The good multilateralists: Brazil and South Africa in the new area of multilateralism

*Os bons multilateralistas: Brasil e África do Sul na nova área do multilateralismo*

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Introduction

On the brink of a ‘long second decade’ in the twenty-first century, the major emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) together with the ‘Next-Eleven’1 (N11)—as identified by Goldman Sachs (2007a; 2007b)—stand out as new nodes of influence in a multipolar world. African countries may be absent among the BRICs and limited among the N11 (Nigeria and Egypt—and not including South Africa), but the economic future of the continent appears increasingly bound to this global shift. Brazil and South Africa seem to possess a capacity to contribute to the production of international order and share a common belief in their entitlement for a more influential role in international affairs. In addition, both countries can be differentiated from other second-tier states and middle-sized powers. John Ikenberry has argued powerfully that one of the most important characteristics of the international system in the second half of the twentieth century was the emergence of a US-led order built around the institutional and multilateral structures created in the wake of the Second World War (the UN, GATT, the international financial institutions) and the extraordinarily dense set of transatlantic and trans-Pacific relations and alliance systems. Unlike Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia and the major European countries (as a bloc and individually), they are not closely integrated in an alliance system with the United States. Many initiatives of the Lula administration are situated in the framework of international trade negotiations and the search for deepening political coordination with emerging countries, namely India, South Africa, Russia and China. Most of these partnerships began taking shape towards the end of the Cardoso administration, but Lula gave a new emphasis to this aspect of Brazil’s international agenda. South Africa’s ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa, bolstered by its preponderance of economic power and recognised internationally political stature in the continent, have contributed to an unprecedented restructuring of the regional economic and political architecture. Employing techniques as varied as institution building and moral suasion, the post-apartheid government has promoted new regional structures and processes and, concurrently, a revivalist form of the pan-Africanist ideology. Coupled to South African capital, whose outreach into the continent has fuelled both growth and controversy, Pretoria has begun to reshape Africa’s economic landscape and, to a certain extent, its political landscape. In spite of these achievements, it is clear that the ability of the South African government to act decisively in the name of African interests is more accepted in global settings like the G8 or WTO than is always the case within Africa.

This article will examine two of the world’s emerging middle powers Brazil and South Africa, the rise and promulgation of their cooperative strategies to reform institutions such as the United Nations Security Council. The article tries to examine the instrumental nature of South African and Brazilian

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foreign policy within the framework of both countries’ commitment to multilateralism and if this has been rising as part of a new form of shallow multilateralism or a regenerated regionalism of the South. Moreover, with regards to recent crises in Honduras and Zimbabwe, we will try to offer a critical evaluation of both countries global standing and their effort to promote democratic values in regional and sub-regional levels.

Changes in Global Governance and the emergence of Middle Powers

Recent changes in the international order are beginning to make inroads into theoretical debates. With them goes a rediscovery of the concept of power in international relations. Several analysts have downplayed insights of the institutionalist belief which leads into a progressive legalization of international relations and a constructivist emphasis on the discursive process of social learning, norm diffusion and the constitutive capacity of institutions as driving forces of constantly deepening multi-layered system of global governance.¹

Forman and Segaar underlined that there is a growing trend to perceive the international system as hierarchical by taking account of the ranging distribution of power in different issues.² As noted before, beyond the efforts to institutionalize reforms into the international organizations there are numerable attempts to change the way the international community does the world’s business.³ The changing nature and function of the international institutions must be attributed at least to two major factors. One is the rise of powers such as China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa the countries benefited more from globalization. The second factor is closely linked with the reluctance of the Northern developed countries to agree into adjustments of the international institutional architecture.

