In this, structural precepts in theories such as neorealism tend to predominate in scholarship that address security concerns. Consequently, in response to structural incentives, ideational factors are seen as complementary rather than conditioning, even if partly, of foreign policy. This work tried to demonstrate how the ideational structure of Brazilian foreign policy, which is based upon autonomy, is not just an accessory in Brazil’s foreign policy decision-making, but a determinant of its orientation. The case study of Brazil in the fight against terrorism sheds light on the ambivalence in Lula’s PEB that is concomitant to the causal duality in NCR. That is, positions of participation and distancing from the GWT accompany and are explained by structural and domestic ideational factors that have constrained PEB decision-making. Therefore, Brazil responded to structural pressures in its foreign policy, as well as responded equally to the incentives of autonomy carried within institutions such as Itamaraty and within the Brazilian government.

Although NCR has been a suitable framework through which to understand the case of Brazil, it is noticeable that addressing particularities/subtleties of Itamaraty or of Lula’s decision-making preferences are made difficult within this theory. This is because NCR embraces ideas and perceptions, as intervening variables in the unit level, but does not offer the necessary analytical tools to assess how these intervening variables are embedded in institutions and decision-makers, rendering the analysis mainly state centric. Nevertheless, NCR is still able to fill a theoretical vacuum by adding
domestic intervening variables (autonomy) and granting them with instrumentality (determine Brazil’s stance on terrorism).

In March 2016, President Rousseff sanctioned a legislation criminalizing terrorist acts (Casa Civil 2016). The international context of recent attacks in Europe and in the Middle East coupled with the 2016 Rio Olympics Games set the stage and incentive, in part, for this move. However, because of Brazil’s turbulent political crisis, social movements have raised their red flags over concerns of state oppression. It is, therefore, yet to be seen whether autonomy will continue determine the direction of PEB regarding the issue of terrorism, or if a regression in the political scenario will favor the predominance of outside pressures.

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