Middle power is a term used in the international relations theory in order to describe states that do not have great power status, but nevertheless, have international relations influence. Keohane defines middle powers as states whose leaders consider that they cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group of states or international institution.⁴ From the perspective of a materialist account of states and power set within the framework of the international system, middle powers are better understood to be committed multilateralists as means of overcoming their material deficiency in terms of structural power. Nevertheless, debates about that classification of states as middle power can obscure the category. Cooper has stated that middle power behaviour can be better described as that of a catalyst to promote global issues or a facilitator to build coalitions. Middle powers are engaged in followership and leadership behaviour in order to respond to relative changes to the status of hegemonic powers.⁵ However, the grouping of states as diverse as Brazil and Canada, or South Africa and Sweden together raises the issue of the usefulness of the middle-power concept and risks undermining the concept’s analytical power. Many analysts have met problem in order to identify middle powers. Higgott and Nosal propose as a solution to identify middle powers by their foreign policy behaviour; that is, their proclivity for seeking multilateral solutions to international problems, for advocating compromise and for, in general, being part of the solution to problems at international level. David Black has

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¹ RULAND Jurgen, BECHLE Karsten (2010): Interregionalism without regions: IBSA as a form of shallow multilateralism (to be published), pp. 158.
³ Ibid.
pointed to an unavoidably tautological element in the identification of middle powers; namely, that middle powers are identified by their foreign policy behaviour, which leads to the identification of similarities in the constitutive features of middle-power states, from whence the circle is completed by explaining middle-power foreign policy as shaped by these compositional features.

However, there seems to be a differentiation in the category of middle power states into classic middle powers and emerging middle powers. Traditional middle powers are stable social democracies, whereas democracy in emerging middle powers is often far from consolidated, and in many cases only recently established. Traditional middle powers qua middle powers came to prominence during the Cold War. The insecure positions of smaller states powerlessly caught in the standoff between the two superpowers resulted in a foreign policy highly concerned with military and political issues. On the other hand, in emerging middle powers democracy often stands superimposed onto a society with deep social cleavages, whether in terms of class in Brazil or ethnicity in South Africa the popular contestation of these cleavages having been placed largely beyond the scope of polyarchical democracy. Furthermore, democracy in some emerging middle powers often seems of a poorer quality than that found in traditional middle powers, considering, for example, commonplace human rights abuses in Nigeria, Malaysia and Turkey and one-party domination in countries like South Africa and Malaysia.

Emerging middle powers rose to assume their internationalist postures after the Cold War. The bygone insecurities of the Cold War meant the reduction of military and strategic concerns in foreign policy and a concomitant increased importance for economic matters. In addition, emerging middle powers are semi-peripheral, the middle-income status of emerging middle powers, coupled with great income inequality, suggests that elites in these states are very well integrated into the world economy, with the parallel existence of huge pockets of ‘internal South’. Furthermore, Emerging middle powers are eager, and often leading, participants in regional structures. In Africa, South Africa and Nigeria dominate their respective regions economically. In South America, Brazil has the largest economy and Argentina the most developed economy. South Africa’s trade surplus within both the Southern African Development Community and in the wider African market compensates for its trade deficit with the rest of the world. Dictated by their semi-peripheral status, compared with the core position of traditional middle powers in the global economy, emerging middle powers favour greater reform to global economic rules and structures. However, the reform preferred by emerging middle powers is reformist and not fundamental, given that semi-peripheral economies still hold a competitive advantage over peripheral states, especially over those in their immediate geographical vicinity. In this regard, Brazil has embraced the sub regional project embodied in MERCOSUR, while resisting hemispheric integration for fear of its powerful position being usurped by the United States.

However, middle power internationalism is not strictly defined by complex of dominant values, social forces and institutions embedded in their own society complexes as well as state-societal abilities in terms of diplomatic capacity and skill. A way of contrasting the internationalism of these two groups of middle powers is viewing the emerging middle-power orientation as ‘reformist’, whereas that of the traditional middle powers is ‘appeasing’, as shaped by their different positions in the global political economy. Emerging middle powers, which assumed their middle-power roles largely in the aftermath of the Cold War, focus more strongly on their immediate regions than do traditional middle powers by, for example, assuming the lead in processes of regional integration, the same which cannot generally be said of traditional middle powers. In some cases, the hegemon even welcomes opposition from emerging middle powers, as the hegemon can later draw on this semblance of emerging middle-power independence to assist in legitimising the hegemonic project with regard to other issues. Ironically, by performing typical middle power tasks, emerging middle powers seek to construct an identity more removed from the regions
that give them their relative international visibility and influence. This tendency is noticeable in the example of South Africa and Brazil seeking debt relief for other Southern African and South American states, but not for themselves. A reason for this distance from other neighbouring states becomes apparent if one considers, for example, the negative effect the recent faltering of democracy and civil order in Zimbabwe has had on the South African currency, currency values often being determined more by perception than reality.

Towards the era of shallow multilateralism

Where institutions have become arenas for power struggles over norms, rules, decision making and membership issues balancing moves tend to dominate. This means that states form institutional alignments or coalitions in order to prevent other states from realizing their policy objectives. As power configurations are usually dynamic and change frequently, states are not much interested in investing in institutional strengthening.

Intergovernmental initiatives have developed over the past decades in response to a perceived lack of effectiveness of existing multilateral institutions, notably the United Nations in dealing with transnational and global problems. Shallow multilateralism is a form of multilateralism where only the institutional shell remains, but where the normative substance was lost.6 Hard law is declining towards soft law. A growing number of actors and the complexity of matters, become increasingly difficult to reach binding, precise and enforceable agreements. Soft law suits the interests of many actors in multilateral institutions as it keeps commitment low and thus allows for swift and opportunistic responses to changing power equations and new policy issues. Within this framework and institutional environment the two partners of the IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) partnership have repeatedly declared their intention to transform globalization into a process with a human face. Their thrust for a socially more equitable process of globalization entails a vocal opposition against any neoliberal agendas, nevertheless, this article will not explore further the impact of this rising powers against established Western powers. While the IBSA partnership between India Brazil and South Africa fits well into the concept of shallow multilateralism, the exclusive Brazil-South Africa partnership can be depicted as a form of interregionalism.7 Interregionalism in a wider sense includes the continental dialogues between two regional powers representing a regional group (MERCOSUR and SADC) or without representing the group, given their status the regional powers can act as continental superpowers. However, why the Brazil South Africa cooperation is exclusive and why we did not include India in our analysis?

To begin with, after the 50th General Assembly of the United Nations in New York in 2003, where India, Brazil and South Africa deployed a wide range of activities to lend substance to the trilateral cooperation and soon after the Brazilian Summit Declaration in 2006, the Brazilian President Ignacio Luis da Silva “Lula” and his South African counterpart Thabo Mbeki reaffirmed their commitment to the promotion of peace, security and human rights. Second, Brazil and South Africa have common standpoints regarding non-proliferation and disarmament, quite the contrary India was the only one from the partnership who enriched its nuclear arsenal. In addition, Brazil and South Africa are interested in avoiding the extension of national crises in their regions as democratic stability is a precondition for the economic development for their regions.8 On the contrary to India-Pakistan hostility, Brazil and South Africa have not involved in armed conflicts and any regional dispute. Third, Brazil and

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7 RULAND Jurgen, BECHLE Karsten (2010): Interregionalism without regions: IBSA as a form of shallow multilateralism (to be published), pp 158.
South Africa view regional power bases in the form of integration schemes such as the South African Development Community and the African Union or MERCOSUR and the Union of South American Nations (UNISAR) as pivotal to their global ambitions.

The Interregional Partners

Brazil

Brazil’s position of dominance in South America is a product of its geography, population and economic status as well as of its military capacity has shaped its sense of distinctiveness from the rest of the region.

Brazilian foreign policy has involved historically around an axis of diplomacy which represents the relations within relatively equal states in South America. In order to overcome its relative weakness within the international system, Brazil has utilized multilateralism as means of enhancing its status as a global player. Our concern here is not a detailed analysis of Brazilian foreign policy but the substance and change that President Lula gave to its nature. Despite the fact that Lula government has adopted an orthodox macroeconomic recipe, quite one resembling the Cardoso policies, in the foreign affairs moved significantly towards a more autonomy-focused strategy.9 During President Lula’s first government (2002–2006), these apparently contradictory objectives—a conservative economic agenda and an increasingly developmentalist foreign policy—were stretched to their limits, without amounting to a definitive break. The potential particularity of Brazilian foreign policy is what Marco Antonio Vieira called “pragmatic resilience”.10 In this concept Lula has utilized a new set of cooperative arrangements between Middle Power states, which pooled together their material and principal assets to achieve clear national interests. Brazil’s commitment and active involvement in multilateral institutions has been constant since the end of the nineteenth century. Brazil sought to raise the profile of its activities in the political realm and in trade negotiations, attempting to counter its conservative position through diplomatic activism in areas that the Cardoso did not insist upon. A more straightforward position backing UN system reform—especially the enlargement of the Security Council, to which Brazil placed its own candidacy—was also taken. The apparent changes in the Lula administration had some guidelines: 1) to contribute to the search for greater equilibrium and to attenuate unilateralism; 2) to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations in order to increase the country’s weight in political and economic negotiations on an international level; 3) to deepen relations so as to benefit from possibly greater economic, financial, technological and cultural exchanges. These guidelines implied precise emphases: 1) an intensification of relations with emerging countries such as India, China, Russia and South Africa; 2) an important role at the Doha Round of the WTO, as was the case in other international negotiations and campaigning for the reform of the UN Security Council, including a permanent seat for Brazil.

Over the past years the United Nations has faced increasing pressures for institutional reform and for democratization of its decision making process. After the end of the Cold War, Brazil supported the enforcement of multilateral institutions, particularly the expansion of the UN peacekeeping operations. Regarding the UN reinforcement, Brazil had pursued an agenda of three core principles involving around the strengthening of the multilateral norms, the need to reestablish the frontier between peacekeeping and peacenforcement and the process of the decision making within the United Nations Security Council. The latter goal has been one of the key priorities of the Lula administration, who insisted on the need to give substance internationally to democratic values. Finally, Brazil has expressed its special concern at the definition of coercive actions under the Chapter VII and has strongly defended the principle of non interventionism and pacific resolution of disputes.

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9 THE ECONOMIST (2009), November 14.
Nevertheless, Lula’s foreign policy making has been involved around a complex decision making process into which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers South America should placed on top of the foreign policy agenda and on the other hand, the Lula team have been more active in interregional politics. Meanwhile Lula is supportive of the view that Brazil should expand its responsibility for the maintenance of political stability on South America through the promotion of stronger democratic norms and institutions.

Since 2003, Brazil has interfered in crises in Venezuela, Bolivia and Haiti. Whereas in the first two, Brazil seek to find a political viable solution, in Haiti lead one of the most emergent UN peacekeeping operations (MINUSTAH). Lula’s foreign policy, seeking to increase its international and regional status, has taken on a pre-eminent role in Haiti. Here the country has accepted the command of a UN Special Mission to establish peace in Haiti by sending a contingent of some 1200 soldiers. Even in this situation, we cannot identify an action that implies goal changes in relation to the country’s traditional foreign policy, but there may be a change from the autonomy through-distance period. The sending of troops to Haiti is part of Brazil’s tradition, taking into account the country’s peacekeeping role back in 1956, under President Kubitschek, when it sent forces to Sinai, having followed through in Angola and other smaller countries (Yugoslavia and East Timor). The presence in Haiti, approved in 2003, is linked to the tradition of Brazilian diplomacy of co-operating in policies that seek to promote international (Sinai) or national (Angola) peace. In Venezuela, Brazil tried to settle the Chavez-opposition differences under a democratic framework and in Bolivia along with Argentina mediated the Losada-Menza talks. In Haiti, the MINUSTAH operation was involved around reforming Haitian national police, assisting the transitional government in disarmament and reintegration programmes. Moreover, Brazil has launched a Middle East Initiative and President Lula has visited Syria, Lebanon, Libya and United Arab Emirates. In addition, within the IBSA framework, Brazil and its partners condemned the extensive use of force in the 2006 Summer War in Lebanon and the destruction of the country’s infrastructure.

Finally and most recently, after the military coup in Honduras, the exiled President Manuel Zelaya seek asylum in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. The Honduras coup touched a sensitive nerve in Brasilia, where given its long battled military rule, Lula was in mood to consider any ambiguity in that case. The de facto President Roberto Michelleti rejected the plan backed by the OAS (Organization of American States) and endorsed by Brazil under which Zelaya would serve the rest of its tenure until January. Brasilia granted asylum to Zelaya which means that under the Vienna Convention, the Honduran ex President should abstain from any political declaration.

The Lula administration has been following in this case its doctrine of pragmatic resilience, having strongly support multilateral institutional solutions and abstaining from taking a concrete stance which could take off Brazil’s image as a power broker.

South Africa

South Africa is regarded as an emerging power, the key defining characteristic of which is the aspiration to play a dynamic and constructive role beyond its borders. In order to play that role, a secure domestic base, a sizable economic capability and a decent enabling environment is required. Although originally democratic socialist in orientation, the ANC shifted its policy upon taking office to embrace a neoliberal agenda that put emphasis on opening markets.

Given the lack of smaller governments of effective hard power and soft power resources in order to protect themselves from the detritus of civil wars, poverty, crime, smuggling, trafficking etc, South Africa, under Thabo Mbeki grew increasingly confident in its position as the dominant player in Southern Africa and wider African region. In addition, despite

11 TIME MAGAZINE, Brazil Reluctantly Takes Key Role in Honduras Dispute, September. 30, 2009
12 ARNSON, C. Weak Institutions and the Honduras Crisis, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 2009.
the combination of adverse circumstances both in southern African region and Africa which complicates Pretoria’s attempt to foster a constructive role, South Africa is perceived a the hegemonic power in Africa by Western powers.

South African foreign policy under Thabo Mbeki had a central role in reconstructing the former Organization of African Unity into the African Union and the launch of the New Economic Policy for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) which both initiatives helped underway for Africa’s building of liberal governance. In theory NEPAD and AU symbolized a new African premise build on good governance, human rights and rejection of authoritarian norms. Supported by Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, originally an Mbeki brainchild and product of the so-called African Renaissance, the NEPAD supported African solutions to Africa’s problems. In reality however as we shall see, in the most enduring crisis in Southern Africa region in Zimbabwe, South Africa’s policy have been contradicting. Mbeki’s Zimbabwe policy must be seen its historical context. The country’s foreign policy makers felt that South Africa has been humbled in its previous intervention attempts under Nelson Mandela. The Nigerian episode in 1995 regarding the condemnation of the Ogoni in Niger Delta and the intra-SADC acrimony in Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998, where South Africa sought a diplomatic solution to the problem and Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola assisted Laurent Kabila. Within this context Mbeki viewed the Zimbabwe crisis as regional problem and his professed willingness to mediate the crisis rather than overtly to condemn Robert Mugabe was a part of a mindset of presenting South Africa as a regional hegemon. Nonetheless, the view which was held widely was that South Africa is a hegemonic power with the means to influence outcomes in Zimbabwe and elsewhere wider in the region. On the other hand many commentators have argued, stating that South Africa’s view as a hegemonic power was exaggerated. According to Newman and Evans a hegemon’s ability to lead is derived as much from what it stands for as how it seeks to achieve its goals. With regards to the South African foreign policy under Mbeki, this has created a fundamental contradiction on the one hand South Africa seemed to promoting multilateral institutions as well as its role in the formation of NEPAD and AU, while on the other hand many felt that the policy towards Zimbabwe should more outspoken.

The crisis in Zimbabwe after the elections of 2008, where the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) disputed the outcome and charged the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) for making an electoral fraud using violence. The SADC couched the crisis as a political battle between Pan-Africanism and neocolonialism, nevertheless, adopted a more partisan posture as the election crisis of 2008 unfolded. However, from many points of view the SADC remains loyal to the ZANU-PF and failed to condemn overtly Robert Mugabe for unleashing an orchestrated campaign of violence or the electoral irregularities. The SADC has ignored its own verdict of observer mission and soon after the negotiating deadlock of the power sharing talks conducted under the SADC framework; it supported a solution under which the ZANU-PF retained control of central security ministries.

In his approach to Zimbabwe crisis, Mbeki was guided by South Africa’s own experience in conflict resolution and mediation and his doctrine of “helping Africans duplicate South Africa’s model of power-sharing and reconciliation”. In trying to export the South African model in Zimbabwe, Mbeki overlooked the peculiar nature of the country, with Zimbabwe being the world’s fastest shrinking economy between.

2002 and 2004, ridden by poverty and inflation. In addition, the Zimbabwe state retained the monopoly of state power and its leaders the loyalty of armed forces, failing to label the country as a rogue state or into the obvious categories of statehood. Moreover, there was little chance in seeing Robert Mugabe in the mould of a de Clerk who recognized that the system existed had entered a cul-de-sac from which there must have been a decisive break. Mbeki adopted a kind of multilateralism that assumed that there must was some kind of common ground between the MDC and ZANU-PF, but this seems until now to be rather a dogmatic perversion and a panacea.

The difficulty with this strategy of so called quiet diplomacy, was that Mbeki trying to stay in line with African colleagues, hostile to intervention strategies, risks disillusioning Western liberals who argued that this kind of solidarity between Mbeki and Mugabe profoundly harms South Africa’s profile as multilateralist, dedicated to the international institutions and human rights champion. Moreover, Mbeki’s failure to condemn authoritarianism in Zimbabwe discredited its own initiatives and made them appear hypocritical exercises in window dressing.

Critical views on the legitimacy of multilateralism

Critical commentators note that small and medium sized states seek to enhance their international standing by assuming the role of mediators. Thus, it can be said that mediating saves them from having to take sides when pressed to do so in a conflict. In addition, Cooper states that the capacity of middle powers to increase their global influence and acceptance through the employment of their specific capabilities (Niche Diplomacy). Touval and Zartman note that mediation by medium sized states appears often to have been motivated by the desire to enhance their influence and prestige. For instance, Brazil to lead the UN Mission in Haiti in order to enhance its chances to become a permanent UNSC, while South Africa participated with 1500 troops each in the peace missions of DRC and Burundi.

From this perspective middle powers such as Brazil and South Africa could be attributed as functional leaders which are actually a specification of leadership in certain areas. Thus, while regional leadership is more focused on comparative high military and economic capabilities, functional leadership requires expertise in a specific issue or area.

On the other hand, neorealists consider international institutions to be merely puppets of the superpowers. From their perspective a multipolar system can be the result of the emergence of regional unipolarities against the superpower. Therefore, despite the fact that Brazil and South Africa enjoy increasing regional influence they are still located in the periphery of the current world system. Neoliberal institutionalism ascribes only limited importance to institutions in view of the tendencies to change within the international relations. Brazil and South Africa use global governance institutions and summits to build new coalitions to pursue common interests. They use international organizations as platforms to challenge the legitimacy of the present international order and to change the existing dominant norms.

Nevertheless, the proliferation of the kind of partnerships like IBSA or bilateral arrangements in the context of Brazil-South Africa relationship has rendered the international architecture increasingly complex and unrepresentative, and raises questions regarding their legitimacy. Most of these state-to-state arrangements seem to have no mechanisms of accountability or to keep any public records of their meetings and discussions. Another criticism as fomented by Forman and Segaar concerns the so-called “forum-shopping” of these countries that can pick the mechanisms that fit better their individual political agenda.

Conclusion and Perspectives

Brazil along with South Africa has been explicit in its intention to assume new responsibilities regarding regional security, the defense of democracy and the
consolidation in the regional integrations schemes. For Brazil as discussed above one of its main motivations has been the reform of the UN system, especially the reform of the Security Council. On the other hand South Africa has not been so vocal in promoting a larger UNSC. When it comes to the reform of the UN Brazil has invited South Africa to join the group of the countries lobbying for a permanent UNSC membership. However, South Africa had to abide by the AU guidelines preventing it from fielding its candidacy.

It’s evident though that the promotion of Brazil of closer South-South coalitions and especially with African Nations marks a turn in Brazilian foreign policy with regards to its intention to (re)build up the country’s African identity. However, the scramble for a concrete South-South cooperation could be at least a costly venture for Brazil partly due to the fact that the country must assume the consequences of collective action.

Furthermore, on the one hand, Brazil’s intellectual circles do not value military deterrence as a source of international prestige while on the other it will become more difficult for Brazil to sustain his position if it wishes to expand its responsibilities in regional and world security. The South African foreign policy under Mbeki has been highlighted a disjuncture between rhetoric and reality. South Africa’s global reputation has been tarnished by the Zimbabwe episodes. Pretoria’s global standing has suffered by its inability to act as a guarantor of democratic values within its own neighborhood. It remains to be seen the future of South Africa’s foreign policy under Jacob Zuma and how his going to handle all these foreign policy dilemmas. President Zuma has proved notably pragmatic caretaker of South Africa’s foreign policy and he has respected the country’s commitment to democratic institutions.

However, the future of South Africa’s foreign affairs seems less clear, like Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma aims to strengthen the African prestige and to keep the warm relations with the United States. Unlike, Mbeki, Zuma has been more vocal in his position regarding Zimbabwe and the human rights violations. Brazil face major challenges ahead, the Lula administration came to office strongly committed to the idea of change in the domestic front and it raised high expectations in terms of what it could achieve through multilateral institutions. Finally, the expectations are raised for the future of the Brazil’s Presidential politics since President Lula has identified Dilma Rousseff his chief of staff as his preferred successor for the forthcoming elections.

Resumo: Este artigo examinará dois dos maiores países emergentes do mundo, o Brasil e a África do Sul, o alavancar e a promoção de suas estratégias cooperativas de reforma dos institutos como o Conselho de Segurança da ONU. O artigo tentará examinar a natureza instrumental da política exterior brasileira e sul-africana dentro do quadro de ambos os países' comprometimento com a multilateralismo e se este foi subindo como parte de um novo tipo de multilateralismo superficial ou um renascimento da regionalismo do Sul. Além disso, em relação a recentes crises na HN e na Zimbábue, tentaremos oferecer uma avaliação crítica do status global de ambos os países e seus esforços para promover valores democráticos em níveis regionais e sub-regionais.

Abstract: This article will examine two of the world’s emerging middle powers Brazil and South Africa, the rise and promulgation of their cooperative strategies to reform institutions such as the United Nations Security Council. The article tries to examine the instrumental nature of South African and Brazilian foreign policy within the framework of both countries’ commitment to multilateralism and if this has been rising as part of a new form of shallow multilateralism or a regenerated regionalism of the South. Moreover, with regards to recent crises in Honduras and Zimbabwe, we will try to offer a critical evaluation of both countries global standing and their effort to promote democratic values in regional and sub-regional levels.

Palavras-chave: Brasil; África do Sul; Multilateralismo; Ordem Mundial; Cooperação Sul-Sul
Key words: Brazil; South Africa; Multilateralism; World Order; South-South Cooperation